PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-1844
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant
v.
HECTOR MERCED, a/k/a Braveheart
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 2-08-cr-00725-001
District Judge: The Honorable William J. Martini
Argued March 8, 2010
Before: AMBRO, SMITH, and MICHEL * ,
Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 20, 2010)
*
The Honorable Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by
designation.
John F. Romano (argued)
George S. Leone
Office of United States Attorney
970 Broad Street
Room 700
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellant
Louise Arkel (argued)
David A. Holman
Office of Federal Public Defender
972 Broad Street
4 th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Hector Merced pleaded guilty to a drug possession charge
and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment. That sentence
was well below the prison term recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines. The United States appeals, claiming that the District
Court committed procedural errors in determining Merced’s
sentence. We agree with the government. Accordingly, we will
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
2
I.
On June 27, 2007, Merced sold 49.1 grams of crack
cocaine to an undercover police officer. Merced received
$1,500 from the sale, and expressed willingness to do more
deals in the future. He was arrested on January 14, 2008. He
pleaded guilty to one count of distributing and possessing with
intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B).1 That crime
carries a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B).
A pre-sentence report (PSR) was prepared. The PSR
recounted Merced’s extensive criminal history, which included:
• a 1997 conviction for possession of controlled dangerous
substances (“CDS”) – specifically, 41 bags of crack
cocaine and a bag of marijuana – with intent to distribute
within 1000 feet of school property;
• two 1998 convictions for prowling public places;2
• a 1999 conviction for possession of CDS (15 bags of
cocaine) with intent to distribute within 1000 feet of
school property;
1
Thus, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3231.
2
Merced possessed marijuana on both occasions.
3
• a 2001 conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle;
• a 2001 conviction for possession of CDS (52 bags of
heroin and 8 bags of crack cocaine) with intent to
distribute within 1000 feet of school property; and
• a 2006 conviction for conspiracy to distribute CDS (23
bags of marijuana).
Due to his criminal history, Merced qualified as a career
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. That provision applied
because (1) Merced was more than 18 years old when he
participated in the June 27, 2007 crack cocaine deal, (2) his
crime was a controlled substance offense, and (3) he had two or
more prior felony convictions that were controlled substance
offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Merced’s career offender
status increased his offense level to 34, id. § 4B1.1(b); a three-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility lowered that
level to 31. Id. § 3E1.1. The PSR placed him in Criminal
History Category VI. Id. § 4B1.1(b). His combined offense
level and Criminal History Category yielded an advisory
Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months. Absent the career
offender provision, his base offense level would have been 28,
his adjusted offense level 25, and his Guidelines range 110-137
months.
Both parties filed memoranda before the sentencing
hearing. Merced argued for a below-Guidelines sentence. He
acknowledged that the Guidelines range of 188-235 months had
been correctly calculated, but argued that the resulting
Guidelines sentence was “exceedingly harsh” and not justified
4
under the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).3 His
3
Those factors are:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed –
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the
law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for –
5
argument was twofold. First, based on Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), he attacked the crack cocaine
Guidelines and the career offender provision of § 4B1.1 on
policy grounds. He claimed that because neither reflected the
Sentencing Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic
institutional role,” his Guidelines range, which was a product of
those two provisions, was a “poor touchstone[] in any § 3553(a)
inquiry.” Second, he argued that consideration of the sentencing
(A) the applicable category of
o f f en s e c o m m itte d b y th e
applicable category of defendant as
set forth in the guidelines . . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement –
(A) issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . . subject to any
amendments made to such policy
statement by act of Congress . . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar conduct;
and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims
of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
6
factors in his specific case counseled in favor of leniency.
Merced claimed that he was a casualty of a “‘perfect storm’ of
discouraging forces: a splintered family, economic struggle, and
an increasingly punitive criminal justice system.” Merced
explained that his life “imploded” at the age of 12, when two ex-
convict uncles moved into his home and got his mother hooked
on crack cocaine. According to Merced, the mother’s addiction
led to domestic strife, and eventually caused Merced’s father to
abandon the family and move to Puerto Rico. Merced claimed
that this troubled childhood pushed him down the wrong path
and led him to a life of criminal activity for which he was not
wholly responsible. Additionally, he asked the court to consider
his strong relationship with his longtime girlfriend and their 10-
year-old son, as well as letters from various family members
attesting to his positive attributes. Merced did not request a
sentence of any particular length, but he argued that even a 10-
year sentence was “simply not necessary” to satisfy the
sentencing goals of § 3553(a).
The government advocated a sentence within the
Guidelines range and urged the court to reject Merced’s
Kimbrough attack on § 4B1.1. It argued that Kimbrough was
inapposite because, unlike the crack cocaine Guidelines at issue
in that case, the career offender provision that dictated Merced’s
recommended sentence reflected not only the Sentencing
Commission’s exercise of its unique institutional role, but also
direct “congressional involvement in the setting of punishment
for certain recidivists.” (A. 53-55, citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
It further argued that even if the Court accepted Merced’s
argument based on Kimbrough, it should not apply a
replacement ratio less than the 20:1 ratio accepted by the
7
Supreme Court in Spears v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 840, 842
(2009). According to the government, applying that ratio would
generate a Guidelines range of 92 to 115 months, and “any ratio
less than this would result in significant sentencing disparities,
as a defendant who possessed merely an additional .9 grams of
crack [i.e., 50 grams] . . . and had no criminal history
whatsoever, would be subject to a mandatory minimum term of
ten years’ imprisonment, [under] 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).”
Finally, the government turned to the sentencing factors
and argued that each relevant factor weighed in favor of a
Guidelines sentence. It emphasized Merced’s criminal history,
which included at least five drug-related convictions, and the
seriousness of his offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). It
argued that a Guidelines-length sentence was necessary to
protect the public and to deter both Merced and other drug
dealers. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C). The government also
contended that a within-Guidelines sentence was necessary to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See id. § 3553(a)(6).
It argued that Merced’s sentence “should be commensurate to
other career offenders convicted of similar offenses in New
Jersey and across the country.”
The District Court held a sentencing hearing on February
24, 2009. At that hearing, the Court took particular interest in
the application of the career offender provision. All parties
agreed that Merced was eligible for career offender status under
a mechanical application of § 4B1.1. The point of debate was
not Merced’s technical eligibility, but whether the Court should
sentence him within the range generated by applying that
provision. Throughout the hearing, the District Court was
8
obviously wrestling with two competing realities. The first was
that Merced was a 31-year-old career criminal who had not been
deterred by the punishment he received for his prior convictions.
The second was that many of the crimes that brought Merced
within § 4B1.1 were “street level” offenses that the Court did
not consider to be terribly serious. This tension between the
numerosity and the severity of Merced’s crimes led the District
Court to engage in an on-one-hand-on-the-other-hand dialectic
several times during the hearing. For example:
[Merced has] been a repetitive drug – street drug
dealer, okay? He just doesn’t get it. I mean, he’s
been on the street dealing drugs, relatively small
amounts compared to what I often see, but he’s
been doing it repetitively . . . . And it begins at a
very young age, it begins at 19. He’s 31 years of
age now. It begins at 19. A lot of what’s in his
record with the exception of four prior drug
arrests, a lot of it is the type of stuff that you see
with people who are dealing with drugs on the
street level. I’m not minimizing it, but, you know,
public – prowling, public places, a couple of
municipal court violations.
After walking through the specifics of Merced’s criminal
history, the Court returned to this issue. He acknowledged that
“there are career offenders and there are career offenders . . . .
