Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1479, -1517

VITA-MIX CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BASIC HOLDING, INC. (formerly known as Back to Basics Products, Inc.),
FOCUS PRODUCTS GROUP, LLC, FOCUS ELECTRICS, LLC,
and WEST BEND HOUSEWARES, LLC,

Defendants-Cross Appellants.

David T. Movius, McDonald Hopkins Co., LPA, of Cleveland, Ohio, argued for
plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Michael L. Snyder and David B. Cupar.

Larry R. Laycock, Workman Nydegger, of Salt Lake City, Utah, argued for
defendants-cross appellants. With him on the brief were David R. Wright, David R.
Todd, Robert E. Aycock and Clinton E. Duke.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio

Judge Patricia A. Gaughan
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2008-1479, -1517

VITA-MIX CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BASIC HOLDING, INC. (formerly known as Back to Basics Products, Inc.),
FOCUS PRODUCTS GROUP, LLC, FOCUS ELECTRICS, LLC,
and WEST BEND HOUSEWARES, LLC,

Defendants-Cross Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in case
no. 1:06-CV-2622, Judge Patricia A. Gaughan.

__________________________

DECIDED: September 16, 2009
__________________________

Before BRYSON, GAJARSA, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge PROST. Opinion concurring-in-part and
dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge BRYSON.

PROST, Circuit Judge.

This case involves alleged infringement by Basic Holding (“Basic”) of a patent

and alleged trademark held by Vita-Mix Corporation (“Vita-Mix”). The United States

District Court for the Northern District of Ohio granted summary judgment of no direct

infringement, no inducement of infringement, no contributory infringement, and no

trademark infringement in favor of Basic. The court also granted summary judgment of

no invalidity based on anticipation, obviousness, or lack of enablement, no inequitable

conduct, and no laches in favor of Vita-Mix. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate
and remand the district court’s judgment of no direct infringement. We affirm the

judgments of no inducement, no contributory infringement, and no trademark

infringement. We vacate and remand the judgments of no invalidity for anticipation,

obviousness, or lack of enablement. We affirm the judgments of no inequitable conduct

and no laches.

I

A

The patent at issue in this appeal is directed to a method of preventing the

formation of an air pocket around the moving blades of a consumer food blender. The

method involves inserting a plunger into the body of the blender. The object of the

plunger is to block the air channel that creates the air pocket when ingredients are

blended. The sole claim of the asserted patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,302,021 (“the ’021

patent”) recites:

1. A method of preventing the formation of an air pocket around
rotating blades positioned in a pitcher of a blender, the air pocket
being created from an air channel of a cross-sectional size defined
by a member associated with the blades, comprising the steps of
supplying a fluid into the pitcher, and positioning a plunger, having
a cross-sectional size approximating the cross-sectional size of the
member, adjacent to and above the rotating blades while
maintaining the plunger free of contact with the pitcher thereby
preventing the formation of an air pocket in the fluid around the
rotating blades.

During prosecution, the applicant explained that the claimed method differed

from the prior art due to its preventative capability. Prior art methods of combating air

pockets involved stirring the contents of the blender to break up or dislodge the pockets

after they have begun to form. Stirring is only a temporary solution, however, and air

pockets begin to reform as soon as the stirring stops. The applicant stated that the

2008-1479, -1517 2
claimed method prevents air pockets from ever forming by blocking the air channel that

creates the air pockets, due to the plunger’s size and position within the blender.

Vita-Mix markets one embodiment of its blender and plunger device as the VITA-

MIX® 5000, which is the product relevant to Vita-Mix’s trademark infringement claims.

Other Vita-Mix blenders include the VITA-MIX® 3600, 4500, and 5200. According to

the record before the district court, and the representations of Vita-Mix counsel during

oral argument before this court, the numerical designations roughly correspond to the

different wattages of the blenders. Vita-Mix markets its products as high-speed liquid

food blenders, with emphasis on the plunger device.

Basic markets several accused blenders, including the Smoothie Elite™, the

Smoothie Plus™, and the Blender Solutions™ 5000. Basic also sells other products

under the Blender Solutions™ name, including the Blender Solutions™ 4000 and 5500.

Each of Basic’s accused blenders includes a “stir stick,” which resembles the plunger

from Vita-Mix’s patented method. The lids of Basic’s blenders have an opening which

can be covered with a flat cap, or can receive the stir stick. The proximal end of the stir

stick forms a ball and handle. The ball is seated on the lid opening in a ball-and-socket

configuration. This configuration allows a user to grip the handle and move the distal

end of the stir stick around within the pitcher of the blender. A rubber o-ring mounted on

the distal end of the stir stick prevents the stir stick from scratching the inner sides of the

pitcher during stirring. The sides of the pitcher also include a vertical ribbing that is

interrupted at the points where the o-ring may contact the sides during stirring.

B

The ’021 patent issued in 1994. Basic launched its line of blenders around

2008-1479, -1517 3
March of 2001. In October of 2006, Vita-Mix filed suit against Back to Basics, Inc., now

Basic Holdings, its parent company Focus Products, and two other subsidiaries of

Focus Products; Focus Electrics and West Bend. Vita-Mix alleged infringement of the

’021 patent by dozens of Basic’s blender models, and trademark infringement by the

Blender Solutions™ 5000 model. Basic responded by filing declaratory judgment

counterclaims of noninfringement, invalidity, inequitable conduct, and several affirmative

defenses.

