United States v. McNerney

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 11a0061p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________

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Plaintiff-Appellee, -
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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No. 09-4011
v.
,
>
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Defendant-Appellant. -
TIMOTHY MCNERNEY,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 08-00511-001—Dan A. Polster, District Judge.
Argued: January 11, 2011
Decided and Filed: March 1, 2011
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL
ARGUED: Darin G. Thompson, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Carol M. Skutnik, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Darin G. Thompson,
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Carol
M. Skutnik, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellee.
CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUHRHEINRICH, J.,
joined. ROGERS, J. (p. 13), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
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OPINION
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CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Timothy McNerney appeals his sentence of
120 months of incarceration, followed by 10 years of supervised release. The district
court sentenced Defendant on August 12, 2009 following Defendant’s guilty plea to one

1
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 2

count of receiving and distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of possession of
child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).

For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.

BACKGROUND

On February 20, 2007, federal agents obtained a valid search warrant to search
Defendant Timothy McNerney’s house based on a federal task force agent’s
determination, through an internet search, that Defendant was sharing 166 files depicting
child pornography online via a peer-to-peer file-sharing program. Pursuant to this valid
search warrant, federal agents searched Defendant’s house, and seized Defendant’s
computer. A forensic analysis of Defendant’s computer revealed that the file-sharing
program was installed on Defendant’s computer, and that numerous images of child
pornography were located in the shared folder, allowing other users of the file-sharing
program to access them. The agents also found that Defendant had backed up his files
on a second hard drive, creating an identical second copy of all of the data contained on
his computer, including the images of child pornography.

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant on December 10, 2008, for receiving and
distributing visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). On April 22, 2009, Defendant pled guilty to both counts
of the indictment. On August 13, 2009, the district court held a sentencing hearing, and
sentenced Defendant to an 120 month term of imprisonment, followed by 10 years of
supervised release.

At the sentencing hearing the district court calculated Defendant’s total offense
level at 30, and Defendant’s criminal history category at I, producing an advisory
sentence range of 97 to 121 months. In calculating Defendant’s offense level, the district
court began with a base offense level of 22, which both parties agreed was correct. The
district court proceeded to add the following enhancements: a two level enhancement for
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 3

images of prepubescent minors pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(ii); a two level
enhancement for transferring materials over the internet pursuant to U.S.S.G
§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F); a two level enhancement for using a computer in the crime pursuant
to U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(6); and a five level enhancement for having more than 600
images pursuant to U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(7), producing a total offense level of 33. The
district court then adjusted Defendant’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility,
placing Defendant’s final offense level at 30.

Regarding its computation of the number of images Defendant possessed, based
on which the district court enhanced Defendant’s offense level by five points, and which
is disputed in this appeal, the district court stated:

[T]here’s a dispute about the number of images.1 The Probation
Department has recommended an additional five levels based on the
finding that there are more than 600 images, specifically 766. The
[D]efendant has argued that there’s double counting because there are
multiple copies of the same image and, therefore, those images should be
counted only once in reaching the total . . . . Mr. McNerney had two hard
drives and many of the images are found on both hard drives . . . .
[G]iven that as the government pointed out the computer automatically
creates a mirror image of the first hard drive on the second hard drive,
and so if hard drive number one is damaged or erased all the images
would still exist on the backup hard drive in pristine form, and in my
view then we have multiple images and it’s not double counting because
we’ve got two separate hard drives and this means if one were damaged,
the [D]efendant would still have them on the other hard drive. That’s the
only reason to have them on two hard drives, so I don’t believe it’s unfair
or inappropriate to count, you know, we have image A on hard drive one
and the same image is on hard drive two, we have two separate images
and they could both be used and they are there in case one hard drive
crashes. So I don’t believe we have double counting, and given that,
there are more than 600 images in total and so the plus five applies.

(R. 30, Tr. of Sentencing Proceeding at 4-5.)

1
Although the district court and the litigants are not clear on this point, thumbnail images are not
counted separately for U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) purposes because thumbnails are not duplicate digital
images. Rather, thumbnails are simply previews of digital images that are viewable without opening the
digital folder in which the digital images are contained.
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 4

Defendant objected to the district court’s computation, and the five level
enhancement under U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(7). (Id. at 13-14.) Defendant timely appealed
his sentence.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review “de novo a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing
Guidelines.” United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir. 2005).