But he hasn’t learned.” In the same vein, the Court later noted
that “we’re talking about a relatively small sale of crack cocaine
at the street level. But it’s his fifth time he’s done this now . . .
. I don’t know when he’s going to wake up.”
9
In the midst of his oral ruminations, however, the District
Court revealed another possible reason for its reluctance to
sentence Merced as a career criminal. The Court told Merced
that he needed to realize that “he can’t make a living like this”
because “another judge might . . . [apply] the career offender
status recommendation . . . . I have a problem with that. I mean,
I kind of reserve career offender status for violent, significant
drug deals, that type of thing, even though the guidelines may
advise that it’s appropriate.” (A. 76, emphasis added.) The
Court did not explain either how it arrived at this personal
sentencing policy, or why it believed that the contrary policies
reflected in the Guidelines were out of line.
During the hearing, the District Court also took note of
several § 3553(a)(1) factors that in its view favored a downward
variance. He observed the relatively small quantity of crack
involved in Merced’s latest offense, the “street level” nature of
Merced’s previous crimes, the fact that Merced “probably [has]
a drug problem himself,” 4 Merced’s troubled childhood, and his
strong relationships with his girlfriend and son. The District
Judge noted that the longest prison term Merced had received
for any of his previous crimes was, at most, four years, and
reasoned that no matter what, he was facing “more [jail time]
than he’s done before.” The government conceded that Merced
was a relatively low-level dealer, and not “the main connect
around here who is bringing in kilos of heroin and coke.” It
emphasized, however, that this was Merced’s sixth drug crime,
4
Merced used ecstacy and marijuana daily, and claimed
that he was addicted to the latter.
10
and remained adamant that Merced deserved a Guidelines
sentence because he had not “learned his lesson” from previous
arrests. The Court was not persuaded: “Looking behind and
looking at his criminal record, which gets into the individual
circumstances of his conduct and his history, it just is an
excessive guideline recommendation, in this Court’s opinion.”
After Merced read a letter to the Court accepting
responsibility for his crime, the District Judge undertook a
formal analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. We reprint this analysis
in full, because just as important as what the Court said is what
it did not say. Specifically, it made no mention of § 3553(a)(6),
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct”:
That’s my responsibilit[y] under 3553, to impose
a sentence that’s sufficient but not greater than
necessary. I have to look at the nature of the
circumstances of the offense, and I certainly have
here. The offense before me itself is in all
respects a relatively small offense compared to
what I deal with on drug cases frequently. I’m
not minimizing it, but I have to put it in some
context.
But the history and characteristics of the
defendant. It’s clear, and I’ve said it already, he
hasn’t learned his lesson since he was 19 years
old. He’s had a number of different involvements
and convictions for possession with intent to
11
distribute, mostly in state court, mostly small
amounts, glassine bags, marijuana, crack cocaine.
Clearly, it shows that he’s resorted to being a
street dealer. Maybe not all the time, but when
he’s in need of money. And his biggest sentence
up to now was 30 months to 4 years.
I don’t know if he served – he had 4 years with a
30-month mandatory minimum. I don’t know if
he served more than 30 months or not. But he
still didn’t get it is my problem. And as I’ve said
already, statutorily he’s faced with at least 60
months [here]. I’m not sure that’s going to be
enough time for him to wake up and get it. Okay?
There are some – you know, look, he’s
unfortunately somewhat a product of his
upbringing. You know, it appears that his
upbringing – his parents were drug users and
perhaps even violent; yet, there are some good
things, at least hopeful things about him. He
appears to have – considering his conduct in
terms of being in the streets with drugs, he’s
maintained a consensual union with his girlfriend
for over 12 years. That’s probably the strongest
thing going in his life. He has one child from this
relationship and one child from a previous one.
He says he has a harmonious relationship with
this woman, and he appears to at least attempt to
want to take care of his kids. I don’t see that all
the time in these cases.
12
He says he’s tried to gain employment but he’s
faced obstacles. And, of course, he’s going to face
more obstacles with the stronger criminal record
that he has.
I think a substantial variance is warranted. It’s a
serious crime, but I put it in context looking at his
record. There’s a need to deter others from this
type of street conduct but, you know what?
There’s a need to deter him. And he hasn’t gotten
it yet. And there is some need to protect the
public from people who feel that they can go out
when they are struggling and sell drugs on the
street. I also have a duty not to impose an
unnecessarily harsh and punitive sentence for the
conduct that’s before me, even with the criminal
record I have.
Based on this analysis, the Court sentenced Merced to 60
months in prison. This was the shortest prison term allowable
by statute. It was also 128 months below the bottom of
Merced’s advisory Guidelines range, and 50 months below the
bottom of what that range would have been even in the absence
of § 4B1.1. Later, the Court issued a written Statement of
Reasons (“SOR”) explaining that this variance was based on
the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history and characteristics of the defendant
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court
finds that a sentence within the career offender
guideline range[] is far greater than necessary to
13
achieve just punishment and that a variance is
appropriate because of the relatively small sale of
crack cocaine[] in the instant offense and the
relatively minor nature of the transactions in prior
qualifying convictions.
The SOR did not mention the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, or the Court’s personal policy of applying
§ 4B1.1 only in cases involving “violent, significant drug deals.”
The government appealed the sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3742(b). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, the
federal Sentencing Guidelines were binding on district courts;
they had “the force and effect of laws.” United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005). Booker “held unconstitutional that
portion of the Guidelines that made them mandatory,” United
States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 354 (2007), and replaced the
mandatory regime with one in which the Guidelines are
“effectively advisory.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. After Booker,
sentencing courts must “consider the Guidelines range” pursuant
to § 3553(a)(4), but also “tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns” reflected in the sentencing factors of §
3553(a). Id. “[A]ppellate review of sentencing decisions is
limited to determining whether they are reasonable.” 5 United
5
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals
may (but need not) presume that a within-Guidelines sentence
14
States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (internal quotations
omitted).
“[B]oth the district court’s crafting of an appropriate
sentence and the appellate court’s review of that sentence for
reasonableness must be ‘guided by the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313,
327-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437
F.3d 324, 327 (3d Cir. 2006)). Reasonableness review proceeds
in two stages, and employs the “familiar abuse of discretion
standard” at each stage. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. First, we ensure
that the district court committed no “significant procedural
error,” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)
(en banc), “such as failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
If the district court commits procedural error, our preferred
course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, without going
is reasonable. 551 U.S. at 347. Our Court has declined this
invitation; others have accepted it. Compare United States v.
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006), with United States v.
Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006). No court of
appeals, however, may presume that an outside-the-Guidelines
sentence is unreasonable. Rita, 551 U.S. at 354-55.
15
any further. Ausburn, 501 F.3d at 328.6 But if the district
court’s procedures are sound, we proceed to examine the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. “The touchstone
of reasonableness is whether the record as a whole reflects
rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated
in § 3553(a).” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted).
In Tomko, we held that our substantive reasonableness
inquiry must be highly deferential. 562 F.3d at 568. We
recognized that the sentencing judge, not the court of appeals,
“‘is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import
under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The sentencing judge
sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations,
has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed
by the record.’ This means that ‘the sentencing judge has access
to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the
individual defendant before him than . . . the appeals court.’” Id.
at 566 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52) (internal citations
omitted). We further recognized that the district court’s superior
vantage point compels us to “‘give due deference to [its]
determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,’ justify the
sentence.” Id. at 568 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
Accordingly, we held that “if the district court’s sentence is
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that
6
But see United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 219-20
(3d Cir. 2009) (finding procedural error yet proceeding to
analyze substantive reasonableness).