The district court conducted a Markman hearing to construe several disputed

claim terms. During the hearing, the court examined the prosecution history and

determined that the patentee expressly disclaimed any stirring operation that breaks up

or dislodges air pockets after they have begun to form, and limited the scope of the

claimed invention to positioning the plunger such that it prevents air pockets from

forming. The court construed claim 1 to exclude “stirring to disperse, dislodge, or break-

up an air pocket after it has begun to form.” The court also construed the term “plunger”

as a “device that can be inserted into a blender.” Basic does not dispute that its stir

stick is a plunger as that term was construed by the district court.

At the close of discovery in the trial phase following the Markman hearing, both

parties filed multiple dispositive motions. These included summary judgment motions

and cross-motions on issues of end user infringement of the patented method,

inducement of infringement for Basic’s product instructions, contributory infringement for

Basic’s products, common law trademark infringement for Basic’s use of the designation

“5000,” invalidity of the ’021 patent for anticipation and obviousness in light of the cited

prior art, lack of enablement due to the patented method’s alleged inability to prevent air

2008-1479, -1517 4
pockets, unenforceability for inequitable conduct in making false statements to the

patent examiner, and laches for delaying five and a half years before bringing suit.

On July 2, 2008, the district court entered a final order granting Basic’s summary

judgment motions of no direct infringement, no inducement, no contributory

infringement, and no trademark infringement. The court granted Vita-Mix’s summary

judgment motions of no invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, or lack of enablement.

The court also granted Vita-Mix’s summary judgment motions of no inequitable conduct

and no laches. The district court also ruled on several motions not on appeal before

this court, thereby resolving on summary judgment the entire dispute between the

parties.

On July 16, 2008, Vita-Mix timely filed a notice of appeal on the issues of no

infringement, no inducement of infringement, and no contributory infringement of the

’021 patent, and no trademark infringement of Vita-Mix’s use of the designation “5000.”

On August 1, 2008, Basic timely filed its notice of conditional cross-appeal on the issues

of no invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, and lack of enablement, and

unenforceability for inequitable conduct and laches. This court has appellate jurisdiction

over the appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II

The appeal and cross-appeal challenge the district court’s resolution on summary

judgment of various contested issues. Summary judgment is appropriate when no

genuine of issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with

2008-1479, -1517 5
the moving party. Id. A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court must afford all

reasonable inferences and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. See id. at 255. To defeat summary judgment, the evidence as properly

construed must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party; a

mere scintilla of evidence will not suffice. Id. at 252. We review a grant of summary

judgment de novo, reapplying the standard that the district court employed. Rodime

PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

As discussed below, numerous issues are raised by Vita-Mix on appeal. These

issues include direct and indirect patent infringement, and trademark infringement. We

address each in turn.

A. Claim Construction

Although the district court’s claim construction was not actually appealed, Vita-

Mix contends that the district court erred in finding no direct infringement based, in part,

on applying to the accused device a claim construction inconsistent with its claim

construction order. Direct infringement by Basic’s customers also serves as a basis for

Vita-Mix’s claims of inducement and contributory infringement. We must therefore

decide whether the district court applied an inconsistent claim construction, and if so,

which claim construction should have been applied.

At the Markman hearing, the district court reviewed the prosecution history of the

’021 patent and found that the patentee distinguished its invention over prior art stirring

actions that break up or dislodge air pockets after they have formed. In light of this

characterization, the court found that the preamble of the claim, “a method of preventing

2008-1479, -1517 6
the formation of an air pocket around the rotating blades positioned in a pitcher of a

blender” was necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the body of the claim. See,

e.g., MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton Dickson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In

re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The court found that

the prosecution history statements distinguishing the function of the plunger constituted

an express disclaimer of other functions. The court construed the preamble to include

the limitation, “but not including a method of stirring to disperse, dislodge, or break-up

an air pocket after it has begun to form.”

Vita-Mix’s ’021 patent originally included apparatus claims to its blender and

plunger device. These claims were rejected for anticipation and obviousness. The prior

art disclosed blenders with structurally similar stirring wands that were used to break up

or dislodge air pockets. The applicant attempted to distinguish the claimed device by

emphasizing the novel function of preventing air pockets, as opposed to dealing with air

pockets that have already formed. The examiner found that this functional limitation did

not overcome the anticipation and obviousness rejections of the apparatus claims,

where substantially similar structure was disclosed in the prior art. The method claim,

however, did overcome the rejection by the addition of novel functional limitations. The

district court interpreted this exchange in the prosecution history to indicate that the

examiner understood the invention’s preventative function to be a new use of an

existing structure. The district court thus construed “preventing” to exclude methods

that eliminate an air pocket at any time after it has begun to form.

In its cross-motion for summary judgment of no infringement, Basic argued that

its accused line of smoothie makers did not infringe because the stir stick was used to

2008-1479, -1517 7
stir the contents of the blender, and the patentee disclaimed stirring. In its response,

Vita-Mix argued that it was irrelevant to the infringement analysis whether Basic’s stir

stick was used to stir the ingredients in the blender. Vita-Mix’s infringement theory was

that it was the positioning of the stir stick, and not the stirring action, that prevented air

pockets from forming. Vita-Mix contended that since the express disclaimer was limited

to stirring for a particular purpose—breaking up or dislodging air pockets after they

begin to form—Basic could not avoid infringement by just any stirring operation.

In its order granting summary judgment of no infringement, the court held that

Vita-Mix’s position was “untenable” and that the patentee disclaimed “all stirring.” Vita-

Mix argues on appeal that the exclusion of all stirring was a new construction, and

represents a change in the district court’s position. Vita-Mix argues that the original

claim construction order correctly construed the term “preventing the formation of an air

pocket” to exclude breaking up or dislodging already formed air pockets, and not to

exclude stirring for other reasons. Vita-Mix points out that the district court even noted

that the ’021 patent specification disclosed that the plunger could also be used to stir

the ingredients of the blender. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holdings, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-2622

(N.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2007) (Claim Construction Order at 7).

