UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4398
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR ALI COVINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:07-cr-00302-BR-1)
Submitted: January 27, 2011 Decided: March 1, 2011
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In 2008, Jamar Ali Covington pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted
of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one
year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006), and the
district court sentenced him to twenty-seven months of
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release.
Subsequently, Covington pleaded guilty to violating the terms of
his supervised release, and the court sentenced him to
twenty-four months of imprisonment. Covington now appeals,
arguing that the revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable.
Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence imposed as a result of a
supervised release violation to determine whether the sentence
was plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). The first step in this analysis is a
determination of whether the sentence was unreasonable. Id. at
438. This court, in determining reasonableness, follows
generally the procedural and substantive considerations employed
in reviewing original sentences. Id. On review, we will assume
a deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion. Id. at 439.
Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along
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with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2006) and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006), “‘the court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439 (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir.
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a sentence
imposed after a revocation is not unreasonable, we will not
proceed to the second prong of the analysis — whether the
sentence was plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the
sentence imposed by the district court is reasonable, and
therefore we have no need to consider whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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