United States v. Young

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

No. 10-1513
_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOSEPH YOUNG,
Appellant
_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00156)
District Judge: Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 13, 2011

Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 10, 2011)
_____________
Candace Cain, Esq.
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue
1500 Liberty Center
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellant

.
Robert L. Eberhardt, Esq.
Donovan Cocas, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney
700 Grant Street
Suite 4000
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Appellee
_____________

OPINION
_____________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

The principal issue presented on this appeal is whether
a court may consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) – “the seriousness of the offense, . . . respect
for the law, and . . . just punishment for the offense” – when
imposing a sentence for the violation of the conditions of
supervised release. Concluding that a court is not prohibited
from considering the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in the
supervised release revocation context, we will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.

2
 I.

From December 4, 2003 to September 7, 2005,
Appellant Joseph Young went on a forged-check-cashing
spree, enlisting the assistance of several individuals to present
bogus checks in exchange for a share of the proceeds. On
September 22, 2005, he was sentenced in the Cambria County
Court of Common Pleas on twenty separate charging
instruments. The sentence on one of the charging instruments
included a prison term of thirty to sixty months, which was
later reduced to 273 days to twenty-four months, less one day.
He was released on parole on February 13, 2006.

Undeterred by the criminal justice sanctions imposed
and the fact that he was under the supervision of state parole
and probation authorities, Young quickly reverted to passing
counterfeit checks. On July 8, 2006, Young, with the aid of
Jeanne Hooter, unsuccessfully attempted to pass a counterfeit
check at a JC Penney department store at the Pittsburgh Mills
Mall. This incident garnered the attention of federal law
enforcement authorities. On April 17, 2007, Young and
Hooter were indicted on a charge of conspiracy to make,
utter, and possess counterfeit securities of an organization
involved in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. On October 16, 2007, Young entered a plea of guilty
to the conspiracy count pursuant to a written agreement. The
plea agreement included several stipulations concerning such
matters as the amount of loss and acceptance of
responsibility. The parties further stipulated that “no other
enhancements or reductions in the offense level apply.” (A.
50-4.) The plea agreement also included an appeal and
collateral challenge waiver.

3
 As a result of the parties’ stipulations, Young’s
conduct resulted in an offense level of eight. Young’s prior
criminal history netted sixteen points, placing him in criminal
history category VI. Young’s resulting advisory guideline
range for imprisonment was eighteen to twenty-four months. 1

Young’s sentencing proceeding convened on February
22, 2008. Young did not object to any of the factual findings
presented in the PSR. After considering all the pertinent
factors, the District Court imposed a prison term of twenty-
four months, restitution in the amount of $384.74, and a
supervised release term of three years. Among the conditions
of supervised release, Young was not to commit another
federal, state, or local crime, and was to refrain from the
possession or use of any controlled substance.

Young commenced his supervised release term at the
end of September 2008. He made his initial report to the
Probation Office in the Western District of Pennsylvania on
October 10, 2008. At that time, he tested positive for use of
cocaine and acknowledged having used cocaine the prior day.
The Probation Office recommended that no action be taken

1
According to the Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”), but for the parties’ stipulations, Young would have
received an offense enhancement of two levels for use of an
access device, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)(i), and
two additional levels under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for his role as
a leader. Inclusion of these offense level adjustments would
have resulted in an advisory guideline range of thirty to
thirty-seven months’ imprisonment.

4
based upon the admitted use of cocaine, and the District Court
concurred with the recommendation.

On November 6, 2008, less than one month after
supervision commenced, Young was arrested in Blair County,
Pennsylvania, on charges of forgery, escape, resisting arrest,
false reports to law enforcement, and false identification to
law enforcement. On November 24, 2008, the District Court
ordered that a bench warrant be issued for Young’s arrest for
violation of the terms of supervised release, with the warrant
to be lodged as a detainer at the Blair County Prison.

Disposition of the supervised release violations was
deferred pending the outcome of the state charges in Blair
County. Young was sentenced by the state court to a prison
term of ten to twenty-three and one-half months. Upon his
parole from the state sentence, Young was taken into federal
custody to answer for the violation of the terms and
conditions of supervised release.