Claim construction is an issue of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517

U.S. 370 (1996). Claims are properly construed without the objective of capturing or

excluding the accused device. NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d

1062, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107,

1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). A patentee may, through a clear and unmistakable

disavowal in the prosecution history, surrender certain claim scope to which he would

2008-1479, -1517 8
otherwise have an exclusive right by virtue of the claim language. See, e.g., Purdue

Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharms. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Under the

doctrine of prosecution disclaimer, a patentee may limit the meaning of a claim term by

making a clear and unmistakable disavowal of scope during prosecution.”).

We agree with Vita-Mix that the district court’s finding that the patentee

disclaimed all stirring appears to be inconsistent with its earlier claim construction. We

further agree with Vita-Mix that the earlier claim construction is correct for all the

reasons articulated by the district court in its claim construction order. To find that the

patentee disclaimed all stirring, regardless of whether and how the stirring acts on air

pockets, ignores the nature of the distinction between a positioning that prevents air

pockets from forming and an operation that breaks up air pockets after they have begun

to form.

We will address below what, if any, impact the district court’s apparent change in

claim construction had on its grant of summary judgment on the various issues raised.

B. Direct Infringement

The district court found, and the parties do not challenge on appeal, that it is

undisputed that the accused blenders can be used in either an infringing or non-

infringing manner. Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holdings, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-2622 (N.D. Ohio

July 2, 2008) (Summary Judgment Order at 18). The district court then focused its

attention on the question of whether or not any infringing use actually occurred.

Vita-Mix presented two experts to testify on the issue of infringement. The first

expert, Dr. Swanger, testified that in his opinion the accused device necessarily

infringes when the stir stick is inserted into the pitcher but not actively stirred. Basic

2008-1479, -1517 9
presented its own expert to dispute these contentions. Vita-Mix used Dr. Swanger’s

testimony to support its allegations of direct infringement against Basic, and its

allegations of inducement and contributory infringement based on direct infringement by

Basic’s customers.

Vita Mix’s allegations of direct infringement by Basic concern two specific

incidents involving Basic employees Dale Oldroyd and Tom Daniels. Vita Mix alleges

that Mr. Oldroyd infringed the asserted patent during his in-house testing of Basic’s

blenders. Mr. Oldroyd testified that when he tested more than one blender at a time, he

would allow some blenders to run with stir sticks inserted, but would not be able to stir

all of the blenders simultaneously. Vita Mix contends that Mr. Oldroyd infringed the

patent when he allowed some of his testing blenders to run without stirring the stir

sticks.

Vita-Mix also alleges that Basic’s spokesman Mr. Daniels infringed the patent

when he demonstrated Basic’s smoothie maker on a QVC television program. Footage

of the demonstration shows a twenty-six second period where one of the accused

blenders is allowed to run with the stir stick inserted, but where Mr. Daniels does not stir

the stir stick. Vita-Mix contends that Mr. Daniels infringed the asserted patent during

these twenty-six seconds.

The district court determined that Mr. Oldroyd could not be shown to infringe the

patent, because Mr. Oldroyd did not testify as to how he positioned the stir stick. The

court concluded that there was no evidence that he positioned the stir stick as claimed

or that the stir sticks prevented air pockets from forming during Mr. Oldroyd’s testing.

The court also concluded that Mr. Daniels could not be shown to infringe because there

2008-1479, -1517 10
was no evidence in the record as to whether an air pocket actually formed during the

twenty-six seconds of Mr. Daniel’s allegedly infringing use of the accused blender.

Vita-Mix’s second expert, Dr. Traylor, conducted a double-blind survey of blender

users, and testified that during his survey he observed a certain percentage of users

insert the stir stick into the pitcher but not stir it. Vita-Mix offered this testimony as

evidence that some of Basic’s customers use the accused products in an infringing

manner. The district court struck the Traylor report as irrelevant because Dr. Traylor

only testified as to whether and how the survey participants used the stir stick. He did

not observe whether or not an air pocket formed in any particular instance. Because he

was not informed as to the patent at issue or the positions of the parties, he had no

opinion as to whether any of the disputed claim limitations were performed during his

survey. The district court concluded that his testimony did not establish whether any

infringing act actually occurred and was therefore not relevant to the issue of direct

infringement on the part of Basic’s customers. The court then found that the only

remaining piece of evidence, Dr. Swanger’s testimony, was not enough on which to

base an underlying direct infringement claim supporting secondary liability because it

was “hypothetical” in nature.

Having disposed of the two allegations of direct infringement by Basic, and the

allegation of direct infringement by Basic’s customers, the court concluded that there

was no evidence of infringement, and granted Basic’s summary judgment motion for no

infringement. The court’s conclusion of no direct infringement also served as a basis for

granting summary judgment of no contributory infringement and no inducement, which

we address in sections I.C. and I.D. below.

2008-1479, -1517 11
 We find that the district court erred as a matter of law in disposing of the direct

infringement claims by requiring direct evidence of infringement. The court discounted

the accusations against Mr. Oldroyd and Mr. Daniels because there was no testimony

or footage showing actual infringement in those cases. Such evidence, however, is not

required. Direct infringement can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Moleculon

Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Dr. Swanger’s

testimony, accepted as true for summary judgment purposes, establishes that the

accused blenders will necessarily infringe under certain circumstances. Mr. Oldroyd’s

testimony and the footage to Mr. Daniels’s demonstration evidence the occurrence of

those circumstances described by Dr. Swanger.

