UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4245
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CALVIN MANUEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:04-cr-00848-PMD-1)
Submitted: January 4, 2011 Decided: February 25, 2011
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Rhett DeHart,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Calvin Manuel appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing an
eight-month prison sentence, followed by two years of supervised
release. Manuel’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
revocation of Manuel’s release and the imposition of sentence
was unreasonable. Although informed of his right to do so,
Manuel has not filed a supplemental brief. The Government has
also declined to file a brief. After a thorough review of the
record, we affirm.
We review the district court’s decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992). The
district court need only find a violation of a condition of
supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). We review factual determinations
informing the conclusion that a violation occurred for clear
error. United States v. Carothers, 337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th
Cir. 2003); United States v. Whalen, 82 F.3d 528, 532 (1st Cir.
1996) (finding district court’s credibility determinations
concerning evidence presented at a supervised release revocation
hearing not reviewable on appeal).
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Here, Manuel was charged with possession of cocaine
base. The district court found Manuel’s proffer that he did not
know about the drugs in his car not credible. In addition, the
court provided reasoning for its determination, and the facts
supported the court’s conclusion. In addition to the reasoning
proferred by the Government and adopted by the court, a razor
with cocaine residue was found on top of Manuel’s phone in an
open compartment in his car. Thus, we easily conclude that a
preponderance of the evidence supported the district court’s
findings. The district court was, therefore, statutorily
authorized to revoke supervised release and impose a prison
term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Manuel next contends that his sentence was
unreasonable. A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making this review, we “follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that
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[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
with some necessary modifications to take into account the
unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A sentence imposed upon revocation of release is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter Seven policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors that it is permitted to consider. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. A sentence imposed upon
revocation of release is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence
is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we
“decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.
“[T]he court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
When imposing sentence, the district court must
provide individualized reasoning:
The sentencing judge should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority. . . . Where the defendant . . . presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence
than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a
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district judge should address the party’s arguments
and explain why he has rejected those arguments.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The
Carter rationale applies to revocation hearings; however, “[a]
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, the district court considered Manuel’s arguments
for home confinement and rejected them. The court explicitly
considered the Guidelines range as well as many of the statutory
factors that it was permitted to consider when arriving at a
sentence. In this regard, the court mentioned Manuel’s
culpability and responsibility for the bind he was in, the need
to keep Manuel’s sentence in line with others in the same
situation, the fact that Manuel’s personal circumstances were
not out of the ordinary, and Manuel’s unsatisfactory conduct
while on supervised release.
Moreover, Manuel faces a very heavy burden in
challenging his sentence. Even if he could show that his
sentence was unreasonable, he would still need to show that it
was plainly unreasonable. A sentence is “plainly unreasonable”
if it “run[s] afoul of clearly settled law.” Thompson, 595 F.3d
at 549. Manuel has flatly failed to make such a showing. He
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was sentenced at the bottom of his correctly calculated
Guidelines range.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record in this case for meritorious claims and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Manuel in writing of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Manuel requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Manuel. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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