United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
__________________________
RICHARD ERICKSON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
Respondent.
__________________________
2010-3096
__________________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in AT3443070016-M-1.
___________________________
Decided: February 28, 2011
___________________________
MATHEW B. TULLY, Tully Rinckey PLLC, of Albany,
New York, argued for petitioner. Of counsel were
STEVEN L. HERRICK; and MATTHEW D. ESTES, of Washing-
ton, DC.
L. MISHA PREHEIM, Attorney, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent. With
him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney
General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and BRIAN M.
SIMKIN, Assistant Director.
ERICKSON v. USPS 2
__________________________
Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and LINN, Circuit Judges.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemploy-
ment Rights Act (“USERRA”), prohibits public and pri-
vate employers from discriminating against their
employees on the basis of military service. 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311. It also guarantees noncareer servicemembers
reemployment rights upon the completion of their mili-
tary commitments. Id. §§ 4312-15. USERRA does not,
however, protect an employee who leaves a civilian job to
take a career position in the military. See Woodman v.
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 258 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2001). For that reason, a question arises in cases such as
this one as to whether an employee who leaves his civilian
position for military service has left his civilian job to
serve a temporary period of military service, or whether
he has left his civilian job to embark on a military career.
The answer to that question depends on whether the
employee’s military service is properly characterized as a
“temporary non-career hiatus” in a civilian career, or
whether the employee has clearly manifested his inten-
tion to abandon his civilian career in favor of a career in
the military. Moravec v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 393 F.3d
1263, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, the Board determined
that petitioner Richard Erickson abandoned his civilian
career with the United States Postal Service in favor of a
military career. The question before us is whether the
Board’s determination is supported by substantial evi-
dence.
I
3 ERICKSON v. USPS
The facts were set forth in our first opinion in this
case, Erickson v. United States Postal Service (Erickson I),
571 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We summarize the
facts briefly as they pertain to the narrow issue before us.
Mr. Erickson joined the Postal Service in 1988. In
2000, the Postal Service terminated him for excessive use
of military leave. Throughout his tenure with the Postal
Service, Mr. Erickson was a member of the National
Guard. Mr. Erickson’s commitments in the Guard often
required his absence from the Postal Service. “Between
1991 and 1995, he was absent from his Postal Service
position for a total of more than 22 months, and between
1996 and the date of his removal in 2000, he worked at
the Postal Service for no more than four days.” Erickson
I, 571 F.3d at 1366.
While on military leave in January 2000, Mr. Erick-
son spoke by telephone with Roslyn Warner, a labor
relations specialist at the Postal Service, regarding his
federal civilian career. Ms. Warner summarized the
conversation in an e-mail that she sent to a supervisor.
She wrote that “[Mr. Erickson] told me he is staying in
the military until his orders expire . . . he likes the mili-
tary and said that he did not like working for the [Postal
Service]. He doesn’t care for the way they treat their
employees.” Mr. Erickson testified before the Board that
when Ms. Warner asked him why he did not resign from
his position with the Postal Service, he replied that he did
not wish to quit and that he believed his job was with the
Postal Service. Following the conversation between Mr.
Erickson and Ms. Warner, the Postal Service issued a
notice of proposed removal to Mr. Erickson, citing exces-
sive use of leave as the reason for his termination. Mr.
Erickson did not respond to that notification, and the
ERICKSON v. USPS 4
Postal Service issued a final decision terminating Mr.
Erickson in March 2000.
Mr. Erickson appealed his termination to the Board.
He alleged that his termination violated USERRA’s
antidiscrimination provisions and that the agency failed
to reemploy him after his military service ended, as
required by USERRA. The administrative judge who was
assigned to the case found that Mr. Erickson had aban-
doned his civilian career and accordingly had waived his
USERRA rights. The full Board affirmed the administra-
tive judge’s decision, but on a different ground. In finding
that Mr. Erickson was not entitled to relief under
USERRA’s antidiscrimination provision, the Board held
that Mr. Erickson had failed to meet his initial burden to
prove that his military status was a motivating or sub-
stantial factor in his employer’s action. Erickson v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 108 M.S.P.R. 494 (2008). As to his reem-
ployment claim, the Board determined that Mr. Erickson
had failed to comply with USERRA’s relevant procedural
requirements. Id.
Mr. Erickson appealed to this court. We affirmed the
Board’s treatment of Mr. Erickson’s reemployment claim
but reversed the Board on the discrimination claim for the
reasons set forth in our prior opinion. We remanded the
case so that the full Board could consider the validity of
the ground on which the administrative judge had upheld
the agency’s action—that Mr. Erickson had waived his
USERRA protections by abandoning his career with the
Postal Service in favor of a military career. Erickson I,
571 F.3d at 1368.
On remand, the full Board concluded that Mr. Erick-
son had waived his USERRA rights. The Board pointed
to a number of factors that persuaded it that Mr. Erickson
5 ERICKSON v. USPS
had abandoned his career with the Postal Service. First,
the Board looked at the length of Mr. Erickson’s active
service in the military and the fact that he was serving
his fifth consecutive voluntary reenlistment when the
agency removed him. Second, the Board found Mr. Erick-
son’s “expressed preference for military over civilian
service especially significant.” Third, the Board relied on
the fact that Mr. Erickson failed to respond to the notice
of proposed removal or otherwise to contest his removal
until five years after he received the removal notice.
