[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11791 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 3, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00027-MP-AK
ANNETTE KEATON WILLIAMS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(March 3, 2011)
Before MARCUS, FAY and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Annette Williams appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). On appeal, she argues
that the ALJ improperly afforded little weight to a doctor’s diagnosis of psychotic
disorder by giving greater weight to another doctor’s diagnosis that was made two
years earlier, which did not indicate such a disorder, and failed to consider Williams’s
impairments in combination. After careful review, we affirm.
Our review of a social security case is “demarcated by a deferential
reconsideration of the findings of fact and exacting examination of the conclusions
of law.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The
Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if “supported by substantial
evidence,” but the “[Commissioner’s] conclusions of law, including applicable review
standards, are not presumed valid.” Id. (quotation omitted). Substantial evidence is
“more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance,” in that “it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. (alteration and quotation omitted).
The Social Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation
process for determining if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920. At the first step, the claimant must prove that she has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity. At the second step, she must prove that she
has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. If, at the third step,
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she proves that her impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals a
listed impairment, she is automatically found disabled regardless of age, education,
or work experience. If she cannot prevail at the third step, she must proceed to the
fourth step, where she must prove that she is unable to perform her past relevant
work. If the claimant is unable to do past relevant work, the examiner proceeds to the
fifth and final step of the evaluation process to determine whether, in light of residual
functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform
other work. Id.; Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).
The claimant bears the burden of proving that she has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments to demonstrate a qualifying disability. See Moore v.
Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the regulations place
“a very heavy burden” on the claimant to demonstrate a qualifying disability); Phillips
v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the second step of the
analysis requires the ALJ to consider the severity of the claimant’s impairments alone
and in combination). Impairments, alone or in combination, are severe if they
“‘significantly limit’ the claimant’s ‘physical or mental ability to do basic work
skills.’” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1237 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
The “ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary
finding.” Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280 (11th Cir. 1987). “The more a
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medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical
signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion. . . .
Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more
weight” will be given to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3)-(4) and
416.927(d)(3)-(4).
In this case, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination to give little
weight to the opinion of Dr. Linda Abeles that Williams had a psychotic disorder.
As the record shows, Dr. Abeles did not perform clinical tests, her opinion was
unsupported by other medical findings in the record, her opinion was contradicted by
another doctor’s psychiatric evaluation that was based upon clinical tests, and her
opinion appeared to be inconsistent with Williams’s own statements. There is also
no merit to Williams’s contention that, without a medical expert, the ALJ would not
be able to determine whether Dr. Candace Valenstein’s diagnosis of a personality
disorder with paranoid features was indicative of a psychotic disorder. As the record
shows, none of Williams’s numerous physicians -- other than Dr. Abeles, whose
opinion the ALJ properly discounted -- indicated that Williams needed psychiatric
treatment, besides possibly for anxiety and depression. Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d
1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ALJ is not required to seek additional
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independent expert medical testimony before making a disability determination if the
record is sufficient and additional expert testimony would not be necessary).
Moreover, because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
Williams did not have a severe psychotic disorder, such evidence also supports the
ALJ’s decision not to consider her psychotic disorder in combination with her other
impairments. Further, because the ALJ determined that her psychotic disorder was
not severe at the second step, the ALJ did not need to proceed to the other steps of the
sequential analysis, including determining whether Williams’s psychotic disorder
precluded all work at the fifth step. See Crayton, 120 F.3d at 1219.
AFFIRMED.
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