In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2193
L INDA A LDRIDGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
F OREST R IVER, INC., a foreign corporation, and
S PECIFIC C RUISE S YSTEMS, INC., a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 06 C 352—Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
A RGUED JANUARY 12, 2011—D ECIDED M ARCH 8, 2011
Before,
K ANNE and T INDER, Circuit Judges, and
H ERNDON, District Judge.
H ERNDON, District Judge. Linda Aldridge fell and seri-
ously injured her shoulder when the step controller on
The Honorable David R. Herndon, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, sitting
by designation.
2 No. 10-2193
her 2004 Forest River Georgetown recreational vehicle
unexpectedly retracted. Aldridge sued Forest River, Inc.
(“Forest River”), and Specific Cruise Systems, Inc. (“SCS”),
alleging strict liability and negligence. Plaintiff’s counsel
would have this court believe that just as his client’s
feet were pulled out from beneath her as she stepped
out of her recreational vehicle, so was her case at trial
when she was not allowed to present her theory of
liability to the jury. The record does not support his
argument. Prior to trial, the district court granted Forest
River’s motion in limine #27, which barred plaintiff
from arguing that the recreational vehicle as a whole
was the defective product at issue or anything other
than the step controller, and denied her motion for leave
to file an amended complaint. During the trial, the
district judge also amended one of Aldridge’s proposed
jury instructions regarding the ultimate issue of liability.
After the jury returned defense verdicts, the district court
denied Aldridge’s motion for new trial. Aldridge
appeals these decisions. As the district court did not
abuse its discretion on any of these issues, we affirm.
The facts of the accident underlying this case are sim-
ple. Aldridge and her husband purchased a 2004 Forest
River Georgetown recreational vehicle, which was
equipped with a step controller. Forest River manu-
factures and sells recreational vehicles. It manufactured
the 2004 Georgetown recreational vehicle. SCS designs,
manufactures and sells stair-step controllers used to
No. 10-2193 3
raise and lower the external steps on recreational vehicles.1
SCS manufactured the step controller that was on
Aldridge’s 2004 Forest River Georgetown recreational
vehicle. On January 20, 2004, Aldridge fell and sustained
serious injuries while descending the steps of her recre-
ational vehicle. The accident occurred while plaintiff and
her husband were vacationing in Florida. The trial court
determined that Florida law applied to the product
liability issues, a decision which is not contested here.
On January 20, 2006, Aldridge sued Forest River and
SCS in the district court based on diversity jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1332. Aldridge claimed that the step con-
troller unexpectedly retracted and caused her to fall.
Counts I and III, based on strict liability, alleged: “[T]he
RV step controller was not reasonably safe for its
intended use of raising and lowering the steps of the
recreational vehicle.” Counts I and III also alleged that
“as a direct and proximate result of the defective condi-
tion of the RV step controller . . . the plaintiff,
LINDA ALDRIDGE, sustained severe and permanent
injuries.” Counts II and IV, based on negligence, alleged
that Forest River negligently failed to properly wire,
install, and test the step controller and that SCS failed
to warn Forest River that the step controller would occa-
sionally malfunction and retract without warning; failed
1
The step controller is a module that takes signals from the
recreational vehicle and causes the steps to expand and retract.
Generally, when a passenger closes the door, the steps either
retract or remain deployed, depending on how the user sets
certain switches on the controller.
4 No. 10-2193
to properly wire the step controller; and failed to insure
that the step controller was properly operating prior to
selling it to Forest River.2
In denying a motion to transfer, the district judge
stated that the case was about an alleged defective step.
Also, in response to the motion to transfer, Aldridge
limited her discussion to the step controller being defec-
tive. Aldridge’s retained expert James Des Jardins, a
mechanical engineer, opined that a design defect in the
step controller allowed an electrical surge to activate the
stairs as Aldridge stepped down. Des Jardins further
concluded that warnings should have been posted in
the recreational vehicle cautioning that the steps might
unexpectedly retract.3 Furthermore, in response to inter-
rogatories, Aldridge identified the step controller as the
product at issue and specifically denied that she was
pursuing claims as to the recreational vehicle’s other
component parts. Aldridge did not supplement her
interrogatory responses.
On December 4, 2009, the district court granted Forest
River’s motion in limine #27 barring Aldridge from
2
Aldridge voluntarily dismissed the negligence claims prior
to trial.
3
The district court precluded Des Jardins from offering
opinions as to alternative design and failure to warn because
he had not tested an alternative controller and was unable
to formulate an appropriate warning. Eventually, the dis-
trict court barred Des Jardins from testifying at trial finding
that he was unqualified to opine as to the step controller’s
defective design.
No. 10-2193 5
arguing to the jury that the recreational vehicle was the
product at issue in the litigation. The district court
held that Aldridge had maintained throughout the case
that the step controller in the recreational vehicle was
the product on which her suit was based and to allow
the case to be tried in a different fashion would be tanta-
mount to changing the theory of the case at the eleventh
hour. The case proceeded to trial on December 7, 2009.