Erickson v. U. S. Postal Serv., 113 M.S.P.R. 41, 44-45
(2010).
II
Mr. Erickson argues that substantial evidence does
not support the Board’s finding that he abandoned his
civilian career and therefore waived his USERRA protec-
tions. We agree.
We addressed the waiver doctrine, as applied to vet-
erans’ reemployment rights, in Woodman v. Office of
Personnel Management, 258 F.3d. 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Although that case was decided under USERRA’s prede-
cessor statute, the Veterans’ Reemployment Rights Act of
1974, both statutes draw the same distinction between
career and noncareer service. See id. at 1372. In Wood-
man, a civilian employee had left his civilian position in
order to serve on active duty with the National Guard and
had served for 14 years in that capacity. During that
period, he “actively sought service extensions” and ulti-
mately served long enough that he was eligible for re-
tirement from the military. Id. at 1378. The Board held
that the employee’s actions justified an inference that he
had abandoned his civilian job in favor of a career in the
military. This court upheld that determination. We
ERICKSON v. USPS 6
explained that the employee’s actions “created a de facto
resignation by indicating to [his employer] that he never
intended to return to his civilian position.” Id. at 1379.
In Moravec v. Office of Personnel Management, 393
F.3d 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Dowling v. Office of Per-
sonnel Management, 393 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2004), a
pair of cases decided on the same day, we applied the
waiver doctrine to federal employees’ claims that their
years of active duty service with the National Guard
should count toward their years of federal service when
computing their Civil Service Retirement Service annuity.
In each case, the employee had held a civilian position
with either the Army or the National Guard. Prior to
beginning active duty service with the National Guard,
each employee formally separated from his civilian posi-
tion instead of asking to be placed on leave-without-pay
status. Upon separation, each employee withdrew his
personal contributions to his civilian retirement account.
Following his separation from his civilian position, Mr.
Moravec served for 16 years on active duty before rejoin-
ing the civilian workforce. Following his separation from
civilian service, Mr. Dowling served for 12 years on active
military duty. Each of them returned to work for his
previous civilian employer after leaving active duty
service. The Board determined that both employees had
abandoned their civilian careers, and this court affirmed
that determination. Because both Mr. Moravec and Mr.
Dowling had abandoned their civilian careers, the years
they spent with the National Guard were not creditable
toward their civilian retirement accounts. Moravec, 393
F.3d at 1266-68; Dowling, 393 F.3d at 1263-64.
The reemployment provisions of section 4312 of
USSERA apply only if the period of cumulative military
service (excluding exempted periods) does not exceed five
7 ERICKSON v. USPS
years. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(2). In Erickson I, we held that
the five-year cap for reemployment in section 4312 also
applies to section 4311’s antidiscrimination provision in
situations such as Mr. Erickson’s. We explained that the
five-year limit applies where “the alleged discrimination
consists of the employee’s removal because of his military-
related absence; otherwise, the five-year limit on an
employer’s obligation to rehire an employee who left work
to serve in the military would be meaningless.” 571 F.3d
at 1369.
Importantly, Mr. Erickson’s period of military service
did not exceed the five-year limit, taking into account the
statutory exclusions. See Erickson I, 571 F.3d at 1369-70.
The Postal Service, however, apparently believed that his
military service had exceeded the five-year period and
predicated his removal on that assumption. Thus, the
Postal Service’s stated reason for removing Mr. Erick-
son—excessive use of military leave—was improper. Id.
By statute, he was entitled to retain his USERRA antidis-
crimination and reemployment rights until the period of
his military service exceeded the five-year cap. To be
sure, even when an employee falls within the five-year
period in which he would otherwise retain his USERRA
rights, he may abandon his civilian career and the accom-
panying USERRA protections. See Moravec, 393 F.3d at
1269. In that setting, however, abandonment can be
found only if the circumstances demonstrate a clear
intention on the employee’s part to abandon his civilian
career in favor of a career in the military.
In this case, the Board relied on three pieces of evi-
dence to support its finding of abandonment: the length of
the period that Mr. Erickson was away from his civilian
position, his failure to contest his separation at the time
he received the notice, and his expressed dissatisfaction
ERICKSON v. USPS 8
with the Postal Service as compared to the military.
When considered against the totality of the circumstances
of this case, however, that evidence does not provide
substantial support for the Board’s conclusion that Mr.
Erickson manifested a clear intention to abandon his
civilian position with the Postal Service.
