FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 08 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT RADCLIFFE; CHESTER No. 09-56859
CARTER; ARNOLD LOVELL, Jr.;
CLIFTON C. SEALE, III; MARIA D.C. No. 8:05-cv-01070-DOC-
FALCON, MLG
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES JUNTIKKA, Esquire,
Appellant,
v.
TRANSUNION, LLC; JOSE
HERNANDEZ; ROBERT RANDALL;
BERTRAM ROBISON; KATHRYN
PIKE,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS INC.; EQUIFAX
INFORMATION SERVICES LLC,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 17, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: RYMER and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and QUIST, Senior District Judge.**
Plaintiffs-Appellants and their counsel, Charles Juntikka (“Juntikka”),
appeal that portion of the district court’s order denying Juntikka’s motion to allow
him to contact members of the class, who, Juntikka alleged, were his former
clients. Finding that we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.
Appellants cite three bases for appellate jurisdiction. First, they contend that
we have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, set
forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Second,
they argue that the district court’s order is an appealable injunction under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Finally, they contend that mandamus provides an appropriate
means for review.
**
The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for Western Michigan, Grand Rapids, sitting by designation.
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Each of these bases for interlocutory appellate jurisdiction requires that the
order be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. See United
States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003)) (stating that an interim order may be
appealed under the collateral order doctrine where, among other things, it is
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment); Negrete v. Allianz Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 523 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2008) (an order may be appealed
as an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) if it “can be effectively challenged
only by immediate appeal” (internal quotations omitted)); Bauman v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that mandamus is generally
appropriate only where “[t]he party seeking the writ has no other adequate means,
such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires”).
The district court’s order simply concerns the management of a class action,
a matter entrusted to the district court’s discretion under Rule 23(d)(1). The order
is typical of class action management orders that may be reviewed on direct appeal
from a final judgment. See In re Sugar Antitrust Litig., 559 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (stating that the district court’s order certifying indirect
purchasers as class members could be appealed following entry of the final
3
judgment). This is true even though the order limits Juntikka’s communications
with class members. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
Appellants contend that requiring them to wait until entry of final judgment
will effectively deny them review because any delay will result in denial of their
First Amendment rights. We disagree. This is not an instance where Juntikka has
been completely prohibited from contacting his former clients.
DISMISSED.
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