Young’s supervised release revocation proceeding
convened on January 29, 2010. Young acknowledged
violating the terms and conditions of supervised release based
upon the state court conviction. Finding that Young’s
conduct constituted a “Grade B” violation, the District Court,
in accordance with U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(1), revoked Young’s
supervised release. Young’s advisory guideline
imprisonment range was determined to be twenty-one to
twenty-seven months. See id. § 7B1.4(a). Because, however,
Young’s original federal conviction was classified as a Class
D felony, the statutory maximum term of imprisonment was
twenty-four months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

5
 Acknowledging that the guideline range was advisory
only, the District Court afforded defense counsel ample
opportunity to substantiate Young’s request for a prison term
well below the advisory guideline range. Defense counsel
urged that Young’s latest encounter with the criminal justice
system was the product of his substance abuse problems.
Young also presented evidence that four persons in the local
community, including a Magisterial District Judge, were
willing to provide assistance to him.

The government recommended a prison term of
twenty-four months, without any period of supervised release
to follow. The government argued that such a sentence was
necessary in view of Young’s recidivism and continued drug
use. The government also asserted that restitution had been
made by his co-defendant, Jeanne Hooter, and not by Young.
In conclusion, the government argued that a sentence of
twenty-four months would at least safeguard the public for
that period of time.

In rebuttal, defense counsel argued that a prison term
of twenty-four months would not advance any of the
applicable sentencing factors and would ignore the substantial
role that Young’s substance abuse problems played in his
criminal history. Defense counsel also emphasized that
Young had the support of four prominent members of the
community, and argued that Young and society would be
better served by placing Young on supervision.

Ultimately, the District Court decided to impose a
prison term of twenty-four months, to be followed by a
twelve-month term of supervised release. In explaining its
rationale for the sentence, the District Court stated:

6
 Now, in making the factual findings
relevant to your sentence, I did give meaningful
consideration to the factors set out under Title
18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). And
here, you clearly violated the terms of your
supervised release, there’s no question about
that. You committed these crimes not more
than six weeks after your release from custody.
And once again, you were back using cocaine.

And as you and I well know, . . . you
have a very long history, despite the fact that it
doesn’t go back that many years in terms of
chronology. And you’ve been involved with
forging documents, and bad checks, and altering
ID’s. And a lot of this stems from cocaine and
alcohol addiction.

But the other thing that bothered me
when I sentenced you initially was it was my
sense, and it’s still my sense, that you preyed on
others relative to cocaine and alcohol
addictions. And so that was something else that
was troubling to this Court.

I also have to try to deter you from future
criminal conduct, and I’m concerned that even
with these four friends of yours who stood up
and tried to cover your back, and your mom and
your brother, you had some of these resources
available to you when you got out the last time,
and within six weeks you were out doing crimes
again. And you tell me, and everyone else tells

7
 me, you need drug and alcohol counseling
treatment. . . .

As also [has] been pointed out, the
restitution has been paid, but . . . it was the co-
defendant who [made] the payment. . . .

So, considering all of these factors, Mr.
Young, and considering the fact that you’re
[sic] criminal history was remarkable, and
usually it was the same behavior, and it was
spread over various counts, despite the fact that
you had a college education, the job skills, at
one time you owned your own business, that
you went right back out and broke the law
again. So, I’m not sure, you know, whether
supervision in and of itself, or probation in and
of itself, or anything else would stop you from
doing what you’ve done in the past, unless you
have been, in my estimation, treated and
corrected.

So, I believe that the sentence [of
twenty-four months’ imprisonment] . . . meets
the sentencing objectives by reflecting the
seriousness of the violations, promoting respect
for the law, and providing just punishment.

(A. 149-150.)

After the sentence was pronounced, Young, through
his counsel, objected on the grounds that the District Court (a)
had improperly taken into consideration the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
factors; (b) did not have a proper evidentiary foundation for

8
its finding that Young had preyed on other people; (c) had
erred in finding that co-defendant Hooter had paid restitution,
when, in fact, it was Young’s mother who had given the
money to Hooter to make restitution; and (d) failed to give
adequate weight to mitigation factors and rehabilitation
needs. The District Court rejected Young’s renewed entreaty
for a lesser sentence. This appeal followed.

