Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2009-1076

CALLAWAY GOLF COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ACUSHNET COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Frank E. Scherkenbach, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Boston, Massachusetts,
argued for plaintiff-appellee. With him on the brief was Thomas L. Halkowski, of
Wilmington, Delaware.

Henry C. Bunsow, Howrey LLP, of San Francisco, California, argued for
defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were Joseph P. Lavelle and Kenneth W.
Donnelly, of Washington, DC, and Richard L. Stanley, of Houston, Texas. Of counsel
on the brief were Edward A. Pennington and Amanda M. Rettig, Hanify & King, PC, of
Washington, DC.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the District of Delaware

Judge Sue L. Robinson
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-1076

CALLAWAY GOLF COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ACUSHNET COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in
case no. 06-CV-091, Judge Sue L. Robinson.

___________________________

DECIDED: August 14, 2009
___________________________

Before LINN, DYK, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Callaway Golf Company (“Callaway”) brought suit against Acushnet Company

(“Acushnet”), alleging that Acushnet had infringed various claims of four golf ball patents

owned by Callaway (known as the “Sullivan patents”). 1 Acushnet stipulated that its golf

balls infringed, but contended that the asserted claims were invalid for anticipation and

obviousness. After construing the claims, the district court granted summary judgment

1
The four Sullivan patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 6,210,293 (“’293 patent”),
6,503,156 (“’156 patent”), 6,506,130 (“’130 patent”), and 6,595,873 (“’873 patent”). At
issue are claims 1, 4, and 5 of the ’293 patent, claims 1–3 of the ’156 patent, claim 5 of
the ’130 patent, and claims 1 and 3 of the ’873 patent.
of no anticipation. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 388, 407 (D.

Del. 2007) (“Summary Judgment Order”), vacated in part by 585 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D.

Del. 2008) (“JMOL Order”). Following a trial on obviousness, the jury determined that—

with the exception of dependent claim 5 of the ’293 patent—none of the asserted claims

was invalid. The district court entered final judgment concluding that dependent claim 5

of the ’293 patent was invalid for obviousness, but that independent claim 4 (from which

it stemmed), as well as the other seven asserted claims, were not.

We conclude that Acushnet raised a genuine question of material fact concerning

anticipation, and we reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on that issue

and remand. As to obviousness, we affirm the district court’s determination that

Acushnet was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the asserted claims are

invalid for obviousness. But because the judgment on obviousness was based upon

irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts, we vacate the judgment of the district court and

remand for a new trial. Thus, for the reasons that follow, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-

part, vacate-in-part, and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

I

Callaway and Acushnet are golf equipment manufacturers. Callaway is the

current owner of the Sullivan patents, which share nearly identical specifications and

contain similar claims to a multi-layer polyurethane-covered golf ball. Historically, golf

balls designed to travel long distances when struck by a driver were relatively hard.

JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 605. In contrast, golf balls designed to exhibit other

desirable playability characteristics (such as spin control for approach shots, and the

2009-1076 2
proper “click” and “feel” upon being struck) typically were softer. Id. According to the

specification, a major advantage of the patented invention is that it presents a “dual

personality” ball that is capable of travelling great distances, yet does not exhibit

diminished playability or durability. See ’293 patent col.5 ll.23–30; id. col.3 ll.21–29.

As shown below in Figure 2 of the ’293 patent, the patented golf ball contains a

core 10 and a multi-layer cover consisting of a first or inner layer 14 and a second or

outer layer 16. ’293 patent col.5 ll.51–52. The first or inner cover layer is preferably

made of a blend of low-acid ionomer resins, while the second or outer cover layer is

made of a relatively soft polyurethane material. Id. col.5 ll.35–54 & col. 6 l.56–col.7 l.8.

Claim 1 of the ’293 patent is generally representative of the asserted claims:

1. A golf ball comprising:

a core;

an inner cover layer having a Shore D hardness of 60 or more
molded on said core, said inner cover layer having a thickness
of 0.100 to 0.010 inches, said inner cover layer comprising a
blend of two or more low acid ionomer resins containing no
more than 16% by weight of an alpha, beta-unsaturated
carboxylic acid;

and an outer cover layer having a Shore D hardness of 64 or less
molded on said inner cover layer, said outer cover layer having
a thickness of 0.010 to 0.070 inches, and said outer cover layer
comprising a relatively soft polyurethane material.

