FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 07 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MAGDALENA DELGADO DE No. 09-73203
ESCOBAR,
Agency No. A099-669-711
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Magdalena Delgado De Escobar, a native and citizen of El Salvador,
petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order
dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Against Torture (“CAT”). Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We
review de novo questions of law, Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th
Cir. 2008), except to the extent that deference is owed to the BIA’s determination
of the governing statutes and regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535
(9th Cir. 2004). We review for substantial evidence factual findings, Zehatye v.
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006), and we deny in part and dismiss
in part the petition for review.
Delgado De Escobar claimed gang members extorted money from her
bakery business and threatened her when she refused to pay. Substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s denial of Delgado De Escobar’s asylum and withholding of
removal claims because she failed to establish that gang members targeted her on
account of a political opinion, membership in a particular social group, or any
other protected ground. See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740-41 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“[t]he Real ID Act requires that a protected ground represent ‘one
central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”).
We lack jurisdiction to consider Delgado De Escobar’s challenge to the IJ’s
denial of her CAT claim because she did not exhaust the issue before the BIA. See
Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The plain language of
2 09-73203
§ 1252(d)(1) . . . specifically mandates that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a prerequisite to our jurisdiction.”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
3 09-73203