II.

The District Court had jurisdiction by virtue of 18
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). Our standard of review in
the context presented here was recently articulated as follows:

This Court reviews the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a district court’s
sentence upon revocation of supervised release
for abuse of discretion. Procedurally, the
sentencing court must give “rational and
meaningful consideration” to the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors. Where procedural
reasonableness turns on a question of statutory
interpretation, we conduct plenary review of the
meaning of the statute. If a sentencing court
followed the appropriate procedures in
imposing the sentence, we then look to whether
the sentence itself was substantively reasonable.
Substantive reasonableness inquires into
“whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie
within the permissible statutory range, was
premised upon appropriate and judicious
consideration of the relevant factors.” Absent
procedural error, we will affirm the sentencing

9
 court “unless no reasonable sentencing court
would have imposed the same sentence on that
particular defendant for the reasons the district
court provided.”

United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769-70 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citations omitted).

III.

Young argues that the District Court committed three
procedural errors that combined to result in a substantively
unreasonable sentence. Specifically, Young contends that the
District Court was precluded from imposing a sentence that,
in the District Court’s words, “meets the sentencing
objectives by reflecting the seriousness of the violations,
promoting respect for the law, and providing just
punishment.” (A. 150.) The second procedural error posited
by Young concerns the District Court’s findings that Young
appeared to have a proclivity to prey on alcoholics and drug
addicts to facilitate the negotiation of bogus checks and had
not satisfied his restitution obligation. The final asserted
procedural error is the District Court’s purported failure “to
give meaningful consideration to defense arguments and a
proposal for rehabilitation.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) Each
alleged procedural error will be considered in turn.

A.

Young contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because Congress has precluded consideration
of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in the context of a supervised
release revocation proceeding. Young’s argument presents a

10
question of statutory interpretation, over which our review is
plenary. See Doe, 617 F.3d at 769-70.

Revocation of supervised release is governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e), which, in pertinent part, provides:

The court may, after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C),
(a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) –

....

(3) revoke a term of supervised release, and
require the defendant to serve in prison all or
part of the term of supervised release authorized
by statute for the offense that resulted in such
term of supervised release without credit for
time previously served on postrelease
supervision, if the court . . . finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised
release . . . .

Young argues that because § 3553(a)(2)(A) is not one of the
sentencing factors listed in § 3583(e), the District Court
committed reversible error by mentioning the seriousness of
the violation, along with the need to promote respect for the
law and to provide just punishment, in the rationale for its
sentence.

We have not previously addressed the precise question
presented here. We have, however, suggested that
consideration of the gravity of the violation of supervised
release – a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor – is not prohibited. See

11
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 544 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“Sentence is imposed for violations of supervised release
primarily to sanction the defendant’s breach of trust while
taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In
Bungar, we also acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has held that the omission of
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) “does not foreclose a court
from considering ‘other pertinent factors,’ such as the need
for the sentence to reflect ‘the seriousness of the offense.’”
Id. at 543 n.2 (quoting United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35,
47-48 (2d Cir. 2006)). The Sixth Circuit subsequently agreed
with the holding in Williams. See United States v. Lewis, 498
F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2007). We now confront directly
the question of whether consideration of the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
factors in the revocation context is prohibited, and join the
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Sixth Circuits in
holding that a district court does not commit procedural error
in taking into account those factors when imposing a sentence
for the violation of supervised release.

As the Second Circuit explained in Williams, the
enumeration in § 3583(e) of specified subsections of
§ 3553(a) that a court must consider in revoking supervised
release does not mean that it may not take into account any
other pertinent factor. 443 F.3d at 47. Furthermore, because
a court, in revoking supervised release, must take into
consideration “the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), as well as “the need for the sentence
imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and “to protect the public from

12
further crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(C),
Ҥ 3583(e) cannot reasonably be interpreted to exclude
consideration of the seriousness of the releasee’s violation,”
Williams, 443 F.3d at 48. Indeed, the “nature and
circumstances of the offense,” a mandatory revocation
consideration under § 3583(e), necessarily encompasses the
seriousness of the violation of supervised release.

