UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5123
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS ALLEN HAZELWOOD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00225-WO-1)
Submitted: February 7, 2011 Decided: February 25, 2011
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert I. O’Hale, CLIFFORD, CLENDENIN, O’HALE & JONES, LLP,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. John W. Stone, Jr.,
Acting United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Douglas Allen Hazelwood appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from
his residence. Because we conclude the warrant in this case was
adequately supported by probable cause, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
This court reviews the district court’s factual
findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear
error and the court’s legal determinations de novo. United
States v. Day, 591 F.3d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). When a
district court denies a suppression motion, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Matthews, 591 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2009). We
further give due regard to the district court’s opportunity to
judge the credibility of witnesses “for it is the role of the
district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility
during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United States v. Abu
Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
In reviewing the validity of a search warrant, the
relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983); see United
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States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting
that magistrate’s probable cause determination is entitled to
“great deference”). “The validity of a search warrant obtained
by state officers is to be tested by the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment . . ., not by state law standards, when the
admissibility of evidence in federal court is at issue.” United
States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 614 (4th Cir. 1994).
The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants: (1) be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2) contain a
particularized description of the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized, and (3) be based on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation. Id. at 617. The
magistrate reviewing the warrant application is required “simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The crucial element
determining probable cause is “whether it is reasonable to
believe that the items to be seized will be found in the place
to be searched.” United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1582
(4th Cir. 1993).
We have reviewed the warrant, supporting affidavit,
and record of the suppression hearing below and conclude that
this warrant was adequately supported by probable cause. We are
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unpersuaded by Hazelwood’s contention that the officer’s failure
to determine the identity of the owners or residents of the home
defeats a finding of probable cause, as there was ample evidence
before the magistrate from which she could find a substantial
likelihood that contraband would be found in Hazelwood’s
residence.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the district
court’s memorandum opinion and order denying Hazelwood’s motion
to suppress, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
United States v. Hazelwood, No. 1:08-cr-00225-WO-1 (Sept. 26,
2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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