IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40101
Summary Calendar
BRENDA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROBERT BEHRNS, DR.; CORRECTIONAL CORPORATION OF AMERICA;
MRS. BEHRNS, DR.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:98-CV-1581
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March 20, 2000
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Having consented to proceed before the magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Brenda Anderson, Texas prisoner No.
768897, appeals the magistrate judge’s dismissal of her civil
rights complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) and
(ii).
We reject Anderson’s argument that she did not voluntarily
consent to proceed before the magistrate judge and we find no error
in the court’s failure to appoint counsel to represent Anderson.
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Anderson testified that the defendant doctors discontinued her
psychotropic medication because they believed that she did not need
it. Thus, the magistrate judge properly found that neither the
doctors nor their employer, Correctional Corporation of America
(CCA), was liable to Anderson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hare v. City
of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Flores v.
Cameron County, Texas, 92 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1996).
Anderson’s argument that she should have been offered an
opportunity to amend her complaint is meritless. As Anderson
failed to allege a constitutional violation, we find no abuse of
discretion in the dismissal of her complaint prior to discovery.
Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986).
In her appellate brief, Anderson argues for the first time
that the defendant doctors discontinued her medication in
deliberate disregard of a known danger to her health because CCA
has a blanket policy of not allowing inmates to take expensive
drugs. We decline to address this argument because it would
require resolution of factual issues that were not presented to the
district court. See Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 71 n.5 (5th Cir.
1997)
AFFIRMED.