We also find that the district court erred as a matter of law in striking the

testimony of Dr. Traylor and thereby disposing of Vita-Mix’s allegations of direct

infringement by Basic’s customers. Dr. Traylor’s testimony need not establish the

ultimate question of infringement to be relevant. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (holding that evidence is relevant if it may assist the trier of

fact in resolving a factual dispute); Moleculon, 793 F.2d at 1272. Dr. Traylor’s testimony

is relevant to the question of whether users tend to insert the stir stick into the pitcher

without stirring. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence). Dr. Swanger

testified that if the stir stick was inserted into the pitcher without stirring while the

blender was on, then the accused device would necessarily infringe. Dr. Traylor

presented the results of a survey indicating that Dr. Swanger’s proffered conditions

2008-1479, -1517 12
were present at least a small percentage of the time. It is not too great an analytical

leap for the jury to consider both experts’ testimonies and conclude that infringement

actually occurs in at least a small percentage of customer use. The limitations of Dr.

Traylor’s survey may impact the persuasiveness of his testimony, but they do not render

the results of the survey wholly inadmissible.

We find that the combination of Mr. Oldroyd’s testimony and Mr. Daniels’s

testimony with Dr. Swanger’s testimony is circumstantial evidence that creates genuine

issues of material fact regarding whether employees of Basic engaged in acts of direct

infringement. We also find that the combination of Dr. Traylor’s and Dr. Swanger’s

testimonies is circumstantial evidence that creates genuine issues of material fact

regarding whether and when the accused device performs the infringing method.

Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment of no infringement. We remand

the question of direct infringement to the district court for a trial on the merits with

instruction to apply the correct claim construction as discussed in Part I.A. above.

C. Contributory Infringement

In order to reach the question of contributory infringement, we will adopt

arguendo the opinion of Vita-Mix’s expert Dr. Swanger and assume that customer use

of the accused device directly infringes unless the stir stick is being used to break up air

pockets or is in contact with the sides of the pitcher. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible

Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961) (ruling that a defendant can be held

liable for contributory infringement if its customers directly infringe).

The patent laws provide that whoever sells an apparatus for use in practicing a

patented method, knowing it to be “especially made or especially adapted for use in an

2008-1479, -1517 13
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable

for substantial non-infringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.” 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(c) (emphases added). Contributory infringement imposes liability on one who

embodies in a non-staple device the heart of a patented process and supplies the

device to others to complete the process and appropriate the benefit of the patented

invention. See Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1337 (Fed. Cir.

2008).

District courts have found, and we agree, that non-infringing uses are substantial

when they are not unusual, far-fetched, illusory, impractical, occasional, aberrant, or

experimental. Cf. Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 265 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir.

2001) (finding inducement where the accused device was capable of non-infringing

modes of operation in unusual circumstances); D.O.C.C. Inc. v. Spintech Inc., 36

USPQ2d 1145, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Contributory infringement liability is not meant

for situations where non-infringing uses are common as opposed to farfetched, illusory,

impractical or merely experimental.”); Haworth Inc. v. Herman Miller Inc., 37 USPQ2d

1080, 1089 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (“The focus is not the utility or ubiquity of the infringing

configuration; the focus is the utility, presence, and efficiency of the non-infringing

configurations.”).

Since the accused devices are undisputedly capable of non-infringing use, the

question of contributory infringement turns on whether the non-infringing use is

substantial. Vita-Mix did not argue below, and the district court did not directly address,

the substantiality of the accused blenders’ non-infringing uses. Vita-Mix focused only

on the frequency of infringing use, as documented in the survey evidence of Dr. Traylor,

2008-1479, -1517 14
which does not speak to the substantiality of the non-infringing use in this case. On

appeal, Vita-Mix argues that stirring the stir stick in a non-infringing manner or not

inserting the stir stick are insubstantial uses, because those uses are based solely on

“additional features” of the device. We held in Ricoh that an infringer does not evade

liability by bundling an infringing device with separate and distinct components that are

capable of noninfringing use. See Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1337. Although Basic points out

that Vita-Mix has waived this argument, we will consider it properly raised for purposes

of deciding the question of contributory infringement.

Vita-Mix’s argument is correct with respect to the clear cap included with the

accused blenders. This cap is an additional feature, and Basic cannot escape liability

by simply including the cap with an otherwise infringing blender. See id. We will

therefore confine our analysis only to use of the accused blender with the stir stick.

Vita-Mix’s reliance on Ricoh is unavailing, however, with respect to the use of the stir

stick to stir. The accused blenders’ ball and socket joint, interrupted ribbing, and rubber

o-ring are not merely additional, separable features of the device. Cf. id. at 1337-38

(finding that a microcontroller with no use but to infringe the patent did not escape

infringement when it was imbedded in a larger product that had a non-infringing use

unrelated to the microcontroller). The undisputed record shows that these features are

defining features of the device, are directly related to the use of the stir stick, and are

useful only if the stir stick is used to stir the contents of the pitcher and push the

ingredients into the blades.

Accordingly, in light of the evidence of record with all reasonable inferences

drawn in Vita-Mix’s favor, no reasonable jury could find that using the stir stick to stir—

2008-1479, -1517 15
where the stirring operation breaks up air pockets or touches the side of the pitcher—is

an insubstantial use of the accused device. 1 The existence of substantial non-infringing

uses for the accused blenders defeats Vita-Mix’s claim for contributory infringement as

a matter of law. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment of no contributory infringement.

D. Inducement

Reaching the question of inducement also requires adopting arguendo the

opinion of Vita-Mix’s expert Dr. Swanger and assuming that customer use of the

accused device infringes unless it is being used to break up air pockets or is in contact

with the sides of the pitcher. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,

911 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (ruling that a defendant can be held liable for

inducement of infringement if its customers directly infringe).

Patent law provides that whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall

be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Inducement requires a showing that the

alleged inducer knew of the patent, knowingly induced the infringing acts, and

possessed a specific intent to encourage another’s infringement of the patent. DSU

Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part).

