[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13145 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 7, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-00337-CEH-TBM
BRIAN BEVAN,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN E. STEELE,
Individually and as U.S. District Judge,
SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL,
Individually and as U.S. District Magistrate Judge,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 7, 2011)
Before HULL, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brian Bevan appeals pro se the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights
action against U.S. District Court Judge John E. Steele and U.S. Magistrate Judge
Sheri Polster Chappell (collectively “judges”), in their individual capacities,
brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).1 Bevan’s complaint generally alleged, inter alia,
judicial corruption, concealment of a felony, nonfeasance, malfeasance, denial of
due process and abuse of power relating to the events of two separate civil
proceedings in the Middle District of Florida. Bevan contends the district court
erred in adopting the magistrate’s report and recommendation to dismiss his
complaint because the actions of the judges were non-judicial and thus, not subject
to immunity. After review, we affirm the district court.2
Generally, judges are absolutely immune from damages for acts taken
during the performance of their judicial duties. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
9-10 (1991) (per curiam). Judicial immunity is defeated in only two sets of
circumstances: (1) where the judge's actions are non-judicial or (2) where the
judge's actions are taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12.
1
Although Bevan purported to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court
appropriately construed his complaint under Bivens because the claims involve federal officials.
2
We review de novo the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, applying the same standard as the district court. Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).
2
“Whether a judge’s actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity
depends on whether: (1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial
function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's chambers or in open court; (3) the
controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation
arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v.
Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005).
Bevan’s allegations against the judges do not support the assertion that the
purported wrongful conduct of the judges was non-judicial. Instead, the
allegations indicate all of the judges’ actions were taken as part of the normal
conduct of the court, in relation to a case pending before the court, and arose
immediately out of requests or complaints made to the judges in their judicial
capacity. Accordingly, Bevan’s claims against the judges are barred by absolute
judicial immunity and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.3
AFFIRMED.
3
Bevan failed to make any legal arguments regarding the dismissal of his claims against
the judges in their official capacity, so he is deemed to have abandoned that issue. See United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). Regardless, the Supreme Court has
held that Bivens claims do not extend to federal officers in their official capacity and are barred
by sovereign immunity. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 483-86 (1994).
3