II. Analysis

Defendant challenges the district court’s application of a five level enhancement
to his offense level for possessing 600 or more images, pursuant to U.S.S.G
§ 2G2.2(b)(7). Section 2G2.2(b)(7) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for an
increase in a defendant’s offense level for child pornography based on the number of
images possessed as follows: “If the offense involved – (A) at least 10 images, but fewer
than 150, increase by 2 levels; (B) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300, increase by
3 levels; (C) at least 300 images, but fewer than 600, increase by 4 levels; and (D) 600
or more images, increase by 5 levels.”

Defendant contends that only unique digital images, not duplicate digital
images,2 should be counted in computing an enhancement under this provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines. This particular interpretive issue is a question of first impression
for this Court. There is also a dearth of case law on this question in other circuits.3

2
We use the term “digital image” to refer to any image saved on a digital medium, including, by
way of example, a computer hard drive, a camera memory card, a flash drive, or the internet.
We use the term “duplicate digital image” to refer to an identical copy of a digital image.
We use the term “unique digital image” to refer to a digital image of which there are no
duplicates.
We use the term “hard copy image” to refer to any printed image, including, by way of example,
a printed photograph, a picture in a magazine or book, or a videotape.
We use the term “duplicate hard copy image” to refer to an identical copy of a hard copy image.
We use the term “unique hard copy image” to refer to a hard copy image of which there are no
duplicates.
3
Three cases have raised the issue at the federal appellate level, only one of which analyzed
whether duplicate digital images are counted for U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) purposes. See United States v.
Sampson, 606 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Havens, 331 F. App’x 280, 282 (5th Cir. 2009)
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 5

A. History of § 2G2.2

As noted by several of our sister circuits, Congress has taken an active role in
creating the sentencing scheme for child pornography offenses. See, e.g., United States
v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84, 95
(2d Cir. 2010). The Child Pornography Sentencing Guidelines are “fundamentally
different from most . . . . Sentencing Guidelines are typically developed by the
Sentencing Commission using an empirical approach based on data about past
sentencing policies.” Dorvee, 604 F.3d at 95 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
349 (2007)). However, “the Commission did not use this empirical approach in
formulating the Guidelines for child pornography.” Id.

The Child Pornography Sentencing Guidelines “have been substantively
amended nine times since 1987.” Grober, 624 F.3d at 604. As Congress has placed a
“laser-like focus on the child pornography Guidelines, particularly in the last several
years,” id., the Sentencing Commission’s amendments to the Child Pornography
Guidelines have often been at Congress’ behest.

In its report entitled, “The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines,” issued
in October 2009, the United States Sentencing Commission explained that “Congress has
been particularly active over the last decade creating new offenses, increasing penalties,
and issuing directives to the [Sentencing] Commission regarding child pornography
offenses. Indeed, in 2008 [alone] the 110th Congress passed three new laws amending
child pornography statutes.” History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, Oct.2009,
at 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Sex_Offenses/
20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
Moreover, Congress’ child pornography legislation initiatives have been unambiguously
motivated by a desire to cast a wider criminal net, and impose harsher punishments for
child pornography offenses. As the Second Circuit stated, “at the direction of Congress,

(summarily dismissing the defendant’s argument that “there was evidence at trial that some of the images
he possessed were duplicates.”); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 255 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (allowing the
prosecution in that case to discount duplicate images for U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) purposes, although
neither explicitly approving of this interpretation nor analyzing the Guidelines provision).
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 6

the Sentencing Commission has amended the Guidelines under § 2G2.2 several times
since their introduction in 1987, each time recommending harsher penalties.” Dorvee,
604 F.3d at 95; see also Grober, 624 F.3d at 604-05 (stating that “[i]t is clear . . . that [in
its several amendments to the Guidelines increasing penalties for child pornography] the
Commission was constantly reacting to Congress’s (sic.) repeated directives, and the
penalties for child pornography offenses that were steadily, and often dramatically,
increasing.”).

In its recent report, the Sentencing Commission elaborated, “Congress has
demonstrated its continued interest in deterring and punishing child pornography
offenses, prompting the [Sentencing] Commission to respond to multiple public laws that
created new child pornography offenses, increased criminal penalties, directly (and
uniquely) amended the child pornography guidelines, and required the [Sentencing]
Commission to consider offender and offense characteristics for the child pornography
guidelines.” History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, supra, at 54. Specifically,

[f]or more than 30 years, and particularly in recent years, Congress has
focused attention on the scope of child pornography offenses and the
severity of penalties for child pornography offenders. Through creating
new offenses, enacting new mandatory minimums, increasing statutory
maximums, and providing directives to the [Sentencing] Commission,
Congress has repeatedly expressed its will regarding appropriate
penalties for child pornography offenders. Congress has specifically
expressed an intent to raise penalties associated with certain child
pornography offenses several times through directives to the Commission
and statutory changes aimed at increasing the guideline penalties and
reducing the incidence of downward departures for such offenses.

