Deep v. Boies

10-660-cv Deep v. Boies UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of March, two thousand eleven. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.* --------------------------------------------------------------------- JOHN A. DEEP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 10-660-cv DAVID BOIES, BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP, STRAUS & BOIES LLP, TRANSWORLD ENTERTAINMENT CORP., Defendants-Appellees. --------------------------------------------------------------------- APPEARING FOR APPELLANT: JOHN A. DEEP, pro se, Cohoes, New York. APPEARING FOR APPELLEES: MARK T. WALSH, JR., Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O’Shea, Albany, New York. * Judge Pierre N. Leval, who was a member of this panel, recused himself. The remaining two panel members agree on the disposition, and decide this appeal pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure E(b). Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (David N. Hurd, Judge; David E. Peebles, Magistrate Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s judgment entered on January 12, 2010, and the district court’s orders entered on January 12, February 16, April 26, and May 6, 2010, are AFFIRMED. Plaintiff John A. Deep, proceeding pro se, appeals from: (1) the district court’s order entered on January 12, 2010, as well as the district court’s corresponding judgment entered the same day, denying his motions to vacate the registration of a judgment of the District of Maine and to quash subpoenas issued in aid of enforcement of the registered judgment; (2) the district court’s order entered on February 16, 2010, denying his motion for clarification of the order entered on January 12, 2010; (3) the magistrate judge’s order of April 26, 2010, compelling compliance with subpoenas issued to third-party witnesses by defendants and denying plaintiff’s motion to “limit, modify or stay enforcement” of the underlying judgment; and (4) the magistrate judge’s order of May 6, 2010, denying plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of prior orders relating to the third-party subpoenas. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. Plaintiff did not object in the district court to the magistrate judge’s orders of April 26 and May 6, 2010. Accordingly, he waived appellate review of those orders. See Fed. R. 2 Civ. P. 72(a); Caidor v. Onondaga Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A] pro se litigant who fails to object timely to a magistrate’s order on a non-dispositive matter waives the right to appellate review of that order, even absent express notice from the magistrate judge that failure to object within ten days will preclude appellate review.”). With respect to the district court’s January 12, 2010 judgment and January 12 and February 16, 2010 orders, upon independent review of the record, including the magistrate judge’s December 18, 2009 Report and Recommendation – which was accepted and adopted in all respects in the January 12 judgment and the January 12 order – we conclude, for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s and magistrate judge’s thorough and well-reasoned opinions, that the district court correctly resolved these issues. We have considered plaintiff’s other arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the appealed-from judgment and orders of the district court are AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, Clerk of Court 3