1
The dissent suggests that such non-infringing uses of the stir stick are not
substantial because a user would only rarely use the device in a “solely” non-infringing
way. Even assuming that the device might inadvertently infringe the patent for a brief
time in the majority of uses does not mean that the non-infringing use of the stir stick to
stir is not substantial enough to avoid contributory liability. The analysis would be
different if the blender could not be operated in a non-infringing way unless the user
infringed at some point. But where, as here, there is a common use that neither
infringes nor requires infringement, the substantiality of that use is unaffected by any
unrelated infringing operations.

2008-1479, -1517 16
Intent can be shown by circumstantial evidence, but the mere knowledge of possible

infringement will not suffice. Id. at 1305-06.

Vita-Mix establishes that Basic knew of the patent, and argues that Basic knew of

its products’ potentially infringing use, but goes no further. Indeed, the record is devoid

of actual evidence establishing specific intent to encourage customers to infringe the

’021 patent. Vita-Mix instead points to the product instructions and the design of the

device to support an inference of intent.

With respect to the product instructions, Vita-Mix argues that the directions for

operating Basic’s blender teach an infringing use of the product, giving rise to an

inference of intent to induce infringement. There are two sets of instructions relevant to

this point. The original product instructions teach stirring in a counterclockwise motion

while the blades are moving. After Vita-Mix articulated its infringement contentions, but

before the filing of suit, Basic amended its instructions to teach stirring in a

counterclockwise motion while scraping the sides of the pitcher with the stir stick while

the blades are moving. The original product instructions do not evidence a specific

intent to encourage infringement, since they teach a stirring action which Basic could

have reasonably believed was non-infringing. The amended product instructions teach

an undisputedly non-infringing use, evidencing intent to discourage infringement. Thus,

Basic’s product instructions provide no basis on which Vita-Mix can rely to infer specific

intent to encourage infringement. 2

2
The dissent suggests that Vita-Mix introduced enough evidence to show
that following Basic’s product instructions may lead to infringing uses of the device. The
question is not, however, whether a user following the instructions may end up using the
device in an infringing way. Rather, it is whether Basic’s instructions teach an infringing
use of the device such that we are willing to infer from those instructions an affirmative

2008-1479, -1517 17
 Vita-Mix also points to the device itself to support an inference of intent, arguing

that the “default” vertical position of the stir stick leads to infringing use. This argument

is insufficient as a matter of law. “Especially where a product has substantial non-

infringing uses, intent to induce infringement cannot be inferred even when the

defendant has actual knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the

patent.” Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

As discussed in Part I.C. above, Basic’s blenders are capable of substantial non-

infringing use.

Although the “default” vertical position of the stir stick may lead to infringing use

under certain conditions, there is no evidence that Basic intends users to maintain the

stir stick in this position. It is undisputedly possible to use the accused device as

directed without ever practicing the claimed method. Additionally, the product design

naturally encourages non-infringing use. The ball and socket joint facilitates stirring with

a full range of motion, the interrupted ribbing encourages continuous contact between

the stir stick and the sides of the pitcher, and the rubber o-ring encourages contact

between the stir stick and the sides of the pitcher. Finally, pictures of the device in the

product instructions, packaging, catalogues, and Basic’s own patent show the stir stick

touching the sides of the pitcher.

In sum, the record is devoid of direct or circumstantial evidence that Basic

intends to encourage infringement by its customers, and replete with evidence to the

contrary. We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment of no inducement.

intent to infringe the patent. The district court correctly found that Basic’s directions do
not even disputably indicate such intent.

2008-1479, -1517 18
 E. Trademark Infringement

Vita-Mix has a federal trademark registration for the mark VITA-MIX®. Vita-Mix

has not registered the mark “Vita-Mix 5000,” or the number “5000” itself. Although it has

never marked the number “5000™” in commerce, Vita-Mix claims common law

trademark protection for the number 5000. We review non-patent claims, such as

claims arising under the Lanham Act, in accordance with the law of the regional circuit

within which the case arose. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175

F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Sixth Circuit law governs our review here.

In the Sixth Circuit, a registrant must meet two criteria to succeed in a trademark

infringement case: (1) the plaintiff must possess a protectable mark, Leelanau Wine

Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007), and (2) the

plaintiff must show a likelihood of confusion, Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754,

763 (6th Cir. 2005). Where a mark is not registered, a claimant must show that it has

used the mark at issue as a trademark, and that the defendant has used the accused

mark as a trademark. Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134

F.3d 749, 753 (6th Cir. 1998).

An unregistered mark is entitled to protection as a trademark if it is inherently

distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning. Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home

Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 1991). A mark is inherently

distinctive if its intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source. Abercrombie &

Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 635 (6th Cir. 2002). A

mark is not inherently distinctive if it serves as a grade designation rather than an

indication of the source of the goods. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell

2008-1479, -1517 19
Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Arrow

Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 392 (2d Cir. 1995); J.M. Huber Corp. v.

Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467, 1469 (10th Cir. 1985); In re Armco Steel Corp.,

127 USPQ 135, 136 (T.T.A.B. 1960).

Vita-Mix argues that that the Sixth Circuit test for trademark infringement is not a

two part test. Vita-Mix’s brief asserts that it need not first prove that it holds a

protectable trademark in the number 5000 if it can instead establish a likelihood of

confusion. Vita-Mix’s interpretation of Sixth Circuit law is incorrect. The controlling

case, Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, states:

a plaintiff must show that it has actually used the designation at issue as a
trademark, and that the defendant has also used the same or a similar
designation as a trademark. In other words, the plaintiff must establish a
likelihood that the defendant’s designation will be confused with the
plaintiff’s trademark, such that consumers are mistakenly led to believe
that the defendant’s goods are produced or sponsored by the plaintiff.