16
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.
We were careful to note, however, that our adoption of
a deferential standard of review for substantive reasonableness
was “not an exercise in self-abnegation.” Id. at 575. We retain
“an important role . . . in reviewing district courts’ sentencing
decisions.” Id. Chief among our duties in fulfilling this
“important role” is ensuring that district courts follow proper
sentencing procedures. Indeed, the broad substantive discretion
afforded district courts under Tomko makes adherence to
procedural sentencing requirements all the more important.
These procedural requirements exist to “guide the [district
court’s] exercise of discretion,” and failure to observe them may
lead a court to impose a substantively unreasonable sentence.
United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007)
(describing substantively unreasonable sentence as “the product
of the District Court’s procedurally flawed approach”); United
States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2009) (concluding
that “by ignoring relevant factors and failing to offer a reasoned
explanation for its departure from the Guidelines, the District
Court . . . put at risk the substantive reasonableness of any
decision it reached” (internal quotations omitted)).
“[O]ur post-Booker precedent instructs district courts to
follow a three-step sentencing process.” United States v.
Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). First, the court must
correctly calculate the defendant’s Guidelines range. Id.
Second, it must rule on any motions for departures. Id. Finally,
“after giving both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever
sentence they deem appropriate,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49, the court
17
must “exercise[] its discretion” through “meaningful
consideration to the § 3553(a) factors” before deciding on a
sentence. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. While there is “no
mandatory script for sentencing,” Goff, 501 F.3d at 256, the
court’s analysis of the relevant factors must adequately
demonstrate its exercise of “independent judgment” and
meaningful consideration of the relevant sentencing factors.
United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The
district court need not make explicit “findings as to each of the
§ 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear that the court took
the factors into account in sentencing.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at
329. It is “not incumbent on the District [Court] to raise every
conceivable relevant issue on [its] own initiative” during
sentencing, Gall, 552 U.S. at 54, nor must the court “discuss
every argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly
without merit.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. However, if a party
raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one of the
§ 3553(a) factors, the district court may not ignore it. The court
should address that argument as part of its “meaningful
consideration” of the sentencing factors. Ausburn, 502 F.3d at
329 (stating that “the court must acknowledge and respond to
any properly presented sentencing argument which has colorable
legal merit and a factual basis” in the record).
“After settling on the appropriate sentence, [the court]
must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for
meaningful appellate review.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. In other
words, it is not enough for the district court to carefully analyze
the sentencing factors. A separate and equally important
procedural requirement is demonstrating that it has done so.
Because of the “fact-bound nature of each sentencing decision,”
18
there is no “uniform threshold” for determining whether a court
has supplied a sufficient explanation for its sentence. Tomko,
562 F.3d at 567. In some cases, a “brief” statement of reasons
can be “legally sufficient.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 358. See also
United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007)
(finding no procedural error notwithstanding the district court’s
“scant” discussion of the § 3553(a) factors). In others, a longer
explanation may be appropriate. “[T]he record must be
adequate for review, [but] it need not be perfect . . . . [R]eview
in this area is necessarily flexible[.]” Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328.
In all cases, however, the district court must “set forth enough
to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Stated
another way, the district court must furnish an explanation
“sufficient for us to see that the particular circumstances of the
case have been given meaningful consideration within the
parameters of § 3553(a).” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d
190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008). We require this explanation, not
because we distrust district courts or seek to second-guess them,
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 575, but because such an explanation is
necessary and vital to us in performing meaningful substantive
reasonableness review. See Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329
(explaining that “there is no way to review [a court’s] exercise
of discretion” if it “does not articulate the reasons underlying its
decision” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 388 F.3d 96, 101
(3d Cir. 2004))).
The extent of the explanation we require of the district
court may turn on whether the court has varied from the
Guidelines range, and, if it has, on the magnitude of the
19
variance. If the court imposes a sentence outside of the
Guidelines, it “must consider the extent of the deviation and
ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support
the degree of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. While there
is “no mathematical formula” for assessing the adequacy of a
district court’s explanation for a variance, Levinson, 543 F.3d at
196, “a major departure should be supported by a more
significant justification than a minor one.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
See also Levinson, 543 F.3d at 197 (stating that “we may look
for a more complete explanation to support a sentence that
varies from the Guidelines than we will look for when reviewing
a sentence that falls within a properly calculated Guidelines
range); Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 331 n.36 (observing that the
“farther a sentence varies from the advisory guidelines range,
the more compelling the judge’s reasons must be”).
With these principles in mind, we turn to the
government’s specific claims of error in this case.
III.
Significantly, the government does not challenge the
substantive reasonableness of Merced’s sentence. Its claims of
error are entirely procedural. The government claims that the
District Court essentially ignored the advisory Guidelines range,
contrary to § 3553(a)(4); decided to grant a variance before the
government had an opportunity to argue its position; employed
a personal sentencing policy antithetical to congressional and
Sentencing Commission policies, without adequate explanation;
failed to adequately explain the massive downward variance it
granted Merced; ignored the need to avoid unwarranted
20
sentencing disparities, contrary to § 3553(a)(6); and failed to
evaluate the seriousness of Merced’s offense or his criminal
history. Merced argues that the District Court committed no
procedural error, and that the chosen sentence reflects the
Court’s careful analysis of all of the § 3553(a) sentencing
factors.
Most of the government’s claims of error are
underwhelming. In particular, we reject the claim that the
District Court repeatedly interrupted the government at the
sentencing hearing, and would not allow it to present its case.
That accusation is simply not supported by the record. We also
reject the government’s claim that the District Court ignored the
applicable Guidelines range. The Court stated that it had read
the PSR and the parties’ sentencing memoranda, all of which
referenced the correct Guidelines range. The Court
acknowledged the Guidelines range three times during the
sentencing hearing, and correctly adopted that range in its
written SOR explaining the sentence. The record makes clear
that the Court properly considered the Guidelines range as its
“starting point,” Smalley, 517 F.3d at 211, then varied
downward because it viewed that recommendation as excessive
for various reasons.
Finally, we cannot agree that the District Court failed to
adequately consider Merced’s criminal history or the seriousness
of his offense, at least as a procedural matter. As recounted
above, the Court weighed both of those factors extensively at the
sentencing hearing. What the government seems really to be
arguing is that the Court’s choice of sentence did not afford
those factors enough weight. True or not, that is a substantive
21
complaint, not a procedural one. The “district court’s failure to
give [certain] factors the weight [the government] contends they
deserve” does not mean that those factors were not considered.
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). The
government cannot circumvent Tomko by repackaging a
substantive claim of error as a procedural one. If the
government wanted to argue that no reasonable court could have
sentenced Merced to five years in prison, it should have argued
that no reasonable court could have sentenced Merced to five
years in prison.
With all of that said, two of the government’s claims
have merit. First, we agree that the District Court failed to
adequately explain its apparent policy disagreement with the
career offender provision of § 4B1.1, and what role, if any, that
disagreement played in determining Merced’s sentence.
Second, we agree that the Court failed to explain how the
variance it granted to Merced would not contribute to
unwarranted sentencing disparities. These procedural errors
compel us to vacate Merced’s sentence.
A. Policy Disagreement with § 4B1.1
In the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress directed
the Sentencing Commission to “assure that the guidelines
specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the
maximum term authorized” for adult offenders who (1) are
convicted of a felony controlled substance offense or a felony
crime of violence, and (2) have two or more such prior felony
convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(1)-(2). See also United States
v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 662-64 (2d Cir. 2008) (tracing the
22
origins of § 4B1.1). The Commission implemented this
directive in § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines, which prescribes
increased offense levels – and thus, all else equal, harsher
recommended sentences – for “career offenders.” Consistent
with 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), § 4B1.1 provides that a defendant is a
career offender if “(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years
old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that
is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions
of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). It is undisputed that Merced qualifies as
a career offender under this definition.