2009-1076 3
’293 patent col.23 ll.48–61 (emphases added). Callaway’s other asserted claims vary

slightly from claim 1 of the ’293 patent, but each claims a golf ball with a core, an

ionomer resin (or ionomer blend) inner cover layer with a Shore D hardness of 60 or

more, and a polyurethane outer cover layer with a Shore D hardness of 64 or less.

“Shore D hardness” refers to a hardness standard published by the American Society

for Testing and Materials. 2 Callaway sells or previously sold several lines of golf balls

that practice the patented technology. Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at

393.

II

Callaway sued Acushnet for patent infringement on February 9, 2006, in the

United States District Court for the District of Delaware. The accused products are the

Titleist Pro V1, Pro V1 , and Pro V1x golf balls, which Acushnet introduced to the

market in 2000, 2002, and 2003 respectively. The Pro V1 has a three-piece

construction consisting of a solid core, an ionomer-blend inner cover, and a

polyurethane outer cover. The Pro V1 (since discontinued) and Pro V1x balls are

“dual-core” balls having an inner core, an outer core, an ionomer inner cover, and a

polyurethane outer cover.

2
The standard, ASTM D-2240, describes a method of testing hardness by
forcing an indentor into the material to be tested. The indentor’s penetration into the
material under specified conditions indicates the relative hardness of the material. The
standard describes several standard sizes of indentors (type A, B, C, D, etc.), with
“Shore D” hardness referring to hardness measured using a size “D” indentor.
American Society for Testing and Materials, Standard Test Method for Rubber
Property—Durometer Hardness 1 (1995) (“ASTM D-2240”).

2009-1076 4
 On November 20, 2007, the district court construed various disputed terms of the

Sullivan patents, including the term “cover layer having a Shore D hardness.” The

parties agreed that as a general proposition “Shore D hardness” refers to a durometer

measurement of a material’s hardness rated on the Shore D hardness scale, which is

described in the ASTM D-2240 standard. They disagreed, however, as to whether the

Sullivan patent claims refer to the hardness of the cover layer as measured on a golf

ball, or the hardness of a sample of the cover layer material measured off the ball. As

the district court noted, the parties’ experts testified that numerous factors (such as the

composition of the layer under the material being tested) can affect the measured

hardness of a material. Thus, on-the-ball and off-the-ball hardness measurements of

the same cover material can differ. JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 610 & n.6;

Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 399 & n.11.

The district court held that the claim limitation “[c]over layer having a Shore D

hardness” requires that the Shore D hardness measurement of the cover layer be taken

on the ball. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., No. 06-CV-091, 2007 WL 4165415, at

*1 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 2007) (“Markman Order”). Based on this on-the-ball construction,

Acushnet stipulated that its Titleist Pro V1 ball infringed all of the asserted claims, and

that its Pro V1 and Pro V1x balls infringed all claims except claim 1 of the ’293 patent.

III

Thereafter Acushnet focused its defense on the issues of anticipation and

obviousness, moving for summary judgment of invalidity on those grounds. With regard

to anticipation, Acushnet argued that the text of U.S. Patent No. 4,431,193 (“Nesbitt”)

itself discloses a three-piece golf ball meeting all limitations of the Sullivan patents save

2009-1076 5
two: a polyurethane outer cover and a blend of ionomers in the inner cover. Callaway

apparently does not dispute this. Acushnet argued that Nesbitt incorporates by

reference U.S. Patent No. 4,274,637 (“Molitor ’637”), which teaches both polyurethane

and ionomer blends as cover materials and, Acushnet maintains, inherently discloses

the necessary hardness limitations for those cover layers. Thus, according to Acushnet,

when properly viewed as a single reference, Nesbitt/Molitor anticipates the Sullivan

patents as a matter of law. In support of its anticipation argument, Acushnet also

prepared test golf balls combining the polyurethane outer cover described by Molitor

’637 with the core and ionomer-blend inner cover of Nesbitt and proffered

measurements of the resulting balls. Callaway filed a cross motion for summary

judgment of no anticipation (and opposed Acushnet’s motion), arguing that Nesbitt did

not incorporate Molitor ’637 and thus failed to disclose the necessary Shore D hardness

limitation.