134 F.3d at 753-54 (citations omitted). Vita-Mix may be interpreting the phrase “in other

words” as signaling that the likelihood of confusion test is a proxy for proving trademark

use. More detailed review of the decision in Rock & Roll Hall of Fame reveals that this

interpretation is incorrect. The sentence beginning with the phrase “in other words”

merely clarifies that the proper foci of the likelihood of confusion test are the two

competing trademarks as they are used in commerce, as opposed to the products

marked or ancillary designations not used as trademarks.

Vita-Mix does not use the number 5000 in commerce other than in connection

with the designation “Vita-Mix® 5000.” Vita-Mix concedes that the number 5000

functions only to distinguish the blender from previous Vita-Mix products on the market,

namely the Vita-Mix® 3600 and Vita-Mix® 4500, and to indicate that the 5000 was a

2008-1479, -1517 20
higher grade appliance. There is no evidence in the record that the number 5000 has

any secondary meaning apart from its appearance in conjunction with the trademark

Vita-Mix® within the designation “Vita-Mix® 5000.” The district court correctly

concluded that the trademark Vita-Mix® identifies the source of the goods, and the

designation 5000 indicates the style or grade of product. No reasonable jury could find

from the evidence of record that the number 5000 is inherently distinctive or has

secondary meaning and is entitled to trademark protection.

Furthermore, there is no evidence of record that Basic uses the designation 5000

as a trademark in its sale of the Blender Solutions™ 5000 product. Basic’s website

refers to 5000 as a model number, and Basic’s product packaging does not use the

number 5000 in the product name. “Blender Solutions” refers to a line of products that

also includes the 4000 and the 5500. Basic contends that these numbers corresponded

roughly to the suggested retail prices of the products at one time, i.e. the 5000 was

suggested to sell for about $50.00. Similar to Vita-Mix’s numbering scheme

corresponding to the wattages of the blenders, Basic’s numbering scheme serves as a

grade designation rather than an indication of the source of the goods.

Rather than argue that Basic uses the number 5000 as a trademark, Vita-Mix

maintains that it need not show anything other than likelihood of confusion. Vita-Mix is

incorrect as a matter of law. No reasonable jury could find that either Vita-Mix’s or

Basic’s use of the number 5000 is a protectable trademark use. Without a protected

trademark use, Vita-Mix cannot make a prima facie case of trademark infringement as a

matter of law. The district court correctly granted summary judgment of no trademark

infringement.

2008-1479, -1517 21
 III

Basic filed a conditional cross-appeal challenging the district court’s summary

judgments of no invalidity, no inequitable conduct, and no laches. Because the issue of

direct infringement was not properly resolved on summary judgment for the reasons

stated in Part II.B. above and is remanded to the district court, we reach the conditional

cross-appeal. We address each issue raised in turn.

A. Invalidity

Basic filed a motion for summary judgment of invalidity based on anticipation and

obviousness. Basic’s motion cited two of Vita-Mix’s older blender models and two prior

art patents, one of which was cited by the examiner and the other of which was cited

within the first reference. Vita-Mix filed a competing motion for summary judgment of no

invalidity based on anticipation, obviousness, or lack of enablement. The district court

granted summary judgment of no invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, or lack of

enablement in favor of Vita-Mix.

As a preliminary matter, the court made a point of explaining that it was reviewing

the validity issues under “its own” claim construction and not Vita-Mix’s proffered claim

construction. While it is not entirely clear what claim construction the court refers to as

its own in this explanation, it appears that the court is applying a construction that

excludes all stirring. As explained in Part I.A. above, we find that a construction that

excludes all stirring is inconsistent with the district court’s original claim construction

order. We find that the court’s original claim construction order is correct, and that the

validity issues, remanded for the reason explained below, should be reconsidered under

the proper claim construction.

2008-1479, -1517 22
 In reviewing the merits of the cross motions concerning invalidity, the court

determined that Basic did not properly cite any expert testimony in its summary

judgment motions based on anticipation and obviousness. The court found that without

expert testimony, Basic’s motion for summary judgment provided only attorney

argument and no evidence of invalidity. For this reason the court granted summary

judgment of no invalidity for anticipation, obviousness, or lack of enablement.

While we will not comment on whether the district court’s assessment of the need

for expert testimony provides a reason to deny Basic’s motion for summary judgment of

invalidity, we find it provides no reason to grant Vita-Mix’s summary judgment motion of

no invalidity. While we are sympathetic to the district court’s plight in dealing with the

volume of briefing submitted in connection with the parties’ summary judgment motions

in this case, a district court cannot rely on its assessment of one party’s motion for

summary judgment of invalidity when evaluating the other party’s motion for summary

judgment of no invalidity. It appears that the district court did so here.

Unlike Basic’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity, Basic’s opposition to

Vita-Mix’s motion for summary judgment of no invalidity contains numerous citations to

expert testimony. In concluding that Basic cited no evidence relevant to the question of

invalidity, the district court appears to have overlooked Basic’s opposition

memorandum. We find that Basic has raised a genuine issue of material fact with

respect to the anticipation, obviousness, and lack of enablement sufficient to defeat

Vita-Mix’s motion for summary judgment of no invalidity. We therefore remand the

validity issues to the district court for a decision on the merits with instructions to apply

the proper claim construction.

2008-1479, -1517 23
 B. Inequitable Conduct

Basic asserted a counterclaim and affirmative defense that the ’021 patent is

unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. To prevail on summary judgment on a claim

for inequitable conduct, Basic would have to present evidence of affirmative

misrepresentations of material fact, failure to disclose material information, or

submission of false material information, coupled with evidence of an intent to deceive.