During the trial, Aldridge moved to file an amended
complaint to advance the theory that the recreational
vehicle was defective because the stairs did not operate
as intended during normal use. Specifically, Aldridge
sought to amend her complaint to allege that the
entire 2004 Forest River Georgetown recreational
vehicle was not reasonably safe for its intended use
and caused her injuries. The district court denied the
motion based on the reasons for allowing motion in
limine #27: (1) that plaintiff had identified the product
as the step controller; (2) that the defendants had
litigated the case with the understanding that the
product forming the basis of the complaint was the
step controller and (3) that the defendants would not
have time to prepare a meaningful defense at the late
stage in these proceedings.
During the jury instruction conference, Forest River
sought an instruction excluding reference to the recre-
ational vehicle and identifying the product as the “step
controller.” Aldridge argued that her proposed instruc-
tion #24, which asked the jury to determine whether
the recreational vehicle was defective, should be used.
The district court amended plaintiff’s tendered instruc-
6 No. 10-2193
tion #24 4 and gave an instruction which identified the
issue as “whether the recreational vehicle sold by
Forest River, Inc. with the step controller sold by
Specific Cruise Systems was defective when it left the
possession of Forest River.” SCS favored the instruction,
as given, suggesting during the open court conference
that it had been agreed upon, which it clearly had not been.
On December 11, 2009, the jury returned defense ver-
dicts. Thereafter, Aldridge moved for new trial arguing
that the district court erred in granting Forest River’s
motion in limine #27; that Florida law allowed her to
argue that the entire recreational vehicle was defective
and that the erroneous ruling on the motion in limine was
compounded by the denial of her motion to amend. On
April 12, 2010, the district court denied Aldridge’s
motion for new trial finding that Aldridge “unam-
biguously identifies the step controller as the proximate
cause of her injuries and as the product whose defective-
ness is at issue in the litigation” and that defendants
did not consent to litigating the issue of the entire recre-
ational vehicle’s defectiveness and that defendants
would be prejudiced if Aldridge could expand the
scope of the product at this late stage.
4
Aldridge’s jury instruction #24 provided in part: “whether
the recreational vehicle sold by Forest River, Inc. and/or the
step controller supplied by Specific Cruise Systems, Inc. was
defective when they left the possession of Forest River, Inc.
and/or Specific Cruise Systems, Inc. and, if so, whether such
defect was a legal cause of the injuries sustained by Linda
Aldridge.”
No. 10-2193 7
On appeal, Aldridge challenges the district court’s
granting motion in limine #27; the district court’s denial
of her motion to file a first amended complaint; and the
district court’s amendment to a jury instruction. She
also appeals the denial of her motion for new trial.
First, we review the district court’s decision to grant
Forest River’s motion in limine #27. “We review [the]
district court’s rulings on [the] motions in limine for an
abuse of discretion because decisions regarding the
admission and exclusion of evidence are peculiarly
within the competence of the district court.” Von der
Ruhr v. Immtech International, Inc., 570 F.3d 858, 862 (7th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“District court judges, because of the very nature of the
duties and responsibilities accompanying their position,
possess great authority to manage their caseload.”
Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1030
(7th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Reed, 2 F.3d 1441
(7th Cir. 1993)). “Under the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard
of review, the relevant inquiry is not how the reviewing
judges would have ruled if they had been considering
the case in the first place. . . .” Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d
796, 802 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 1984)). Rather, the
district court’s decision is to be overturned only if no
reasonable person would agree with the trial court’s
ruling. Snipes v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th
Cir. 2002).
Aldridge contends that the district court abused its
discretion in granting motion in limine #27 because it
8 No. 10-2193
was untimely; that the issue of the recreational vehicle
was contained in the final pretrial order and that
allowing the motion effectively amended the final
pretrial order. Clearly, the district court acted within
its discretion in allowing motion in limine #27. The
district court granted the motion because it found that
Aldridge’s claims against defendants throughout the
litigation identified the step controller as the proximate
cause of her injuries and as the product whose defec-
tiveness was at issue in the litigation. The ruling
was consistent with the nature of the litigation from
the beginning of the case and it prevented surprise to
the defendants regarding the nature of the case that
they had been defending throughout the litigation. It
was consistent and conformed with the reasonable ex-
pectations of the litigants. Consequently, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in hearing and
granting the motion in limine. Further, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in disallowing Aldridge
from applying an inference of a defect in the rec-
reational vehicle as a whole.5
Aldridge also contends that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied her motion for leave to file
5
Florida defective product law permits an inference of defec-
tiveness as to the product itself so that a plaintiff need not
prove which part within that product was defective. Cassisi v.
Maytag, 396 So.2d 1140, 1152-53 (FL. App. 1981) (if a product
malfunctions during normal operation, a legal inference
arises that the product was defective and the injured plaintiff
thereby establishes a prima facie case for jury consideration). In
brief form, this is sometimes referred to as the Cassisi inference.