On November 20, 2007, the district court granted Callaway’s motion for summary

judgment that Nesbitt does not anticipate as a matter of law. Summary Judgment

Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 398. The court held that “Nesbitt does not describe the use

of polyurethane or blends of ionomer resins in Molitor ’637 with sufficient particularity to

effectuate an incorporation by reference of those features.” Id. Based on this holding,

the court also granted summary judgment of no anticipation on the ground that Nesbitt

(without Molitor ’637) does not disclose a cover hardness of Shore D 64 or less. Id. at

400.

2009-1076 6
 IV

With regard to obviousness, Acushnet contended that the various separate

elements of the Sullivan patents—including golf balls with multi-layer covers, ionomer-

blend covers, and polyurethane covers—were all well known in the prior art. Acushnet

relied on Nesbitt, Molitor ’637, and three additional golf ball patents, U.S. Patent Nos.

4,674,751 (“Molitor ’751”), 5,314,187 (“Proudfit”), and 5,334,673 (“Wu”), 3 in support of

its contention that one of skill in the art would have had reason to combine the prior art

and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. With regard to the cover

hardness limitation, Acushnet contended that Molitor ’751 discloses the required range

(albeit stated in terms other than “Shore D” hardness).

A jury trial limited to the question of obviousness was held from December 5 to

December 14, 2007. The jury returned a verdict concluding that dependent claim 5 of

the ’293 patent was invalid for obviousness, but the remaining eight claims (including

3
Proudfit teaches a three-piece golf ball with a core, an ionomer-blend
inner cover, and a relatively soft outer cover of balata (a type of rubber). Proudfit col.6
ll.19–27; id. col.12 ll.47–52. Molitor ’751 teaches a polyurethane cover that may be
used on two-piece or three-piece golf balls. Molitor ’751 col.3 ll.7–12; col.7 ll.49–51.
Wu teaches a golf ball with a single cover layer made of polyurethane. Wu col.7 ll.37–
47.

2009-1076 7
independent claim 4 of the ’293 patent) had not been proven invalid. 4 On December

19, 2007, the court entered judgment tracking the jury’s verdict. Trial on willfulness and

damages was stayed.

After denying Acushnet’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

eight claims held not invalid, on November 10, 2008, the district court issued a

permanent injunction against Acushnet. JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 608–14, 622–

23. Acushnet timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1)

and (2).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Acushnet challenges five major aspects of the proceedings before

the district court. We address each in turn.

I Claim Construction

Acushnet argues that the determinations that the claims were not invalid were

based upon a faulty interpretation of the phrase “cover layer having a Shore D

hardness,” which appears in each of the asserted claims. Acushnet contends that the

district court’s on-the-ball construction led it to improperly reject Acushnet’s invalidity

4
Question 1 of the verdict form is reproduced in its entirety:

1. Has Acushnet proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of
the following claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,210,293 (the ’293 patent) is
invalid due to obviousness?
‘‘Yes’’ is a finding for Acushnet. ‘‘No’’ is a finding for Callaway.
(A) Claim 1 Yes ___ No _X_
(B) Claim 4 Yes ___ No _X_
(C) Claim 5 Yes _X_ No ___

JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 615. Questions 2, 3, and 4 were identical except for
the patent and claim numbers, and for each claim in those questions the jury marked
“No.” Id.

2009-1076 8
arguments, which in part depended on prior art disclosing the off-the-ball hardness of

polyurethane materials that can be used to make golf ball covers. We review the district

court’s claim construction de novo. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448,

1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). We generally assign to claim terms “the meaning that

the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the

invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).

Acushnet argues that the district court’s claim construction is erroneous because

the specification notes in several places that the hardness values therein are “measured

in accordance with ASTM method D-2240.” ’293 patent col.7 ll.21–22. 5 The ASTM D-

2240 standard states that hardness should not be tested on a rounded or curved

surface, which Acushnet argues precludes measuring hardness on the rounded and

irregular surface of a golf ball. ASTM D-2240, at 2. Thus, Acushnet contends, a person

of ordinary skill in the art would understand “cover layer having a Shore D hardness” to

mean the hardness of a flat sample of the material used for the cover layer at issue,

tested off the ball.