At sentencing, however, the District Court stated that it
“kind of reserve[s] career offender status for violent, significant
drug deals, that type of thing, even though the guidelines may
advise that it’s appropriate.” We interpret this as an expression
of a policy disagreement with the Guidelines over who should
(or should not) be subject to the enhanced punishment reserved
for recidivists.7 It appears that the Court, while recognizing that
Merced technically qualified as a career offender, thought that
§ 4B1.1 prescribed unduly harsh punishment given the low-level
7
If this interpretation is wrong, the District Court will
have the opportunity to correct us on remand. As a matter of
best practices, of course, a district judge who sentences a
defendant pursuant to a policy disagreement with the Guidelines
should clearly state that he is doing so. This will minimize the
risk that he will be misunderstood by a reviewing court.
23
nature of Merced’s previous crimes. In other words, the Court
seemed to believe, as a matter of policy, that § 4B1.1’s
definition of a career offender is overbroad, and that someone
like Merced with a history of mere street crimes should not be
subject to the same heightened penalties as a criminal engaged
in “violent, significant drug deals.”
A threshold issue is whether district courts may properly
vary from the career offender Guidelines range based on this
sort of policy disagreement. In Spears, the Supreme Court
clarified its decision in Kimbrough and held that “district courts
are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-
cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines.” 129 S. Ct. at 843-44. There has been disagreement
as to whether district courts are likewise free to vary from the
Guidelines based on policy disagreements with § 4B1.1. The
First, Sixth and Eighth Circuits hold that they are. United States
v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Gray, 577 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2009). Opinions of the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have taken the opposite view.
See United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2009),
overruled by United States v. Corner, No. 08-1033, __ F.3d __,
2010 WL 935754 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 2010) (en banc); United
States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2009), vacated by
Vazquez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 1135 (2010)
(mem.). Both Welton and Vazquez held that the principles of
Kimbrough are inapplicable to the career offender provision
because, unlike the crack cocaine Guidelines at issue in
Kimbrough, § 4B1.1 was promulgated pursuant to direct
statutory command. See, e.g., Welton, 583 F.3d at 496-97
24
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)); Vazquez, 558 F.3d at 1228-29
(same). They reasoned that “the Sentencing Guidelines may be
only advisory for district judges, [but] congressional legislation
is not.” Welton, 583 F.3d at 496-97.8
This reasoning seems to be falling out of favor. In light
of Spears, the government subsequently confessed error in both
Welton and Vazquez. Neither case is good law today.9 We need
not weigh in on this issue, however, because the parties do not
disagree about it. The government concedes that a sentencing
court may vary downward from the Guidelines range generated
by the career offender provision based solely on a policy
disagreement with the scope of that provision. We will proceed
on the assumption that the government’s concession is well-
8
But see Sanchez, 517 F.3d at 663 (concluding that there
is simply “no statutory provision instructing the court to
sentence a career offender at or near the statutory maximum”
because § 994(h) instructs the Sentencing Commission, not
sentencing courts); Michael, 576 F.3d at 327 (“[A] directive that
the Commission specify a particular Guidelines range is not a
mandate that sentencing courts stay within it.”).
9
The Seventh Circuit sitting en banc overruled Welton,
see Corner, 2010 WL 935754 at *3; the Supreme Court vacated
Vazquez at the government’s request. See Vazquez v. United
States, 130 S.Ct. 1135 (2010) (mem.). The Eleventh Circuit has
not yet considered the issue on remand.
25
grounded.10 That assumption, however, is only the beginning of
the inquiry. For even if district courts may choose a sentence at
variance with the range generated by § 4B1.1, they must do so
while following the same procedures that apply in every other
case.
Here, the District Court committed two procedural errors.
First, it never explained its statement that it “kind of” reserved
career offender status for large-scale or violent drug dealers. It
was unclear whether the Court was describing a categorical rule
that it followed in all cases, or an informal rule of thumb that it
applied only in certain cases (perhaps, but not necessarily,
including Merced’s). The Court mentioned its personal
sentencing policy only once, almost in passing, and said nothing
about it at the time it announced Merced’s sentence. Thus, the
extent to which its disagreement with the scope of § 4B1.1
ultimately affected Merced’s sentence remains a mystery. The
Court identified several unrelated mitigating factors that
weighed in favor of a downward variance, such as Merced’s
difficult childhood, his drug problem, his strong relationship
with his longtime girlfriend, and his resolve to take care of his
children. Along the same lines, the Court wrote in the SOR that
it was basing the variance on its assessment of § 3553(a)(1) (the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant). In theory, the entirety of the
10
We can safely do so, of course, because if district
courts lacked the freedom to vary based on policy disagreements
with § 4B1.1, we would decide this case the same way we
decide it today – the sentence would have to be vacated.
26
variance could have been based on those mitigating factors.11
The Court’s stated reluctance to assign career offender status
absent “violent” or “significant” drug offenses could have been
a stray comment, or it could have been central to the choice of
sentence. We cannot tell on this record. The District Court
must do more to “plainly state the reasoning” behind its
sentence. Levinson, 543 F.3d at 197. See also Grier, 475 F.3d
at 571-72 (requiring “a sufficiently detailed explanation” so as
to allow for “effective review”). For that reason alone, we must
vacate the sentence and remand with instructions for the Court
to explain its sentence more clearly.12
11
Indeed, just after the Court revealed its personal
sentencing policy concerning § 4B1.1, it hastened to add that
“I’m not saying by any means the guidelines application here is
inappropriate or not proper . . . . anything I do would be by way
of a variance looking at” the low-level nature of Merced’s
crimes and the fact that Merced had a drug problem. Then
again, the Court also warned Merced that he needed to change
his ways because “another judge” might apply the career
offender Guidelines, thereby implying that this judge had
decided not to apply them. These statements only add to our
confusion as to whether the Court’s policy disagreement with §
4B1.1 informed Merced’s sentence, or whether the variance was
based on Merced’s personal characteristics.
12
The Court’s handling of the § 4B1.1 issue is further
clouded by its conflicting statements about the strength of
Merced’s argument that § 4B1.1 was analogous to the crack
cocaine Guidelines at issue in Kimbrough. At one point, the
27
Second, if the District Court intends to vary downward
based on a policy disagreement with § 4B1.1, it must better
explain and justify that decision. The freedom to vary from the
career offender Guidelines, assuming it exists, is not free. Its
price is a reasoned, coherent, and “sufficiently compelling”
explanation of the basis for the court’s disagreement. Lychock,
578 F.3d at 219. Examination of our precedents reveals that the
District Court’s explanation here fell short of what is required.
In Lychock, the defendant pleaded guilty to possessing
dozens of images of child pornography. The Guidelines
recommended a prison term of 30 to 37 months, but the district
court refused to impose any jail time. The court’s reasoning
rested in part on its view that imprisoning Lychock would
neither protect the public nor deter future child pornography
possession by others. Id. at 216-17. The court explained:
The only benefit I could see [to imprisonment
would be] as a deterrent to others, and that is a
factor . . . . So other people would recognize that
they cannot subscribe to these images with
impunity. I am not persuaded that a jail term for
this defendant warrants, or is to be equated with
Court told Merced’s lawyer that he need not reprise the § 4B1.1
argument made in his memorandum because “I fully understand
your argument . . . . and I buy into it to a large extent.” Later,
however, when the government attempted to refute Merced’s
Kimbrough analogy, the Court said, in reference to Merced’s
argument, “no, no, I’m not buying into that.”