In Lewis, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the omission of
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from § 3583(e) does not foreclose
consideration of the factors listed in the former section, and
that the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors are “essentially redundant
with matters courts are already permitted to take into
consideration when imposing sentences for violation of
supervised release.” 498 F.3d at 400. The Sixth Circuit
found additional support for its conclusion in United States
Sentencing Commission policy statements. Writing for the
court, Judge McKeague explained:

[I]n the official introduction to the policy
statements regarding supervised release, the
Sentencing Commission explains that “the
sentence imposed upon revocation . . . [is]
intended to sanction the violator for failing to
abide by the conditions of the court-ordered
supervision.” Thus, although violations of
supervised release generally do not entail
conduct as serious as crimes punishable under
the § 3553(a) regime, revocation sentences are
similarly intended to “sanction,” or,
analogously, to “provide just punishment for the
offense” of violating supervised release. Given
that the three considerations in § 3553(a)(2)(A)

13
 are consistent with considerations already
permissible for revocation sentences, the fact
that § 3583(e) does not require that courts
consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) does not mean that
courts are forbidden to consider that factor, and
the fact that a sentencing court does consider
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) is not error.

Id. (citation omitted).

Young relies upon case law from the Ninth Circuit to
support his contention that the District Court in his case was
prohibited from taking into account the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
factors. (Appellant’s Br. at 17-18 (citing United States v.
Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009)).) In
Hammons, which involved a district court’s complete failure
to provide any reasons for the defendant’s sentence upon
revocation of supervised release, the Ninth Circuit observed
that a district court is not to consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A)
factors, citing United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181-
82 (9th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Simtob, 485 F.3d
1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007). Hammons, 558 F.3d at 1104.
Miqbel reasoned that because Ҥ 3553(a)(2)(A) is a factor that
Congress deliberately omitted from the list applicable to
revocation sentencing, relying on that factor when imposing a
revocation sentence would be improper.” 2 444 F.3d at 1182.
Significantly, however, the court in Miqbel went on to state
that it would be unreasonable for a district court to place

2
Miqbel did not cite Williams, which was decided on
March 22, 2006, less than one month before the decision in
Miqbel was issued.

14
“primary” reliance upon a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor, stating that
“[w]e do not suggest that a mere reference to promoting
respect for the law would in itself render a sentence
unreasonable.” Id.

Buttressing the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit did
not make reliance upon a § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor improper per
se is the rationale articulated in Simtob. Explaining the
limited nature of its holding in Miqbel, the court in Simtob
wrote:

[W]e did not set forth a blanket proposition that
a court in no circumstances may consider the
seriousness of the criminal offense underlying
the revocation. The seriousness of the offense
underlying the revocation, though not a focal
point of the inquiry, may be considered to a
lesser degree as part of the criminal history of
the violator. . . .

To ignore the new violation underlying
the revocation entirely would be to ignore a key
predictor of a violator’s potential for
reintroduction into society without relapse. The
history of the violator, when combined with the
violator’s most recent criminal offenses, and
particularly when similar to the past
transgressions, is indicative of the violator’s
propensity for recidivism and inability to
integrate peacefully into a community. A
history of, for example, drug-related offenses,
combined with a drug-related offense
underlying the revocation, as is the case here,
creates a greater likelihood that the violator will

15
 relapse into the same or similar criminal
activity. A violator who, after committing an
offense and being placed on supervised release
for that offense, again commits a similar offense
is not only more likely to continue on that path,
but also has demonstrated to the court that the
violator has little respect for its command.
Because the district court’s trust in the
violator’s ability to coexist in society peacefully
has been broken to a greater degree than if the
violator had committed a minor offense of a
dissimilar nature, greater sanctions may be
required to deter future criminal activity.
Consequently, if the nature and the severity of
the underlying offense were removed from the
equation altogether, the court’s ability to
predict the violator’s potential for recidivism
and to punish the violator for the violator’s full
breach of trust (and, ultimately, to deter the
violator and to protect the public) would be
impaired significantly.

