UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KENYATTA GREEN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00825-PMD-1)
Submitted: February 15, 2011 Decided: March 7, 2011
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenyatta Green appeals his 100-month sentence
following his conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2006). On appeal, Green argues that (1) the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress a gun and ammunition
seized by police officers because they did not have reasonable
articulable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity;
and (2) the district court clearly erred during sentencing when
it applied the second-degree attempted murder cross-reference.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Perry, 560
F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 177 (2009).
When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we construe
evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the
prevailing party below. United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359,
364 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 182 (2008).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989);
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Whether there is
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the totality
of the circumstances, including the information known to the
officer and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the time of
the stop. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8; Black, 525 F.3d at 364-65.
The reasonable suspicion determination is a “commonsensical
proposition,” and deference should be accorded to police
officers’ determinations based on their practical experience and
training. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir.
2004). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court correctly found that reasonable suspicion
justified the stop of Green. * The district court thus properly
denied Green’s motion to suppress.
We also affirm Green’s sentence. We review a district
court’s findings of fact at sentencing for clear error. United
States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2002). Given the
testimony presented at Green’s sentencing hearing, we find no
clear error in the district court’s finding that a preponderance
of the evidence suggested that Green intended to kill and its
subsequent decision to calculate Green’s total offense level
*
We also note that the firearm in question was not subject
to suppression as it was abandoned prior to Green’s seizure and
was thus not the fruit of the seizure. See California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991); United States v. Stevenson, 396
F.3d 538, 546 (4th Cir. 2005).
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using the second-degree attempted murder cross-reference. See
18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 2A2.1(a)(2), 2X1.1 (2009).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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