We disagree. The Sullivan patents make clear that, when read in context, the

reference to ASTM D-2240 does not require hardness of the cover layer to be tested off

the ball. To the contrary, the claims speak of “[a] golf ball” with a “cover layer” having a

certain hardness, rather than focusing on the hardness of the material used to create

the cover layer. E.g., ’293 patent col.23 ll.49–60. Likewise, the specification points to

5
See also ’293 patent col.9 (Table 2, noting that “ASTM Method” “D-2240”
was used to test “Shore Hardness D”); id. col.11 (Table 3, same); id. col.11 ll.61–63
(noting Shore D hardness was measured “per ASTM D-2240”); id. col.16 ll.49–50
(same).

2009-1076 9
the hardness of the assembled ball (rather than of the cover materials in isolation) as

the relevant characteristic. E.g., id. col.5 ll.7–8 (“The hardness of the ball is the second

principal property involved in the performance of a golf ball.” (emphasis added)). While

there are examples providing off-the-ball measurements of commercially available

materials in the patent, the examples directed to golf balls as opposed to starting

materials specifically disclose hardness measurements taken on intermediate and

finished balls. E.g., id. col.22 l.14 (Table 8, showing “Shore D” hardness

measurements on finished balls); see also id. col.17 ll.36–37, 41 (Table 5, showing

“Shore C Hardness” of “Molded Intermediate Balls” with inner cover); id. col.18 ll.52–53,

57 (Table 6A, showing “Shore C Hardness” of “Molded Finished Balls” with outer cover

in place); id. col.19 ll.63, 66 (Table 6B, same). These examples confirm that hardness

was to be measured on the ball. 6 Indeed, as the district court noted, there is no “cover

layer” to measure until a golf ball is produced. Markman Order, , 2007 WL 4165415, at

*1.

Moreover, here there was evidence at trial from Acushnet’s own witnesses

showing that those of skill in the art typically took Shore D hardness measurements on

the ball. Jeff Dalton, for example—Acushnet’s Vice President of Product

Development—testified that the golf ball industry commonly conducted hardness tests

in substantial compliance with ASTM D-2240, with the exception of the requirement that

the test not be conducted on the ball: “[W]e—technical people in the golf ball industry

6
Acushnet notes that some unasserted claims also specify a flexural
modulus for the cover layers, which must be measured off the ball. See, e.g., ’130
patent col.24 ll.1–2. Unlike modulus, however, hardness can be measured on the ball,
and as discussed above, the patent makes clear that the claims refer to on-the-ball
measurement of hardness.

2009-1076 10
deviate from that standard by not measuring [hardness] on the kind of test specimen

that is called for in ASTM [D-2240]. We generally measure it on the ball.” Trial Tr.

514:21–515:1 (emphasis added). 7 Such evidence of accepted practice within the art,

when not at variance with the intrinsic evidence, is relevant to the question of how a

person of skill in the pertinent field would understand a term. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1318 (“[E]xtrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful to . . . establish

that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular meaning in the

pertinent field.”); see also Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d

1279, 1289 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The district court did not err in holding that the phrase

“cover layer having a Shore D hardness” refers to an on-the-ball hardness

measurement.

II Obviousness

A

The jury returned a verdict finding that eight asserted claims of the Sullivan

patents were not invalid for obviousness. Acushnet contends that the district court

erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment as a matter of law that the asserted

claims of the Sullivan patents would have been obvious.

We apply de novo the same JMOL standard applied by the district court to the

jury verdict. See Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 262 (3d Cir. 2005); see also

PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir.

2007). Although the ultimate question of obviousness is a legal issue reviewed de

7
See also Trial Tr. 344:13–14 (Acushnet Senior Vice President of Research
and Development William Morgan noting that “it was our standard practice at the time to
measure the Shore D hardness directly on the golf ball”).

2009-1076 11
novo, see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007), the underlying

findings of fact (whether implicit or explicit within the jury’s verdict) are reviewed for

substantial evidence, see Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 543 F.3d 1342,

1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008). We agree with the district court that, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Acushnet

failed to prove invalidity due to obviousness.