Simtob, 485 F.3d at 1062-63 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit’s explication in Simtob is consistent
with the reasoning articulated by the Second Circuit in
Williams and the Sixth Circuit in Lewis: the mere omission of
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) from the mandatory supervised release
revocation considerations in § 3583(e) does not preclude a
court from taking into account the seriousness of the conduct
underlying the supervised release revocation or the need for
the resulting sentence to promote respect for the law and

16
provide just punishment. To hold otherwise would ignore the
reality that the violator’s conduct simply cannot be
disregarded in determining the appropriate sanction. Indeed,
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines take
into account the seriousness of the violation of supervised
release by setting lengthier guideline ranges for offenses
classified as more serious. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. Thus, for
example, had Young’s conduct been classified as a less
serious “Grade C” violation, his advisory guideline
imprisonment range would have been eight to fourteen
months, as opposed to twenty-one to twenty-seven months for
the Grade B violation for which he was accountable. 3 Id.

3
The Fourth Circuit has stated “[a]ccording to
§ 3583(e), in devising a revocation sentence the district court
is not authorized to consider whether the revocation sentence
‘reflect[s] the seriousness of the offense, . . . promote[s]
respect for the law, and . . . provide[s] just punishment for the
offense.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th
Cir. 2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)). As pointed
out by the Government, the Fourth Circuit made this
observation without citation to Williams or any other
authority. (Appellee’s Br. at 25.) Moreover, the Fourth
Circuit’s statement was not supported by any analysis.
Finally, subsequent holdings of the Fourth Circuit, albeit non-
precedential, have sustained revocation sentences even where
a district court has cited in support of the sentence the “need
to provide just punishment,” United States v. Jennette, 324 F.
App’x 279, 280 (4th Cir. 2009); promote respect for the law,
United States v. Black, 289 F. App’x 613, 615 (4th Cir.
2008); and the seriousness of the defendant’s supervised
release violation, United States v. Turner, 241 F. App’x 168,

17
 It is thus plain to us that a district court’s consideration
of, and explicit reference to, the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in
imposing a sentence for the violation of supervised release is
not a procedural error that renders the sentence per se
unreasonable. Of course, there may be a case where a court
places undue weight on the seriousness of the violation or the
need for the sentence to promote respect for the law and
provide just punishment. But this is not such a case.

Unlike Williams, in which the Second Circuit affirmed
a sentence above the advisory guideline range
notwithstanding the district court’s explicit reliance upon the
seriousness of the violation, the District Court’s sentence in
this case fell within the advisory guideline range. As noted
above, the guideline range takes into consideration the
seriousness of the offense, and we find it difficult to conceive
a scenario where a district court’s reference to a particular
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factor would render a within-guideline range
sentence unreasonable per se. Furthermore, it is evident that
the District Court in this case was motivated to sanction the
repeated breaches of trust that occurred so soon after Young’s
release from custody. As noted above, the primary purpose
of a sentence for the violation of supervised release is “to
sanction the defendant’s breach of trust.” Bungar, 478 F.3d
at 544. In this regard, the District Court commented on the
fact that Young breached the trust reposed in him despite the

171 (4th Cir. 2007). It thus appears that the Fourth Circuit
has acknowledged that the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors are
inextricably intertwined with other factors, such as the nature
and circumstances of the offense, that a court must consider
in determining the appropriate sanction for a supervised
release violation.

18
existence of a supportive family and his educational and
vocational advantages. The District Court also appropriately
considered the need to provide deterrence and to protect the
public from further criminal conduct by Young, observing
that he engaged in the same type of criminal conduct that
resulted in the offense of conviction within weeks of his
release. We have recognized that criminal activity of the
same sort underlying the offense of conviction shortly after
the defendant’s discharge from custody “surely bespeak[s] a
breach of trust.” United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877,
894 (3d Cir. 1991). We have also acknowledged that a
defendant’s immediate return to a past pattern of criminal
conduct, as is the case here, “showed . . . that he continued to
pose a threat to the community,” a pertinent sentencing
consideration under § 3583(e). See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546.
It is thus evident that the District Court’s concluding
observation that the sentence of twenty-four months’
imprisonment “meets the sentencing objectives by reflecting
the seriousness of the violations, promoting respect for the
law, and providing just punishment” (A. 150), did not reflect
undue reliance upon the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors.
Accordingly, Young is not entitled to relief simply because
the District Court took into account those factors in imposing
its sentence.