28
that value. The kind of psychological problem in
persons who are drawn to this kind of material it
seems to me is not going to be deterred by a jail
term for an internet porno observer. There is no
suggestion the public otherwise is threatened by
his conduct.
Id. at 217 (alterations in original). We interpreted this
explanation as reflecting a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines, which embodied the reasoned judgment of Congress
and the Sentencing Commission that the goals of sentencing
would be served by imposing jail time on child pornography
consumers like Lychock. Id. at 219. We allowed that such
disagreement was permissible, but only if the court provided a
“sufficiently compelling,” “reasoned explanation for its apparent
disagreement with the policy judgments” reflected by the
Guidelines range. Id. We concluded that the district court’s
justification for its lenient sentence, a mere “conclusory
statement of personal belief” about the benefits vel non of
imprisonment, was insufficient support for its refusal to follow
the policies embodied in the Guidelines. Id. at 220.
13
Accordingly, we vacated the sentence.
We followed similar reasoning in Levinson. There, the
13
As discussed in Section III.B, this failure to explain its
policy disagreement with the Guidelines was not the only error
that led us to vacate the sentence. The district court in Lychock
also failed to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities pursuant to § 3553(a)(6).
29
defendant was the owner of a failing water cooler business who
engaged in an elaborate fraud to make his company appear
profitable. He ordered employees to shred documents, destroy
electronic records, and create phony sales reports. He also filed
false tax returns which deprived the government of over $40,000
in revenue. Levinson, 543 F.3d at 192. In reliance on
Levinson’s misrepresentations, a parent company, Elkay,
invested millions of dollars in his business. Id. at 191.
Levinson eventually pleaded guilty to wire fraud and filing a
false tax return. He also reached a civil settlement with Elkay.
Id. at 192. The Guidelines recommended a prison term of 24 to
30 months, but the district court imposed probation only. Id. at
192, 194. It reasoned that
[Levinson] put the appearance of prosperity above
his respect for the law. Balanced against this is
the propriety of putting into jail at a substantial
cost to the public a nonviolent offender who poses
little or no threat to the public and whose crimes
had little impact beyond his business partners and
his family. . . . When I look at the costs associated
with putting someone like Mr. Levinson [in] jail
in this day and age compared to the harm he has
caused, which has been resolved amicably with
his business and which certainly will impose even
more harm on his family, I just can’t see that it
makes much sense. I just do not.
Id. at 194 (emphasis added, some alterations in original). We
found this explanation for the court’s substantial downward
variance insufficient, and vacated the sentence. We interpreted
30
the district court’s refusal to imprison Levinson, based on its
view that the cost of imprisonment outweighed its benefits, as
a policy disagreement with the Guidelines. While reiterating
that such “[p]olicy considerations are not off-limits in
sentencing,” id. at 200, we emphasized that sentences influenced
by policy disagreements must be accompanied by a “thorough
explanation” from the court. Id. at 201. The district court’s
bare, unsupported assertion that jail time was too costly to be
worthwhile – simply because Levinson’s fraud was
“white-collar” and directed at a private entity who had been
made whole through a civil settlement – was insufficient to
justify ignoring the “very deliberate policy choices” reflected in
the Guidelines sentence. Id. at 200.
Again, we assume for present purposes that the freedom
district courts enjoy under Kimbrough and Spears includes the
freedom to vary from a career offender Guidelines range based
on a policy disagreement. However, “such disagreement is
permissible only if a District Court provides ‘sufficiently
compelling reasons to justify it.’” Lychock, 578 F.3d at 219
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). A “sufficiently compelling”
explanation is one that is grounded in the § 3553(a) factors. The
authors of the Guidelines, no less than district courts, have been
tasked with ensuring that criminal sentences meet the goals of
sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). Rita, 551 U.S. at 348
(explaining that “both the sentencing judge and the Commission
. . . [carry] out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at
retail, the other at wholesale.”). Thus, the Guidelines reflect the
Sentencing Commission’s “rough approximation of sentences
that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Id. at 350. If a
district court concludes that those objectives are not achieved by
31
a sentence within the career offender Guideline range, and that
belief is driven by a policy disagreement with the career
offender provision, then the court must explain why its policy
judgment would serve the § 3553(a) sentencing goals better than
the Sentencing Commission’s judgments. In doing so, he should
take into account all of the sentencing factors, not just one or
two of them in isolation.14 We require this explanation “so that,
on appeal, we can determine whether the [court’s] disagreement
is valid in terms of the § 3553 factors, the Sentencing
Guidelines, and the perception of fair sentencing.” Lychock,
578 F.3d at 219 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the District Court’s explanation of its policy
disagreement fell short even of the explanations found wanting
in Lychock and Levinson. In fact, the Court offered no real
explanation at all – only a suggestion as to what its personal
sentencing practices are, in light of that disagreement. If the
District Court has a policy disagreement about the scope of §
4B1.1 – about who should and should not be subject to the
enhanced sentences reserved for recidivists – then it might, in
14
For example, a district judge who distinguishes
between kingpins and street level drug dealers for purposes of
§ 4B1.1 may be furthering the goal of imposing sentences that
reflect “the history and characteristics of the defendant” and “the
seriousness of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A).
Even so, he should also consider whether such a distinction
serves other sentencing goals, such as the need to “promote
respect for the law” and “protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (C).
32
light of Kimbrough and Spears, permissibly sentence Merced
according to that disagreement. But first, it must provide a
“thorough explanation” of its reasoning. Levinson, 543 F.3d at
201. So far, the District Court has offered little more than a
“conclusory statement of personal belief” that career offender
status should be reserved for violent or large-scale drug dealers.
Lychock, 578 F.3d at 220. This is inadequate, and constitutes
procedural error.
B. Sentencing Disparities
As noted, a district court is not required to recite and
make findings as to every one of the § 3553(a) factors, as long
as the record makes clear that the factors have been considered
in deciding the sentence. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. Where one
party raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one
of the factors, however, the court should respond to that
argument as part of its “meaningful consideration of the relevant
statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment.”
Grier, 475 F.3d at 571-72. One factor the court must consider
is the need to avoid “unwarranted sentencing disparities.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Its failure to do so in the face of a
colorable argument that an outside-the-Guidelines sentence will
create a risk of such disparities constitutes procedural error.
See, e.g., Lychock, 578 F.3d at 220; Goff, 501 F.3d at 258;
Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 330.
As explained above, in Lychock, the defendant pleaded
guilty to possession of child pornography and his Guidelines
range was 30 to 37 months. The district court sentenced
Lychock to probation and a fine, but declined to impose any jail
33
time. This decision was based in part on its policy view that
imprisoning Lychock would neither protect the public nor deter
child pornography crime, Lychock, 578 F.3d at 216-17, but also
in part on the court’s analysis of several other § 3553(a) factors.