Id. at 6. See also United States v. Gellatly, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693, at *15-24 (D.
Neb. Jan. 5, 2009) (summarizing the history of child pornography legislation).

The Guidelines provision at issue in this case, § 2G2.2(b)(7), providing for a
sentence enhancement of between two and five levels based on the number of images
involved in the crime, was the direct product of one such Congressional initiative.
Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation
of Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”), which “made several changes with respect
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 7

to the child pornography guidelines and contained provisions by which Congress for the
first and only time to date, directly amended the guidelines.” Id. at 38. “The PROTECT
Act of 2003 instructed the Commission to amend § 2G2.2 to include the number-of-
images enhancements, which are currently codified at § 2G2.2(b)(7) and range from two
levels to five levels.” Dorvee, 604 F.3d at 95 n.6. Thus, “[i]n 2003, pursuant to the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act
(“PROTECT Act”), the Commission again revised the guidelines covering child
pornography offenses,” and added the quantity of images enhancement mandated by the
PROTECT Act. History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, supra, at 38.

Congress, in repeatedly enacting legislation regarding child pornography,
“demonstrated its continued interest in deterring and punishing child pornography
offenses.” Id. at 54. As one court explained,

[t]he clear focus of [the child pornography] legislation and concomitant
Guidelines revision is on the patent evils of child pornography and the
new dimension that computer technology adds to those evils. In
particular, the amendments to the Guidelines reflect Congressional
concerns that pedophiles, including those who use the Internet, are using
child pornographic and obscene material to desensitize children to sexual
activity, to convince children that sexual activity involving children is
normal, and to entice children to engage in sexual activity.

Gellatly, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2693, at * 24 (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Simply put, Congress sought to protect “[t]he primary victims of the crime of
possession of child pornography,” namely, “the exploited children.” Id.; see also
Connection Distrib. Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (stating
that in enacting numerous pieces of legislation regarding child pornography, “Congress
[was] attempt[ing] to prevent the exploitation of children through pornography.”).

Despite Congress’ significant purpose in prohibiting the dissemination of child
pornography, some courts and commentators have questioned the wisdom of the
congressionally-directed Child Pornography Sentencing Guideline because they were
the product of Congressional mandate rather than the Commission’s preferred
systematic, empirical approach. See, e.g., Grober, 624 F.3d at 608 (Ҥ 2G2.2 was not
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 8

developed pursuant to the Commission’s institutional role and based on empirical data
and national experience, but instead was developed largely pursuant to congressional
directives.”); Dorvee, 604 F.3d at 95, 97 (stating that the § 2G2.2 Guidelines are
“fundamentally different from most and that, unless applied with great care, can lead to
unreasonable sentences,” and describing § 2G2.2 as irrational); Gellatly, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2693, at *10 (stating that in areas such as child pornography, “[w]hen Guidelines
are not the result of the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role,
such as when they are not based on an empirical approach, but are instead keyed to or
guided by statutory directives . . . the Guideline ranges of imprisonment for those crimes
are a less reliable appraisal of a fair sentence.”); (R. 21-3, Troy Stabenow,
Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the
Child Pornography Guidelines at 3 (explaining that “the changes to the child
pornography guidelines are not the product of an empirically demonstrated need for
consistently tougher sentencing. Instead, these changes are largely the consequence of
numerous morality earmarks, slipped into larger bills over the last fifteen years, often
without notice, debate, or empirical study of any kind.”).) However, the debate
regarding the wisdom of congressionally-mandated enhancements notwithstanding, it
is unquestionably Congress’ constitutional prerogative to issue sentencing directives
such as the sentencing enhancements for quantity of images at issue in this case.

