UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4899
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LONNIE WILLIAM CRISP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:94-cr-00044-GRA-1)
Submitted: January 24, 2011 Decided: February 24, 2011
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. William Norman
Nettles, United States Attorney, David Calhoun Stephens,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lonnie William Crisp appeals his revocation of
supervised release and forty month sentence. Counsel has filed
a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), certifying that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. We affirm.
Crisp was convicted in 1994 of two counts of armed
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1988) and
sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised
release. His term of supervision commenced in June 2008. In
2009, Crisp pled no contest in state court to kidnapping,
carjacking, and assault charges — a grade A supervised release
violation. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment on the
state charges, with instructions that he be able to serve the
sentence concurrent with any federal sentence on the supervised
release violation.
Crisp contested the basis of the charges against him
at his supervised release revocation hearing, though he admitted
that he pled no contest. Although Crisp requested that he begin
serving his supervised release violation sentence immediately,
the district court revoked supervised release and imposed a
forty month sentence to be served consecutive to his state
sentence.
2
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). This
court will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In
determining whether a revocation sentence is “plainly
unreasonable,” the court first assesses the sentence for
unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that [it] employ[s] in [its] review
of original sentences.” Id. at 438.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2009) factors relevant to a supervised release
revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006); Crudup, 461 F.3d at
440. Although the court need not explain the reasons for
imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
imposes an original sentence, it “still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547
(internal quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
3
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will this court “then decide whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
Here, we have reviewed the record and conclude that
the district court did not impose an unreasonable sentence, let
alone one that is plainly so. Crisp received a sentence within
the Guidelines range for his offense and the court offered an
adequate explanation to preserve the sentence upon appellate
review. Furthermore, we note that the Guidelines explicitly
instruct a district court to impose a consecutive sentence for a
supervised release violation, even where the same conduct forms
the basis for both the underlying sentence and the supervised
release violation sentence. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.3(f) (2009).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and conclude that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. This
court requires that counsel inform Crisp in writing of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Crisp requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
4
Crisp. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
5