UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4666
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS MARCUS HARGROVE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:01-cr-00298-WO-1)
Submitted: February 1, 2011 Decided: March 1, 2011
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Marcus Hargrove received an aggregate
thirty-seven month term of imprisonment following the revocation
of his supervised release. Hargrove’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
his opinion that there are no meritorious issue for appeal but
raising the issue of whether Hargrove’s consecutive terms of
imprisonment were reasonable. Hargrove was notified of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a
brief. The Government has declined to file a responsive brief.
We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). The
first step in this review requires a determination of whether
the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). “This initial inquiry takes a more
‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the
exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review for
[G]uidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439)
(applying “plainly unreasonable” standard of review for
probation revocation). Only if the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable does the inquiry proceed to the
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second step of the analysis to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
Here, counsel questions whether the sentence was
unreasonable because Hargrove was sentenced to multiple terms of
imprisonment that were to run consecutively instead of
concurrently. However, counsel correctly notes that where, as
here, a defendant is sentenced to multiple terms of imprisonment
at the same time, the district court may order that the
sentences be run concurrently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a) (2006); see also United States v. Johnson, 138 F.3d
115, 118-19 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e hold that the district court
had the authority to impose consecutive sentences upon Johnson
when it revoked his supervised release.”). In determining
whether the terms will run concurrently or consecutively, the
court must consider the § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b)
(2006).
In Hargrove’s case, the court considered all of the
requisite statutory and Guidelines factors. The court cited the
seriousness of Hargrove’s violations and the proximity to his
release as its reasons for imposing its chosen sentence. We
conclude that this reasoning is sound and that the sentence was
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
This court requires that counsel inform Hargrove, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Hargrove requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hargrove.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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