FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 10 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JERRY ARMSTRONG, No. 09-17801
Plaintiffs - Appellants, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01046-GEB-
GGH
v.
SISKIYOU COUNTY SHERIFF’S MEMORANDUM *
DEPARTMENT; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 15, 2011 **
Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Jerry Armstrong appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that he was unlawfully arrested for
violating the terms of his parole. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
Stewart because Armstrong failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Stewart unlawfully arrested Armstrong without legal grounds to do so and
conspired to put him back into custody. See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d
1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“mere allegation and speculation do not create a
factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
Tharsing because he is protected by qualified immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Monell claim
because Armstrong failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Tharsing’s direction of Armstrong to the halfway house was pursuant to a
municipal policy, custom, or practice, or because of a failure to train officers to
avoid issuing such directives. See Galen v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
667-68 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth required elements of a Monell claim).
2 09-17801
We do not consider Armstrong’s arguments raised for the first time on
appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Armstrong’s motion to amend is granted. His motion for default judgment
is denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 09-17801