See Dayco Prods. Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Both intent and materiality must ultimately be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Id.

Basic’s inequitable conduct charge on appeal is that an inventor of the ’021

patent made a false statement in a declaration when he distinguished low-powered prior

art blenders as incapable of forming air pockets around the blades. In response to a

prior art rejection, inventor John Barnard submitted a declaration to the patent office that

the cited prior art reference was irrelevant because it disclosed a low-powered blender.

Mr. Barnard stated that such blenders did not usually form air pockets around the

blades, and thus do not bear on the claimed solution to the air pocket problem in high-

power blenders. Basic offers an additional prior art reference as evidence that this

statement is false. In his deposition, Mr. Barnard explained that, regardless of whether

the statement is actually false, he believed the statement to be true at the time that he

made it. With no other evidence in the record, the district court correctly found that

Basic made no genuine showing of deceptive intent.

C. Laches

Vita-Mix filed for summary judgment on Basic’s affirmative defenses, including

2008-1479, -1517 24
patent misuse, waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to mitigate. The district court

granted wholesale Vita-Mix’s motion on all of the defenses listed above, “for the reasons

stated in Vita-Mix’s motion.” Of these rulings, Basic appeals the court’s judgment only

with respect to its laches defense.

Application of the defense of laches is an equitable determination that is

reviewed for abuse of discretion, even on summary judgment. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at

1039. To prove an affirmative defense of laches, a defendant must show that (1) the

plaintiff delayed for an unreasonable and inexcusable amount of time in filing suit, and

(2) that the defendant was prejudiced as a result of the delay. Gasser Chair Co. v.

Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1995). A rebuttable presumption of

laches arises when a patentee has delayed more than six years after actual or

constructive knowledge of the defendant’s alleged infringing activity. A.C. Aukerman,

Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 35 U.S.C.

§ 286.

With respect to the first laches inquiry, Basic argues that Vita-Mix’s CEO was

aware of Basic’s accused blenders “when they first came out,” and that Vita-Mix brought

suit over five years after learning of the accused infringement. Such a delay does not

give rise to a presumption of laches, although “[t]he length of time which may be

deemed unreasonable has no fixed boundaries but rather depends on the

circumstances.” Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032.

The circumstances of the present case do not support a finding of laches. Vita-

Mix’s motion for summary judgment asserted that Basic presented no evidence

demonstrating prejudice. In opposition, Basic asserts that it suffered economic

2008-1479, -1517 25
prejudice from the delay because it would have changed its product instructions to avoid

infringement during the entire period of delay. To support this assertion, Basic notes

that it did in fact promptly change its instructions when it learned of the potential

infringement. However, while a change to Basic’s product instructions may impact its

liability for indirect infringement, no change to those instructions would affect Basic’s

liability for direct infringement. In light of our rulings on inducement and contributory

infringement, there can be no prejudice arising from Basic’s lost opportunity to change

those product instructions. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment of no laches.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the district court’s judgment of no direct

infringement is vacated and remanded for a decision on the merits under the proper

claim construction. The judgments of no inducement, no contributory infringement, and

no trademark infringement are affirmed. The findings of no invalidity for anticipation,

obviousness, or lack of enablement are vacated and remanded for a decision on the

merits under a proper claim construction. The judgment of no inequitable conduct is

affirmed. The judgment of no laches is affirmed.

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

2008-1479, -1517 26
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2008-1479, -1517

VITA-MIX CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BASIC HOLDING, INC. (formerly known as Back to Basics Products, Inc.),
FOCUS PRODUCTS GROUP, LLC, FOCUS ELECTRICS, LLC,
and WEST BEND HOUSEWARES, LLC,

Defendants-Cross Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
in case no. 1:06-CV-2622, Judge Patricia A. Gaughan.

BRYSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority’s analysis and disposition of most of the issues in this

case; my disagreement is limited to the portion of the judgment that upholds the district

court’s summary judgment rulings on inducement of infringement and contributory

infringement. In my view, Vita-Mix introduced enough evidence on those issues to

overcome Basic’s summary judgment motion.

1. As to inducement, the majority concludes that although there was evidence of

direct infringement, Vita-Mix introduced no evidence that Basic encouraged or

instructed users of its accused devices to operate them in an infringing manner. My
review of the evidence persuades me that Vita-Mix has pointed to disputed questions of

material fact with respect to induced infringement.

In the portion of its opinion dealing with direct infringement, the majority agrees

that Vita-Mix’s evidence is sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether, when the

stir stick of the accused device is in the “default” position during normal operation—i.e.,

when it is not being used to stir the contents of the blender—the device infringes.

Under those circumstances, a finder of fact could find inducement of infringement based

on instructions that direct the user to operate the device in a normal fashion. That is

because the fact-finder could conclude that operating the device in the normal fashion

entails operating it so that the stir stick is in the default position, even if for a short

period at the outset or for intermittent periods during the use of the blender.

In his expert report, Dr. Swanger stated that in normal operation, the accused

devices will practice the claimed method. He explained that during operation, “when the

stir stick is inserted into the container but not held by a user, the natural, default position

for the stir stick is at or near the center of the container without touching the sides.”

With the stir stick in that default position during operation, he explained, the accused

products would infringe. Dr. Swanger then analyzed Basic’s instructions for using the

blenders and found that they did not direct users to avoid using the device in the default

mode.

The evidence of Basic’s videotaped demonstration of the operation of the

accused device, which was shown on television, was to the same effect. The

demonstration showed the normal operation of the device, depicting periods of time in

which the operator did not use the stir stick or even touch it. During those periods, the

2008-1479,-1517 2
stir stick appeared to remain in the default position near the center of the container, not

touching the sides. A fact-finder could regard that advertising demonstration as a form

of instruction on the use of the device that entailed using it at least in part in an

infringing manner.