It is axiomatic that “[i]n our system, so far as at least concerns the federal
powers, defining crimes and fixing penalties are legislative . . . functions.” United States
v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948). The Supreme Court has reiterated that “Congress,
of course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime.” Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989); see also United States v. Evanouskas, 386 F. App’x
882, 884 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, “[n]othwithstanding the delegation of authority
provided to the Commission in the [Sentencing Reform Act], Congress retained ultimate
authority over the federal sentencing guidelines . . . . Congress [thus] retains the ability
to influence federal sentencing policy by enacting directives to the Commission,”
History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, supra, at 5-6, “which the Commission is
obliged to implement.” Grober, F.3d at 608.
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 9

B. Interpretation of § 2G2.2(b)(7)

The Guidelines provision at issue in the instant appeal is U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(7).
It provides for an increase in a defendant’s offense level for child pornography based on
the number of images possessed. Defendant challenges the application of the Guidelines
to duplicate digital images. In his brief to this Court, Defendant admits that duplicate
hard copy images are counted separately for § 2G2.2(b)(7) purposes. However,
Defendant nevertheless argues that only unique digital images, not duplicate digital
images, should be counted in determining a sentencing enhancement under this
Guideline provision.

As discussed above, § 2G2.2(b)(7) was properly enacted pursuant to explicit
congressional mandate, and congressional will should be considered in construing its
parameters. In so doing, we note that congressional directives regarding sentencing for
child pornography have consistently increased penalties. We further note that although
Congress has explicitly expressed its desire to enhance punishments for child
pornography offenses, Congress has not differentiated between digital images and hard
copy images for the purposes of § 2G2.2(b)(7) image enumeration.

Section 2G2.2(b)(7) provides for enhancements to a defendant’s sentence as
follows: “If the offense involved – (A) at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, increase
by 2 levels; (B) at least 150 images, but fewer than 300, increase by 3 levels; (C) at least
300 images, but fewer than 600, increase by 4 levels; and (D) 600 or more images,
increase by 5 levels.”

Like the congressional directive itself, the Application Note to § 2G2.2(b)(7) is
similarly devoid of any indication that § 2G2.2(b)(7) differentiates between digital
images and hard copy images.

Application of Subsection (b)(7) –

(A) Definition of “images” – “Images” means any visual depiction, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5), that constitutes child pornography, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5).
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 10

(B) Determining the number of images:– For purposes of determining the
number of images under subsection (b)(7):
(i) Each photograph, picture, computer or computer-
generated image, or any similar visual depiction shall be
considered one image. If the number of images
substantially underrepresents the number of minors
involved, an upward departure may be warranted.

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 Application Note 4. In defining the term “image,” the Application
Note refers only to “any visual depiction.” This suggests that duplicate visual
depictions, digital or otherwise, should each be counted separately for purposes of this
enhancement.

Previous versions of the Child Pornography Sentencing Guidelines similarly
treated digital images and hard copy images equivalently. The Commission’s 2000
amendments to the Guidelines clarified that the enhancement then contained in
§ 2G2.4(b)(2) providing for “a two-level enhancement if the offense involved possession
of ten or more items of child pornography,” stated that a “computer file qualifies as an
item for purposes of the enhancement,” thus providing for identical treatment of digital
images and hard copy images. (R. 21-3, Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of
Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed Progression of the Child Pornography
Guidelines at 18.)

Defendant nevertheless attempts to distinguish duplicate hard copy images from
duplicate digital images, stating: “the rationale underlying the increase in levels based
upon the number of images is obvious: each picture represents a separate victimization
of those pictured.” (Br. of Appellant at 9.) Defendant maintains, however, that duplicate
digital images, such as those contained on Defendant’s second hard drive, are not
“multiple victimizations.” (Id.) Defendant argues that, as distinguished from duplicate
digital images, “there are practical reasons why [duplicate] hard copies could be treated
[as multiple images]. Most obviously, because making [duplicate] hard copies requires
more than a minimal amount of effort, and having [duplicate] hard copies makes it
possible to potentially distribute them.” (Id.)
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 11

Defendant’s argument implies that digital images and hard copy images are
disseminated by dissimilar methods of distribution. In this vein, Defendant contends that
it is significant that dissemination of hard copy images requires duplication. According
to Defendant’s reasoning, duplicate hard copy images should be counted separately
pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(7) inasmuch as the duplicates themselves are necessary for
dissemination. However, this rationale does not similarly justify counting duplicate
digital images separately.

Digital distribution of child pornography is facilitated by file-sharing programs
that allow users to access other users’ computers to download shared digital images.
Once an individual uploads a single digital image onto the file-sharing platform, an
infinite number of users can access that digital image. Thus, possessing a duplicate
digital image does not affect the quantity of child pornography available for digital
distribution.

