UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4380
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEON BESSANT, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cr-00136-WO-1)
Submitted: February 3, 2011 Decided: March 3, 2011
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leon Bessant, Jr., appeals from his conviction and
sixty-month sentence following a guilty plea to two counts of
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). On appeal,
Bessant’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel states that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions whether the
district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Bessant’s guilty plea and whether the district court erred in
sentencing Bessant. Bessant was advised of his right to file a
pro se brief, but has not done so. We affirm.
Bessant first questions whether the district court
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, by sufficiently informing
Bessant that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of five
years’ imprisonment on both counts. Because Bessant did not
move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we
review any error in the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).
Our review of the appellate record convinces us that
the district court fully complied with the mandates of Rule 11
in accepting Bessant’s guilty plea. In doing so, the district
court properly informed Bessant of the nature of the charges and
penalties he faced, explicitly stating that he faced a term of
2
imprisonment of not less than five years. Moreover, the
district court ensured that the guilty plea was knowing and
voluntary and supported by a factual basis. See United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
We therefore affirm his conviction.
Bessant also questions whether the district court
erred in imposing sentence. This court reviews a sentence for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United
States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). This
review requires appellate consideration of both the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51.
In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. Bessant
specifically questions whether the district court erred in
calculating his criminal history category by including a state
conviction that occurred after the conduct, but before
imposition of sentence, in the present case. Although Bessant’s
sentence for the state narcotics conviction was imposed in 2007,
after the commencement of the instant offense, it is nonetheless
3
a “prior sentence” because it was for conduct unrelated to the
instant offense and was imposed prior to the January 7, 2010
sentencing for the instant offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1 (2008). Bessant’s criminal history
category thus was properly calculated.
Because the record reveals no procedural error in
Bessant’s sentencing, we conclude that the sentence is
procedurally reasonable. In addition, Bessant’s sentence
pursuant to the statutory mandatory minimum is per se
substantively reasonable. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d
210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we affirm Bessant’s
sentence as reasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues
for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Bessant, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Bessant requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Bessant. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
4
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5