The court acknowledged that Lychock had committed “a serious
offense,” but described him as “basically [a] law-abiding . . .
young man.” Id. at 216. It further noted Lychock’s “cooperation
with law enforcement, his acknowledgment of wrongdoing, his
supportive family, his decision to seek psychological help
immediately, . . . the report of his psychologist that he was
benefitting from their sessions,” id. at 216, and the unlikelihood
that imprisoning Lychock would deter criminal conduct or
protect the public. Id. at 216-17; see also 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2). Nevertheless, we held that the district court “failed
to properly consider the § 3553 factors” and vacated the
sentence. Lychock, 578 F.3d at 218. We found no evidence that
the district court considered the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, even though the government had
specifically cited that need in its sentencing memorandum and
pointed out that several defendants caught in the same
investigation that snared Lychock had received sentences within
the Guidelines range. Id. at 219. We emphasized that courts
need not specifically discuss each of the sentencing factors in
every case, nor must they analyze every frivolous argument
advanced by a party in a sentencing proceeding. Id. But we also
reiterated that where “the sentence imposed is ‘far below the
sentences given to similar offenders,’” the risk of disparities
should be analyzed with “particular care.” Id. (citing Goff, 501
F.3d at 256).
Goff unfolded similarly. In that case, the defendant
34
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and his
advisory Guidelines range was 37 to 46 months. Goff, 501 F.3d
at 252. Nevertheless, the district court sentenced him to only
four months in prison because it concluded that Goff was, in
many respects, a model citizen. Id. at 253. He had no criminal
history and, in the court’s estimation, “had lived an exemplary
life” before his arrest. Id. The court reasoned that Goff had
committed a “victimless crime,” and that his interest in child
pornography did not necessarily mean that he was a danger to
the community. Id. We vacated the sentence, faulting the
district court for failing to analyze the “‘need to avoid
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,’ as
required by § 3553(a)(6).” Id. at 256. We observed that a
defendant caught in the same investigation that led to Goff’s
arrest received 28 months in prison based on a Guidelines range
of 27 to 33 months. Id. at 261. In light of that fact, “discussion
of [§ 3553(a)(6)] should have been undertaken with particular
care,” because Goff’s sentence created “a potential disparity in
sentence for those convicted of child pornography . . . based on
little, if anything, more than [his] luck” in assignment of judge.
Id.
The need to consider the risk of unwarranted disparities
also motivated this Court’s decision in Ausburn. Unlike
Lychock and Goff, which were government appeals of below-
Guidelines sentences, Ausburn involved a defendant’s appeal of
an above-Guidelines sentence. The defendant in Ausburn was
a police officer who engaged in a sexual relationship with a
fourteen-year-old girl whom he had met while responding to a
call at her home. Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 316. When the
35
relationship was discovered, Ausburn was arrested and quickly
pleaded guilty. His Guidelines range was 57 to 71 months. Id.
at 318. He argued for a sentence comparable to that which had
recently been handed down by the same judge in a case called
Kenrick, which also involved a sexual offense against a minor.
He contended that a comparable sentence was necessary to
ensure “the appearance of fairness” and to avoid unnecessary
disparities in sentencing. Id. at 317-18. The district court
rejected his request for leniency. After a cursory recitation of
the § 3553(a) factors, it handed down a sentence of 144 months.
The court explained only that Ausburn had committed a
“serious” offense and that his “position as a law enforcement
officer [made his] violation of the law that much more
unacceptable.” Id. at 320. The court added, “your conduct was
totally unacceptable and you deserve double the number that I
set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id. at 321. Ausburn’s
lawyer objected, arguing that “this case, as I see it, is very . . .
close to the Kenrick case, where the Court did impose [forty-six]
months.” Id. (some alterations in original). The court
responded that it considered four or even six years to be
insufficient, in light of Ausburn’s abuse of his position as a
police officer. Id. He dismissed Ausburn’s argument that his
sentence should be comparable to the one imposed in Kenrick,
saying that if he didn’t like the sentence he could take it up on
appeal. Id. We vacated the sentence, finding error because “the
District Court did not address Ausburn’s argument that two
cases recently decided in the same district – both of which
concerned sexual offenses involving minors – provided bench
marks for determining a proper sentence, and that the court
should hew close to the sentences in those cases” in order to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Id. at 330. We found
36
that the court’s terse explanation that four to six years was
“insufficient” punishment, in light of Ausburn’s abuse of his
position as a police officer, was “inadequate” to demonstrate
that it had meaningfully considered Ausburn’s sentencing
disparities argument. Id.
Lychock, Goff, and Ausburn demonstrate that a district
court’s failure to analyze § 3553(a)(6) may constitute reversible
procedural error, even where (as here) the court engages in
thorough and thoughtful analysis of several other sentencing
factors. In other words, meaningful consideration of the nature
of the offense, the characteristics of the defendant, the need to
protect the public, the need to promote deterrence, etc., may not
save a sentence if the sentence is imposed without considering
the risk of creating unwarranted disparities, and the sentence in
fact creates such a risk. See Lychock, 578 F.3d at 219 (stating
that where “the sentence imposed is ‘far below the sentences
given to similar offenders,’ consideration of [sentencing
disparities] deserves ‘particular care’” (quoting Goff, 501 F.3d
at 256)). This is especially true if the sentence falls outside of
the Guidelines, or where, as in Lychock and Ausburn, a party
specifically raises a concern about disparities with the district
court and that argument is ignored.
Here, as in Lychock, the government voiced unmistakable
concern that granting Merced a significant variance could create
unwarranted sentencing disparities. In his sentencing
memorandum, Merced requested a below-Guidelines sentence
of less than 10 years; the government opposed that request in
part because it argued that such a sentence would create
unwarranted sentencing disparities between Merced and other
37
recidivist crack cocaine dealers. This was, at a minimum, a
“colorable legal argument” with a “factual basis” in the record.
Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. The District Court should have
addressed it as part of its meaningful consideration of the
sentencing factors. It never did so explicitly, and just as in
Lychock, Ausburn, and Goff, there is no evidence that the
District Court accounted for this factor at all, notwithstanding its
thoughtful analysis of other factors. We reiterate that sentencing
courts need not respond in detail and on the record to each and
every argument presented by the parties. But they should
respond to colorable arguments with a factual basis in the
record. If there was some indication in the record that the
District Court had considered the risk of unwarranted sentencing
disparities, we might overlook its failure to explicitly analyze
that factor at length, on the record, at the hearing. See Cooper,
437 F.3d at 329 (explaining that a court need not “discuss and
make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record
makes clear the court took the factors into account in
sentencing”) (emphasis added). Nothing in this record,
however, indicates that the District Court considered §
3553(a)(6) at all, despite the government’s emphasis on that
argument in its sentencing memorandum and the risk of
disparities that Merced’s sentence undoubtedly created.15 See
15
In particular, the Court might have considered the fact
that if Merced had possessed just .9 grams more of cocaine, i.e.,
50 grams, he would have been subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 10 years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
See also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108 (stating that as part of its
§ 3553(a)(6) analysis, a sentencing court “must take account of
38
Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 331 (“Where the record is inadequate, we
do not fill in the gaps by searching the record for factors
justifying the sentence.”).
Merced’s 60-month sentence was 128 months less than
what a similarly situated recidivist crack cocaine dealer could
expect to receive under the circumstances. See, e.g., United
States v. Tupuola, 587 F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009)
(describing career offender who pleaded guilty to distribution of
crack cocaine, had an advisory Guidelines range of 188-235
months, and received a 188-month sentence); Welton, 583 F.3d
at 495-96 (same); United States v. Sharkey, 543 F.3d 1236, 1238
(10th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48,
50-51 (1st Cir. 2008) (describing defendant who sold 10 grams
of crack cocaine, qualified as a career offender, fell within the
same Guidelines range as Merced, and received a 195-month
sentence). Before the District Court granted such a large
variance, it should have explained why that variance would not
contribute to unwarranted sentencing disparities pursuant to §
3553(a)(6). Its failure to do so was procedural error.