As we explained in Woodman, the duration of an em-
ployee’s military service is frequently relevant to the
abandonment inquiry. The inquiry is a factual one, and
there is no minimum period of military service that will
trigger an assumption that the employee has decided to
abandon his civilian position and thus waive his USERRA
rights. The employee in Woodman was in military service
and away from his civilian position for 14 consecutive
years. 258 F.3d at 1374. The employees in Moravec and
Dowling were absent for 16 and 12 years, respectively.
See Dowling, 393 F.3d at 1261; Moravec, 393 F.3d at
1265. Mr. Erickson was absent for nearly four consecu-
tive years at one point and approximately two years at
another point. Mr. Erickson’s period of military service
was considerably shorter than the periods held to support
a finding of abandonment in Woodman, Moravec, and
Dowling. Moreover, and importantly, Mr. Erickson’s
absence did not exceed the five-year statutory limit (tak-
ing exempted periods into account) at the time of his
removal. Because the five-year period provides a distinct
termination point for USERRA’s reemployment rights,
the enactment of that statutory period makes it reason-
able to assume that, absent clear evidence to the contrary,
employees who have not exceeded that period do not
intend to abandon their civilian positions. 1
1 Like Mr. Erickson, Mr. Moravec had not exceeded
USERRA’s five-year limit on military service. 393 F.3d at
1267. However, Mr. Moravec was in a somewhat different
9 ERICKSON v. USPS
In finding that he intended to abandon his civilian ca-
reer, the Board also relied on Mr. Erickson’s failure to
contest his removal for a period of six years. USERRA
provides a window of time during which noncareer ser-
vicemembers must assert their section 4312 reemploy-
ment rights. 38 U.S.C. § 4312(e)(1). By contrast, there is
no statutory timeframe during which a section 4311
discrimination claim must be asserted, and there is no
statute of limitations on filing a USERRA complaint or
claim. Id. § 4327(b). Congress thus plainly chose not to
place a limit on the period within which a noncareer
servicemember would be permitted to assert a claim
under section 4311. Because an employee who is in
military service retains his USERRA antidiscrimination
rights despite the passage of time, an employee’s failure
to promptly challenge an adverse action by his employer
should not be given undue weight in the abandonment
inquiry. While an extensive delay in bringing a USERRA
claim might offer some support for a conclusion that the
employee has abandoned his USERRA rights, see Mo-
ravec, 393 F.3d at 1268 (employee failed to contest his
separation for 12 years), that factor is not entitled to
substantial weight in this case, particularly in light of the
fact that during most of the intervening period, Mr.
Erickson was on active duty in an overseas military
deployment.
Finally, the Board found Mr. Erickson’s “expressed
preference for military over civilian service especially
significant” to its determination that he abandoned his
career with the Postal Service. 113 M.S.P.R. at 44. While
position than Mr. Erickson. The bulk of Mr. Moravec’s
service occurred before 1994, the year in which USERRA
was enacted. Id. USERRA’s predecessor statute did not
contain a five-year limit, and USERRA’s five-year limit
applied only prospectively from December 12, 1994. Id.
ERICKSON v. USPS 10
an employee’s unequivocal statement that he intends to
leave his civilian job permanently is perhaps the best
evidence of an intention to abandon a civilian career (and
thus waive USERRA’s protections), Mr. Erickson’s re-
marks fall far short of such an unequivocal expression of
intent. His statement that he liked the military and did
not like the way employees were treated in the Postal
Service cannot be regarded as equivalent to an expression
of intention to resign from his civilian position. That is
particularly so in light of his testimony, not discredited by
the Board, that when Ms. Warner asked him why he did
not resign his position with the Postal Service, he replied
that he believed his “job was at the post office.”
Apart from the considerable difference in the length of
Mr. Erickson’s absence from his Postal Service position as
compared with the length of the employees’ absence in
Moravec, Dowling, or Woodman, there were other factors
in those cases that strongly supported the Board’s finding
of abandonment. The employees in both Moravec and
Dowling formally resigned their civilian positions and
withdrew their personal retirement contributions when
they left their civilian jobs. Moravec, 393 F.3d at 1268;
Dowling, 393 F.3d at 1263. The employee in Woodman
manifested his election of a military career by remaining
in active military service until he was eligible for full
military retirement benefits. Woodman, 258 F.3d at
1378. None of those factors was present in Mr. Erickson’s
case. In sum, while it was legitimate for the Board to
consider evidence such as Mr. Erickson’s failure to contest
his removal immediately and his remarks to Ms. Warner,
that evidence, viewed in context, is not sufficient to justify
an inference that Mr. Erickson intended to abandon his
civilian career. That is the case particularly in light of
the fact that, at the time of his removal, he had not ex-
ceeded the five-year period set forth in USERRA during
11 ERICKSON v. USPS
which an employee is entitled to continue in military
service without losing his USERRA reemployment rights.
We therefore vacate the Board’s determination that Mr.
Erickson abandoned his civilian career in favor of a career
in military service, and we remand to the Board for
further proceedings on Mr. Erickson’s USERRA discrimi-
nation claim.
VACATED and REMANDED