However, although the rationale for individual counting of duplicate hard copy
images does not extend to duplicate digital images, we remain mindful that the Child
Pornography Guidelines contain no indication that either Congress or the Sentencing
Commission intended to differentiate between hard copy images and digital images. See
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 Application Note 4.4

Moreover, it is significant that § 2G2.2(b)(7) applies to all of the following child
pornography crimes: trafficking in material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor;

4
The recent Eighth Circuit case United States v. Sampson, 606 F.3d 505 (8th Cir. 2010), is the
only case on the circuit level that we have identified which discusses whether duplicate digital images
should be counted for purposes of a § 2G2.2(b)(7) sentence enhancement. In Sampson the Eighth Circuit
held that § 2G2.2(b)(7) does not include a uniqueness requirement for counting digital images. The Eighth
Circuit maintained that possessing duplicate digital images increases the supply of digital child
pornography, and therefore, duplicate digital images should be counted separately for purposes of a
§ 2G2.2(b)(7) enhancement. See id. at 510.
However, although we agree with the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Sampson that duplicate digital
images should be counted for purposes of a § 2G2.2(b)(7) sentence enhancement, we disagree with its
reasoning to the extent that it is premised on a misunderstanding of the methods used to distribute digital
images of child pornography. Possessing duplicate digital images does not affect the supply of digital
child pornography. An individual possessing a unique digital image can disseminate that single image as
widely as an individual possessing duplicate digital images. Once an individual uploads a digital image,
an infinite number of people can download that single digital image. Therefore, possessing duplicate
digital images does not increase an individual’s capacity to facilitate wide dissemination of that digital
image.
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 12

receiving, transporting, shipping, soliciting, or advertising material involving the sexual
exploitation of a minor; possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor
with intent to traffic; and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a
minor. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7). The Guidelines provision applies equally to
distribution and possession of child pornography. Its applicability is not dependent on
a defendant’s capacity to distribute child pornography. Thus, the rationale for
differentiating between duplicate hard copy images and duplicate digital images based
on differences in distribution methods is not persuasive.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that § 2G2.2(b)(7) applies to possession of
duplicate hard copy images, and that even in cases of simple possession of child
pornography we consider the quantity of images involved in the crime relevant to the
measure of a defendant’s culpability. See United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 910 (6th
Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Acosta, 619 F.3d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that application of § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D) was proper in that case because
“enhancing a defendant’s sentence for the number of illegal items with which he was
involved is a common practice throughout the Guidelines”). Therefore, neither
application nor interpretation of § 2G2.2(b)(7) is tied to facilitation of distributing child
pornography.

We therefore find that duplicate digital images, like duplicate hard copy images,
should be counted separately for purposes of calculating a sentence enhancement
pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(7).

III. Summary

The district court did not err by counting duplicate images in calculating
Defendant’s U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7) enhancement based on the number of images he
possessed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
No. 09-4011 United States v. McNerney Page 13

___________________

CONCURRENCE
___________________

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur in the result and in much of the
reasoning of the majority opinion. Defendant makes the categorical argument in this
case that identical duplicate images may not be counted separately for the purposes of
calculating a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7). For the
reasons given in the majority opinion, we reject this argument.

To reject an argument that duplicate digital images are never to be counted
separately, however, does not require us to hold that they are always to be counted
separately. It is not necessary for us to decide that broader issue in order to resolve this
appeal. Indeed, the Government concedes that certain “thumbnail” duplicate images
need not be separately counted. In the instant case, the duplicate images were in a
back-up hard drive, thus decreasing the chance that the images would be lost. In that
sense, the copies increase the likelihood of further distribution. In such a context, the
district court could properly count the digital images separately. It is not necessary for
us to rule more broadly that duplicate images must be counted even when their presence
on the computer does not increase the likelihood of further distribution.

As a related matter, I think it may be misleading to say that “[p]ossessing
duplicate digital images does not affect the supply of digital child pornography” and that
“possessing duplicate digital images does not increase an individual’s capacity to
facilitate wide dissemination of that digital image.” Maj. Op. 12 n.4. While the
individual’s ultimate capacity to disseminate may be the same, the likelihood of
dissemination is obviously greater in some cases than others. The present instance is a
good example: the existence of a back-up hard drive increases the risk that the images
will be preserved and later viewed by the user or someone else. Similarly, having
duplicates in different folders versus the same folder, or in undeleted versus deleted
status, can change the likelihood of dissemination.