IV.
In summary, we hold that the District Court committed
two errors. First, it may have sentenced Merced pursuant to a
personal policy disagreement with the Guidelines; specifically,
disagreement with the scope of the career offender provision of
sentencing practices in other courts and the ‘cliffs’ resulting
from . . . statutory mandatory minimum sentences”).
39
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. While granting a variance on such grounds
may be permissible, the District Court must, at the very least,
explain itself more thoroughly than it has so far. On remand, the
District Judge should clearly explain whether he is granting a
variance based on a policy disagreement with § 4B1.1. If so, he
must justify that decision to the extent required by our
precedents. Second, the District Court failed to analyze a highly
relevant sentencing factor, § 3553(a)(6). The Court’s choice of
sentence may have created a risk of unwarranted disparities
between Merced and similarly situated recidivist crack cocaine
dealers. The Court should have considered this issue, and
addressed the government’s argument that a Guidelines sentence
was necessary to promote uniformity in sentencing.
Our insistence that sentencing courts follow the requisite
procedures by no means diminishes the “superior position” of
the district judge to make those determinations so critical to a
just and reasonable sentence. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 566.
Rather, requiring a “reasoned and rational justification” on the
record for the sentence chosen serves several critical purposes.
Grier, 475 F.3d at 572. Most basically, it allows us to fulfill our
“important role,” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 575, of exercising
“effective appellate oversight” as required by Supreme Court
precedent. Grier, 475 F.3d at 572. But it also serves an even
higher purpose within our system of criminal justice. Requiring
coherent explanations of sentence “instill[s] public confidence
in the judicial process.” Id. It “assure[s] the parties of the
fairness of the proceedings,” “demonstrat[es] the serious
reflection and deliberation that underlies each criminal
sentence,” and “offers the defendant, the government, the
victim, and the public a window into the decision-making
40
process and an explanation of the purposes the sentence is
intended to serve.” Id. See also Rita, 551 U.S. at 356
(“Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s
trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those
reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates
that trust.”) We believe that each of these important interests is
served by our decision today.
“We do not suggest that the original sentence reflects
anything less than the sound judgment of the District Judge, or
that the final sentence should necessarily differ from the one
previously imposed.” Grier, 475 F.3d at 572. We simply ask
for a clearer, more complete explanation than the District Court
has offered to date. We do not think that this asks too much.
Demanding close adherence to procedural requirements –
including the requirement that sentencing courts explain their
reasoning with clarity – is, we think, more than fair in light of
the deference we afford to district courts as a substantive matter
under Tomko.
The judgment of sentence will be vacated, and the case
remanded for re-sentencing.
41
United States v. Hector Merced
No. 09-1844
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring
I fully join my colleagues in concluding that the District
Court erred procedurally by failing to explain its apparent policy
disagreement with the career offender provision, U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1, and by failing to consider the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). I
write separately to explain why I do not doubt that district courts
are free to vary from the career offender Guideline range based
on a categorical policy disagreement with § 4B1.1.1 Because of
1
In addition, though I agree with my colleagues that the
District Court did not “ignore[]” the Guideline range, Maj. Op.
at 21, I am unsure that it gave the Sentencing Guidelines “the
consideration they are due” in reaching its sentence. United
States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007).
At sentencing, the Court quickly rejected the propriety of
a sentence within both the career offender Guideline range of
188 to 235 months and the Guideline range that applied in the
absence of the career offender enhancement—110 to 137
months, calculated under the drug quantity table in U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c). Though the Court subsequently articulated a reason
for rejecting the career offender Guideline range, and found that
a sentence within that range was not “near a reasonable
sentence,” App. at 76, it did not explain why a sentence within
the 110 to 137 month-range was also inappropriate. A sentence
within this range would seemingly take into account the Court’s
the importance of this question, I believe we should resolve it in
this case, despite the fact that the parties do not dispute it. Cf.
Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281, 290 (1917)
(noting that a “court cannot be controlled by agreement of
counsel on a subsidiary question of law”). Indeed, I find it odd
that we vacate the District Court’s sentence with instructions to
explain its policy disagreement without first concluding that it
was authorized to vary on that ground in the first place.
I.
It is, of course, not always the case that, when a district
court varies from the career offender Guideline range, it has
done so based on a “policy disagreement” with § 4B1.1. Rather,
a variance from that range often may reflect a sentencing court’s
predominant concern that the amount of crack cocaine possessed
by Merced was “relatively small” when compared to the
“kilograms and pounds of stuff” that it “usually sees,” id. at 77,
as the offense levels provided for in § 2D1.1(c) are tied
specifically to the amount of crack cocaine involved in the
offense. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2) (providing for an
offense level of 36 for an offense involving between 1.5 and 4.5
kilograms of crack cocaine), with § 2D1.1(c)(6) (providing for
an offense level of 28 for an offense involving between 35 and
50 grams of crack cocaine). In that light, I cannot conclude with
conviction that the Court gave the Guidelines “the consideration
they are due” as a factor under § 3553(a). Goff, 501 F.3d at 256;
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A).
2
determination that, “despite meeting the formal criteria for
career offenders,” the defendant’s individual circumstances “fall
outside the guideline’s heartland or intended scope.” United
States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1170 (10th Cir. 2007)
(McConnell, J., concurring), vacated on other grounds, 128
S. Ct. 1869 (2008); see also United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d
87, 95–96 (1st Cir. 2008) (district court’s variance from career
offender Guideline range was not a “repudiation of the policies
embodied in the [S]entencing [G]uidelines,” as the court had
“grounded the defendant’s sentence in case-specific
considerations,” including the court’s conclusion that the
defendant was a “changed man” who would “not re-offend”).2
Turning to our case, this is how Merced seeks to
characterize the District Court’s variance: he argues that, rather
than basing its sentencing decision “on a categorical policy
about the career offender provision in general[,] . . . the District
2
These types of justifications were also typical of pre-Booker
downward departures in calculating the sentencing range under
the Guidelines for defendants qualifying as career offenders.
See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential
Analysis, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 356–57 & n.248 (1996)
(reporting that a frequent justification for a sentence below the
career offender Guideline range was that the defendant’s
predicate offenses were “minor or too remote in time to warrant
consideration”).
3
Court grounded its sentence firmly in the individual
circumstances of Mr. Merced’s case, as filtered through the
§ 3553(a) factors.” (Appellee’s Br. at 28.) The Court similarly
characterized its sentence as solely based on its evaluation of
“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of” Merced, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), rather than
a criticism of the career offender provision itself.
Yet the Court’s stated policy of reserving a sentence
within the career offender Guideline range for “significant,
violent drug deals” is essentially a rejection of § 4B1.1’s policy
of treating repeat drug offenders—regardless of the quantity of
drugs involved or whether the defendant’s offense or prior
offenses involved violence—as offenders whose Guideline
ranges should be at or near the statutory maximum sentence.
Stated another way, the Court imposed new, categorical factors
(the quantity of drugs involved and whether the offense or
predicate offenses involved violence) in determining the
appropriateness of a sentence within the career offender
Guideline range. Cf. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424,
436 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that the career offender provision is
“fraught with potential imprecision,” and “covers a broad range
of offenders, encompassing the street-level dealer who handles
only small quantities of drugs and the drug kingpin or the
recidivist with a history of violence”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Pruitt, 502 F.3d at 1167 (McConnell, J.,
concurring) (noting that, under § 4B1.1, “it does not matter, for
sentencing purposes, whether [the defendant’s] prior drug
4
felonies were large-scale or petty, violent or nonviolent”). In
that light, I believe the Court’s variance is best understood as
motivated by a policy that “applies to a wide class of offenders
or offenses,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d
Cir. 2008) (en banc)—and one that disagrees with the policy
underlying § 4B1.1—rather than a straightforward application
of the § 3553(a) factors to reach a reasonable sentence for a
defendant whose circumstances fall outside the intended scope
of the career offender provision.
