NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2260
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PERRY GADDIS,
Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(C.A. No. 2:09-cv-1222)
District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
____________
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
Friday, February 18, 2011
Before: SLOVITER and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges,
and JONES, II,* District Judge.
(Opinion Filed: March 10, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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JONES, II, District Judge.
*
The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
Appellant Perry Gaddis (“Gaddis”) appeals the denial of his claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. We
will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we need not repeat the essentially
undisputed facts and procedural history of this matter. Moreover, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Robert Mitchell aptly summarized much of that background in his March 3, 2010, Report
and Recommendation (“Report”). See Gaddis v. Astrue, Comm’r of Soc. Sec., C.A. No.
2:09-cv-1222 (W.D. Pa. March 3, 2010) (Docket No. 14). The Report recommended that
the Social Security Commissioner’s (“Commissioner”) final decision regarding denial of
Gaddis’s claim be affirmed because it was supported by substantial evidence. Id. On
March 24, 2010, the District Court issued Orders that adopted the Report, granted the
Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Gaddis’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, and entered final judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. See id. at Docket
Nos. 15; 16. This appeal timely followed.1
II.
1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Gaddis did
not object to the Report and Recommendation at the District Court level, however appellate
review is not conditioned on the existence vel non of objections to a Magistrate Judge’s report.
Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 878-79 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Welch v. Heckler, 808 F.2d
264, 266 (3d Cir. 1986)).
2
On appeal, Gaddis argues that there is no basis in the record for the Administrative
Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding, which is required when the claimant is fifty-five years old
or older, that Gaddis’s job-related skills were readily transferable to jobs involving the
same industry, work processes, or tools. 2 Gaddis contends that, because the result of that
job skills inquiry is outcome-determinative, remand is the only appropriate disposition of
this case. 3
The Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Rules (“MVR”) direct findings of
“disabled” or “not disabled” based on a combination of factors such as age, education,
skilled or semi-skilled prior work experience, and residual functional capacity. By
application of these factors, Gaddis would have been found “disabled” if he had no
transferable work skills, but “not disabled” if he had transferable work skills. See MVR
201.06; 201.07. Gaddis’s skills would most likely transfer to, inter alia, jobs requiring a
2
Gaddis does not dispute the ALJ’s findings that: (1) Gaddis’s past work as a teacher
was skilled, (2) Gaddis’s job provided him with potentially transferable skills, and (3) Gaddis is
presently capable of performing “sedentary work,” as defined at 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a).
3
Upon appellate review, if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be upheld. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Plummer
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). We have referred to it as “less than a preponderance
of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Burns, 312 F.3d at 118 (citing Jesurum v. Sec’y
of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995)). Where the
Commissioner’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, courts are bound by those
findings even if they would have decided the factual inquiry differently – i.e., we are not
permitted to weigh the evidence or substitute our own conclusions for those of the fact-finder.
Burns, 312 F.3d at 118 (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992));
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
3
lesser degree of skills. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(2) (2008). However, due to Gaddis’s age
and residual functional capacity, a finding of transferable skills could only be made if
Gaddis would need to make few, if any, vocational adjustments in terms of processes,
settings or industries. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4) (citing 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) (2008));
Social Security Ruling 82-41, 1975-1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 847, 1982 WL 31389
(S.S.A.) (hereinafter “SSR 82-41”).
“[W]here job skills have universal applicability across industry lines, e.g., clerical,
professional, administrative, or managerial types of jobs, transferability of skills to
industries differing from past work experience can usually be accomplished with little, if
any, vocational adjustment where jobs with similar skills can be identified as being within
an individual’s [residual functional capacity].” SSR 82-41 § 4(c). When a finding is
made that a claimant has transferable skills: (1) the acquired work skills must be
identified, (2) the specific occupations to which the acquired work skills are transferable
must be cited, and (3) evidence that these specific skilled or semi-skilled jobs exist in
significant numbers in the national economy should be included. See SSR 82-41 § 6.
While he did not author a particularly lengthy opinion, we are satisfied that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) fulfilled the obligations imposed by SSR 82-41 in a
manner supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ identified transferable skills
from Gaddis’s past work as a teacher, including working with data, compiling, recording,
4
and preparing test results and grades. See ALJ Tr. 20-21. Next, the ALJ determined that
the skills Gaddis had gained from being a teacher were at a higher level than those
required for other sedentary, semi-skilled occupations, including the occupations of
examination clerk and clerical sorter, and were thus transferable to those occupations with
little, if any, vocational adjustment. Id. Because these occupations involved skills
closely related to his prior employment skills, Gaddis “could be expected to perform these
other identified jobs at high degrees of proficiency with a minimal amount of job
orientation.” SSR 82-41 § 4(c). Finally, the ALJ established that the identified lesser-
skilled jobs Gaddis could obtain existed in significant numbers in the regional and
national economies. 4 ALJ Tr. at 20; 242. This is sufficient.5
Contrary to Gaddis’s arguments, current regulations do not require the ALJ to find
Gaddis had “highly transferable” skills. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)(4); SSR 82-41, passim.
Rather, it was satisfactory for the ALJ to establish that Gaddis had identifiable,
transferable skills that could be utilized for sedentary office jobs in a controlled climate,
4
Specifically, the ALJ found that these occupations represented thousands of jobs in the
Pittsburgh Metropolitan Statistical Area and tens of thousands of jobs in the national economy.
See ALJ Tr. at 20-21; 242.
5
Gaddis’s argument concerning the degree to which the ALJ discussed the specific skills
utilized in the lesser-skilled potential jobs of data examination clerk and clerical sorter, as
identified by the Vocational Expert, is unpersuasive. The ALJ’s questioning of the Vocational
Expert represents an understanding that those positions would require “no additional skills”
other than those Gaddis already possessed as a result of his prior work experience. While
perhaps not especially artful, we do not find the ALJ’s phrasing to be unacceptably “odd,” as
asserted by Gaddis.
5
as discussed by the Vocational Expert. ALJ Tr. at 243. In addition, we find it is not of
outcome-determinative consequence that the ALJ did not specifically cite SSR 82-41.
The specific use of the phrase “SSR 82-41” is not of cardinal significance – indeed,
making it so here would unnecessarily elevate form over substance. What is important is
whether the ALJ engaged in the necessary analysis and issued a decision based on
substantial evidence. Here, we conclude from the record that the ALJ followed the letter
and the spirit of SSR 82-41 and relevant regulations, the ALJ sufficiently explained his
reasoning, and substantial evidence existed to support the ALJ’s decision.
III.
We will affirm the District Court judgment.
6