No. 10-2193 9
a first amended complaint. We also review the district
court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a com-
plaint under the abuse of discretion standard. Trustmark
Ins. Co. v. Gen. & Cologne Life Re of Am., 424 F.3d 542, 553
(7th Cir. 2005). “[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion
to file an amended pleading is a matter purely within the
sound discretion of the district court.” Brunt v. Serv.
Employees Int’l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2002).
We will overturn a denial of a motion for leave to
amend a complaint only if the district court “abused its
discretion by refusing to grant the leave without any
justifying reason.” Id.; see also J.D. Marshall Int’l Inc. v.
Redstart, Inc., 935 F.2d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 1991).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) permits the
amendment of a complaint during trial if “issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent.” The district court must determine “whether the
opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and
whether he could have presented additional evidence
had he known sooner the substance of the amendment.”
In re Rivinius, Inc., 977 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Matter of Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 725 (7th Cir.
1986) (citations omitted)).
Clearly, the district court was well within its discretion
to deny Aldridge’s motion for leave to file an amended
complaint because defendants did not consent to add
this theory of liability and they were not proceeding as
such. Further, the amendment would have added a new
theory of liability to the case at the late stage of the pro-
ceedings. The amendment would have required re-
10 No. 10-2193
opening discovery and postponing the trial. Moreover,
Aldridge could have brought this new theory of liability
much sooner than during the trial. In sum, the district
court’s denial of Aldridge’s motion for leave to amend
was justified; therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
We review the district court’s decisions on jury instruc-
tions for abuse of discretion. Russell v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 189 F.3d 590, 593 (7th Cir. 1999); Spiller
v. Brady, 169 F.3d 1064, 1066 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]
district court has substantial discretion with specific
wording of jury instructions. . . .” Heller Int’l Corp. v.
Sharp, 974 F.2d 850, 860 (7th Cir. 1992). We consider
jury instructions in their entirety and consider whether
the jury was misled in any way and whether the jury
had an understanding of the issues. Russell, 189 F.3d at
593. Based on the record, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in amending the issue instruction. The
jury instructions, as a whole, given during trial were not
in any way improper or misleading. As stated earlier,
the district court framed this issue as “whether the recre-
ational vehicle sold by Forest River, Inc. with the step
controller sold by Specific Cruise Systems was defec-
tive.” Although the trial court amended plaintiff’s
tendered instruction #24 in a way that plaintiff strongly
disagreed with, but which tracked the language of the
complaint and the final pretrial order, the district court
formulated an appropriate issue instruction based on
the facts of the case that were tried before the jury. It
appears that the jury properly applied the jury instructions.
The jury inquired, during deliberation, about instruc-
tion #24 in a note sent out to the court. It read:
No. 10-2193 11
Page 19, Paragraph # 1
In reference to “whether the recreational
vehicle sold by Forest River with the Step
Controller sold by SCS was defective when
it left possession of Forest River”
Is it to imply liability to only the Step
Controller or the entire recreational vehicle.
During the discussion with counsel in open court,
plaintiff’s counsel kept up his attempts to amend the
complaint as well as his arguments that the case had
been litigated all along as a recreational vehicle defect
and the jury should be so advised. Defense counsel as
well as the judge maintained, as they had during
the jury instruction conference and the argument re-
garding motion in limine #27, that the case was always
litigated over the step controller. The court, therefore,
decided the best way to answer the jury’s question was
to refer the jury to the instruction on the following
page, which read, “If you find that the stairs unex-
pectedly retracted during normal operations, you may
infer that the product was defective, unless taking
into consideration all of the evidence in the case, you
conclude that the retraction of the stairs was not due
to any defect. Plaintiff is not required to identify the
specific cause of the malfunction.” The handling of the
jury question was not argued by any party to be error,
nor does this court find it to be such.
As to the district court’s denial of the motion for new
trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion. A
party seeking to reverse a district court’s denial of a
12 No. 10-2193
motion for a new trial “bears a particularly heavy burden.”
Lowe v. Consol. Freightways of Del., Inc., 177 F.3d 640, 641
(7th Cir. 1999). A motion for a new trial should succeed
“[o]nly when a verdict is contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. . . .” Cefalu v. Vill. of Elk Grove, 211 F.3d
416, 424 (7th Cir. 2000). The district court, having seen
the presentation of the evidence and observed the wit-
nesses, “is in a unique position to rule on a new trial
motion.” Id. at 424. Thus, “[o]nly if the district judge has
abused her discretion will we disturb her decision to
deny a new trial.” Id. This court will not overturn a jury
verdict if a reasonable basis exists in the record to
support it. See Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 40 F.3d 239, 244 (7th
Cir. 1994). Based on the reasons stated supra, the
district court acted within its discretion in denying the
motion for new trial as there was no basis to grant the
motion.
Finally, we briefly discuss the claims against SCS.
Aldridge did not assign any error directed at the jury
verdict in favor of SCS and against her. There is nothing
in the record to suggest that the district court commit-
ted any error with regards to Aldridge’s claims against
SCS. In fact, the evidence at trial pertained exclusively
to the step controller.
The decision of the district court is A FFIRMED.
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