Though the line between a variance based on a “policy
disagreement” with § 4B1.1 and one based on an
“individualized determination” of a particular career offender’s
circumstances is less than precise, it is vital that we give district
courts explicit guidance regarding their authority to vary from
the career offender Guideline range on policy grounds. First,
doing so will discourage courts from “masking” their policy
disagreements as “individualized determinations,” an
“[un]acceptable sentencing practice” that the Supreme Court has
described as “institutionalized subterfuge.” Spears v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 844 (2009). Second, the distinction
between these types of variances may have important
implications for the scope of our appellate review. When a
district court finds that a defendant’s circumstances place him
outside the “heartland” of defendants to whom § 4B1.1 was
intended to apply, its decision to vary from the career offender
Guideline range presumably will be entitled to the “greatest
respect.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)
5
(a district court’s decision to vary from the Guidelines “may
attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a
particular case outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission
intends individual Guidelines to apply”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). By contrast, a variance for a career offender
whose circumstances place him within the “heartland” of
defendants to whom § 4B1.1 was intended to apply—and thus
“is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the
Guidelines,” Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843—may be subject to
“closer review” and entitled to less deference. Kimbrough, 552
U.S. at 109; Spears, 129 S. Ct. at 843 (the “implication” of
Kimbrough is that “an ‘inside the heartland’ departure . . . may
be entitled to less respect”).
Though we are not required in this case to determine
whether the District Court’s seeming policy disagreement
survives such “closer review” (as the Court did not explain its
policy in light of the § 3553(a) factors), I nonetheless believe
that we should determine (before remanding for resentencing)
whether a sufficiently explained policy disagreement with
§ 4B1.1 is a permissible ground on which to vary from the
Guidelines. I address this second question below.
II.
Until recently, the Government had taken the position
that district courts were not free to vary from the career offender
Guideline range on policy grounds. The Circuit Courts for the
6
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits previously agreed, and concluded
that district courts are not authorized under Kimbrough to vary
based on policy disagreements with the career offender
provision because § 4B1.1 was promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission in direct response to a statutory directive in 28
U.S.C. § 994(h). See United States v. Welton, 583 F.3d 494 (7th
Cir. 2009), overruled by United States v. Corner, No. 08-1033,
___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 935754 (7th Cir. Mar. 17, 2010) (en
banc); United States v. Vazquez, 558 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2009),
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010).
As the majority notes, this position is “falling out of
favor.” Maj. Op. at 25. The Government has now abandoned
it, see Appellant’s Br. at 24 (conceding that policy
disagreements “may be the basis for varying from the career
offender [G]uideline”), Welton was overruled by the en banc
Seventh Circuit Court, and Vazquez was vacated by the Supreme
Court. Moreover, each of the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit
Courts have concluded that, after Kimbrough, district courts may
vary from the career offender Guideline range based on a policy
disagreement (just as they may for any provision of the
Guidelines). See United States v. Gray, 577 F.3d 947, 950 (8th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327–28 (6th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87 (1st Cir.
2008) (“[W]e do not see why disagreement with the
Commission’s policy judgment (as expressed in [§ 4B1.1])
would be any less permissible a reason to deviate than
7
disagreement with the guideline policy judgment at issue in
Kimbrough.”).3
I have no hesitancy reaching the same conclusion.
Section 994(h) is directed to the Sentencing Commission, not
sentencing courts, and does not purport to limit their sentencing
discretion.4 See Michael, 576 F.3d at 328 (“By its terms,
[§ 994(h)] tells the Sentencing Commission, not the courts, what
3
Though the Second Circuit Court has not precisely held that
Kimbrough authorizes district courts to vary from the career
offender Guideline range on policy grounds, it similarly has
rejected the argument that § 994(h) restricts district courts’
sentencing authority. See United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d
651, 663–65 (2d Cir. 2008).
4
Section 994(h) provides that
[t]he Commission shall assure that the guidelines
specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or
near the maximum term authorized for categories
of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen
years old or older and—(1) has been convicted of
a felony that is . . . (B) an offense described in . . .
21 U.S.C. § 841 . . . and (2) has previously been
convicted of two or more prior felonies, each of
which is . . . (B) an offense described in . . . 21
U.S.C. § 841[.]
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (emphasis added).
8
to do.”); Sanchez, 517 F.3d at 663 (same). And though
Kimbrough cited § 994(h) as an example of “Congress . . .
direct[ing] sentencing practices in express terms,” 552 U.S. at
103, it did not thereby suggest that the policies reflected in
§ 994(h) are binding on sentencing courts. Rather, Kimbrough
cited § 994(h) in the context of explaining why a different
statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 841(b), was not binding on the
Sentencing Commission. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 102–03
(rejecting the Government’s argument that § 841(b) required the
Sentencing Commission to establish offense levels for crack
cocaine offenses reflecting the crack/powder cocaine sentencing
disparity imbedded in that statute). See Corner, 2010 WL
935754, at *3 (Kimbrough referred to § 994(h) solely in the
context of explaining why “the crack/powder ratio in the
Guidelines was the choice of the Commission rather than
[mandated by] Congress [in 28 U.S.C. § 841(b)]”). In sum,
though Congress required the Commission to follow certain
policies in crafting the career offender provision, neither
Kimbrough nor § 994(h) supports the conclusion that a district
court is prohibited from considering a policy disagreement with
§ 4B1.1 in sentencing a career offender.
Moreover, our Court recently rejected the basic premise
underlying Welton and Vazquez in the context of sentencing
disparities resulting from “fast-track” programs, which apply in
certain judicial districts and authorize a downward departure if
a qualifying illegal immigrant defendant pleads guilty and
waives his or her appellate rights. See United States v.
9
Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1); see also Vazquez, 558 F.3d at 1229
(concluding that district courts may not vary based on a policy
disagreement with the career offender provision because the
enhanced sentencing ranges provided for in § 4B1.1, like the
disparities resulting from fast-track programs, are “the result of
‘direct congressional expression’”). There we rejected the Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts’ conclusion that district
courts may not consider disparities resulting from the limited
availability of the “fast-track” program because the Guideline
provision authorizing the downward departure was the result of
a congressional directive in the 2003 PROTECT Act.5 See id.
at 149–53. We criticized these Courts’ “attempt to distinguish
fast-track programs from the sentencing guidance provided in
Kimbrough [] and [to] constrain a district court’s sentencing
discretion solely on the basis of a congressional policy
argument,” which we characterized as “an attempt to manipulate
the advisory character of the Guidelines.” Id. at 151. That
observation applies equally here; though both § 994(h) and the
PROTECT Act direct the Sentencing Commission to promulgate
Guideline provisions reflecting certain policies, neither restrains
a district court’s sentencing discretion under Booker.
5
We did so even though the Government had declined to
argue that “congressional policy concerning fast-track programs
prohibited the exercise of a district court’s discretion.” Id. at
150 n.8.
10
* * * * *
In sum, I believe, and would hold, that the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Kimbrough extends to § 4B1.1 and that
district courts are authorized to vary from the career offender
Guideline range on policy grounds. Save these statements and
my supplemental comment in the first note of this concurrence,
I join Judge Smith’s excellent opinion in full.
11