The majority relies on Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348 (Fed.

Cir. 2003), for the proposition that an intent to induce infringement cannot be inferred

from a defendant’s knowledge that some users of the product may infringe. But this

case is quite different from Warner-Lambert. There, the court found no inducement

because there were many uses for the accused product and because “fewer than 1 in

46 sales of that product [were] for infringing uses.” Under those circumstances, the

court concluded that “we are not in a position to infer or not infer intent on the part of

Apotex without any direct evidence.” Id. at 1365. In contrast, if we accept Vita-Mix’s

evidence as true, in this case nearly all users will infringe as soon as they turn on the

accused blender.

The difference can be illustrated by a simple example: Suppose a manufacturer

sells a device that can be made to infringe by removing a set of screws that are in place

when the device is sold. In such a case, the manufacturer would not ordinarily be liable

for inducing infringement unless it instructed users to remove the screws or otherwise

encouraged them to do so. But if the manufacturer sold the device with the screws

removed, so that the device would infringe if used in the ordinary manner in the “as-

sold” configuration, the fact that the manufacturer provided screws that would enable a

user to convert the device into a non-infringing form would not shield the manufacturer

from liability for vicarious infringement. In such a case, the manufacturer could be found

2008-1479,-1517 3
liable for inducement even if the instruction manual taught users how to insert the

screws and pointed out the advantages of using the device in that altered, noninfringing

form.

Finally, at least some of Basic’s instructions arguably give specific directions to

use the accused device in the default manner for some purposes. To begin with, one of

the instruction manuals in the record directs the user to turn on the device with the stir

stick in place, to start the blending process, and to turn off the device when the blending

is complete. The manual contains no intervening reference to manipulating the stir

stick. Elsewhere, the instructions for making “smoothies” direct a sequence of steps,

including the use of the “pulse” feature and the low and high power settings sequentially

until the contents of the blender are smooth. The instructions add, “Turn the stir stick

counter-clockwise for best mixing results.” Even assuming that “turning” the stir stick is

interpreted to mean rotating it around the inner edges of the container, the suggested

departure from the default operation could be viewed as only an optional step, or one to

be used from time to time during the blending process, rather than throughout the

process from beginning to end. The “instruction” evidence thus seems to me sufficient

to overcome summary judgment on the issue of whether the instructions evidence the

intent to encourage infringement.

2. As applied to this case, a similar analysis governs the resolution of the issue

of contributory infringement and the question, common to vicarious infringement

generally, whether the accused device can be used for substantial noninfringing

purposes. As the majority notes, this court has held that a party will not be held liable

for infringement if that party provides a device that can be used for infringement but can

2008-1479,-1517 4
also be used for substantial noninfringing purposes. In this case, the evidence proffered

by Vita-Mix, summarized above, would allow a fact-finder to conclude that when the

accused device is used with the stir stick in place, it will frequently be used in an

infringing manner and that it would be most unusual for an ordinary purchaser of the

blender to use it in a manner that avoided infringement altogether.

Basic makes two arguments as to why there is no contributory infringement in

this case, neither of which is persuasive. First, it points out that the accused blenders

are sold not only with a stir stick, but also with a “lid cap” that can be used in place of

the stir stick, and that when the blenders are used with the lid cap in place of the stir

stick, they do not infringe at all. That, according to Basic, is a “substantial non-infringing

use” that is sufficient to avoid liability for contributory infringement. That argument is

entirely unconvincing, as the majority correctly points out.

Basic’s second argument is based on the testimony of Vita-Mix’s president, who

answered “yes” when asked if “it’s possible to use a Basics blender in a non-infringing

manner.” That answer, however, does not provide the “Aha!” moment that Basic seems

to believe it does. In the context of this case, the question was the wrong one: What is

important is not whether it is possible to use the Basic blender in a noninfringing

manner, but whether it is possible (or likely) that a user could (or likely would) operate it

solely in a noninfringing manner. There is no dispute that the stir stick can be used in a

noninfringing manner, such as during the time the user is rotating the stir stick within the

blender container, keeping the stir stick in contact with the container’s inner walls. But

that does not overcome the evidence offered by Vita-Mix that customers who use the

Basic device with the stir stick inserted will infringe in a large percentage of instances

2008-1479,-1517 5
and that the device has no substantial use that does not entail at least some period of

infringement.

In this regard, I disagree with the majority’s comment that “the frequency of

infringing use . . . does not speak to the substantiality of the non-infringing use.” Vita-

Mix’s evidence suggests that on the facts of this case frequency is closely related to

substantiality, and I agree. That is because, based on Vita-Mix’s evidence, a user of the

accused devices would have to take exceptional measures to avoid infringement; i.e.,

the user would have to rotate the stir stick continuously during the blending process

without letting it rest at any point in the default position. A finder of fact could conclude

that, as a practical matter, the continuous rotation process would be an infrequent mode

of noninfringing use, and for that reason, an insubstantial one.

I would likewise discount the elements of the structure and packaging of the

accused devices, factors on which the majority relies. The majority is correct that those

features suggest using the stir stick to stir in a manner that results in contact with the

sides of the container. But the features to which the majority points do not support the

inference that the stirring will be continuous and that the stir stick therefore will never be

left in the default position during operation. As to that issue, Vita-Mix’s evidence is to

the contrary.

In sum, without suggesting how any of the above factual issues might ultimately

be decided, I would hold that the evidence before the trial court is sufficient to overcome

Basic’s motion for summary judgment on both inducement and contributory

infringement.

2008-1479,-1517 6