B.

Young contends that the District Court committed
procedural error by finding that Young’s criminal conduct
involved his preying on others when there was no evidence
presented at the revocation hearing to support such a
conclusion. Young further argues that “the [D]istrict [C]ourt
improperly drew on unreliable information from another

19
hearing involving a co-defendant, where neither Mr. Young
or his counsel were present.” (Appellant’s Br. at 19.)
Young’s assertion is mistaken.

At the sentencing proceeding on his original federal
conviction, the District Court observed that Young had
preyed on vulnerable addicts and alcoholics by having them
present bogus checks in exchange for a share of the proceeds.
There was ample support for this conclusion in the factual
findings set forth in the PSR, and Young did not object to
those findings. In fashioning the revocation sanction, the
District Court was required to consider “the history and
characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and
it was not error for the District Court to consider Young’s
“history and characteristics” as revealed in the PSR that was
considered at a sentencing proceeding conducted less than
two years before the revocation hearing.

Young also complains that the District Court faulted
him for having had his mother pay the restitution of $384.74.
Young contends that there was no evidentiary support for the
District Court’s observation that Young “should have been
able to come up with the wherewithal [to make restitution],
even in prison.” (A. 157.)

As the Government points out, the District Court’s
statements about restitution must be placed in context. The
District Court initially understood that Young himself had
satisfied the restitution obligation. Satisfaction of a
restitution obligation implies acceptance of responsibility for
the underlying crime. That Young’s mother paid the very
modest restitution obligation of a 53-year-old college-
educated person implies a failure on Young’s part to take
responsibility for his actions. The District Court was entitled

20
to take this factor into account in determining the appropriate
sanction for the supervised release violation, and committed
no error in observing that it was troubled by the fact that
Young had not made any effort to make restitution on his
own.

C.

Young’s final claim of procedural error is that the
District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to
mitigation factors. Specifically, Young asserts that the
District Court failed to take into account the substance abuse
component of Young’s criminal conduct and the support
offered by Young’s friends and family.

A defendant, of course, is entitled to meaningful
consideration of the pertinent sentencing factors. See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007). But the record need not show that every
argument advanced on behalf of the defendant was addressed.
Id. All that is required is that “the record makes clear the
court took the [pertinent] factors into account in sentencing.”
Id.

In this case, the record demonstrates that the District
Court did give meaningful consideration to the mitigation
factors advanced by Young. First, the District Court
acknowledged the role that substance abuse problems had
played in Young’s criminal conduct. In fact, it recommended
to the Bureau of Prisons that Young be placed in any
substance abuse program for which he qualified. Second, the
District Court recognized that friends had pledged to assist
and support Young to avoid a repetition of his substance

21
abuse and related criminal conduct. None of the persons who
came forward to offer assistance, however, had experience
working with addicts. The District Court also noted that
Young had similar support when he was discharged from
custody, but reverted to drug use and criminal conduct as
soon as he left prison.

The District Court’s statements evince deliberate and
careful consideration of Young’s arguments. The District
Court’s decision to accord less weight to mitigation factors
than that urged by Young does not render the sentence
unreasonable. See Bungar, 478 F.3d at 546.

IV.

Young’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
his sentence is premised upon alleged procedural errors. We
have concluded, however, that Young has failed to show that
the District Court committed any procedural error in
sentencing him to a prison term of twenty-four months plus a
supervised release term of one year. It necessarily follows,
therefore, that the substantive challenge to his sentence fails
as well. Indeed, it cannot be said in this case that “no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same
sentence on [Young] for the reasons the district court
provided.” Doe, 617 F.3d at 770 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

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