Acushnet frames the invention of the Sullivan patents as nothing more than a

predictable and “obvious to try” variation of known elements (solid cores, ionomer-blend

covers, polyurethane covers, and three-piece balls). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (noting

that a “combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be

obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results”); PharmaStem

Therapeutics, 491 F.3d at 1360. Callaway, in contrast, argues that such analysis is

inappropriate because the Sullivan patents disclose more than a rearrangement of prior

art elements with each element predictably performing its same function in the new

combination. Rather, Callaway contends that use of a soft polyurethane cover over a

hard ionomer inner cover and a solid core, a construction not present in the prior art,

“produce[s] a synergy and an important new result” over and beyond that which could

be expected independently from each prior art element: namely, a true dual-personality

ball. Pl.-Appellee’s Br. 28; see KSR, 550 U.S. at 416 (noting prior-art elements

“work[ing] together in an unexpected and fruitful manner” as indicia of nonobviousness).

The evidence before the jury did not compel a finding that all claim limitations

were present in the prior art. At trial, Acushnet sought to establish obviousness

primarily through a combination of prior art three-piece balls with non-polyurethane

2009-1076 12
outer covers (the ball taught by Proudfit and a similar ball marketed by Wilson, the Ultra

Tour Balata), with the polyurethane covers of Wu or Molitor ’751. JMOL Order, 585 F.

Supp. 2d at 607. Callaway argues that the record contains ample evidence upon which

the jury could have rationally concluded that these combinations did not in fact disclose

or render obvious all limitations of the asserted claims.

The Sullivan patent claims require the polyurethane outer cover of the patented

golf ball to have a Shore D hardness, as measured on the ball, no greater than 64.

E.g., ’293 patent col.5 ll.48–61. It is undisputed that none of the prior art references

upon which Acushnet relied expressly discloses the requisite hardness limitation for a

polyurethane golf-ball cover on a three-piece ball. Lacking direct evidence of the

claimed limitation, Acushnet instead relied on indirect evidence to attempt to establish

the existence of the claimed hardness limitation in the prior art. It first argued that

Molitor ’751, which discloses a two-piece ball with a core and a polyurethane cover,

demonstrates the necessary hardness because that patent’s specification states that

the polyurethane-blend cover of the Molitor ’751 ball should have “a shore C hardness

less than 85, preferably 70–80, and most preferably 72–76.” Molitor ’751 col.2 ll.33–39

(emphasis added); id. col.7 ll.65–68.

Callaway maintains that Molitor ’751’s disclosure of a Shore C hardness is

insufficient to teach an on-the-ball Shore D hardness less than 64. There is no dispute

that a hardness measurement taken with a size “C” indentor will vary from a

measurement of the same material taken with a size “D” indentor; that is, a Shore C

measurement cannot be precisely converted mathematically into a Shore D

measurement or vice-versa. However, while acknowledging that no simple linear

2009-1076 13
relationship exists between the two types of measurements, Acushnet argues that one

of skill in the art would have understood that approximate comparisons can be drawn

between the scales. Indeed, Acushnet argues, the Sullivan patents themselves contain

statements drawing such comparisons. E.g., ’293 patent col.3 ll.50–54 (describing layer

that “has a Shore D hardness of about 45 (i.e., Shore C hardness of about 65)”).

Acushnet thus contends that even if a precise conversion between the scales is not

possible, a golf ball designer would have recognized that a Shore C hardness of 72–76

would be something less than Shore D 64. In support of this specific comparison, it

introduced the “comparison chart” from the ASTM D-2240 standard showing

approximate ranges for measurements taken with different size indentors, as well as

expert testimony that Shore C 72–76 would be approximately Shore D 55.

Although the jury could have accepted Acushnet’s argument that the Shore C

range disclosed in Molitor ’751 would have been equivalent to an on-the-ball hardness

measurement no greater than Shore D 64, we cannot say that as a matter of law the

jury was required to do so. Substantial evidence supports the contrary position. Most

notably, the ASTM “comparison chart” upon which Acushnet relied states plainly on its

face that “[t]his is not and cannot be used as a conversion reference.” ASTM D-2240, at

1. The standard further cautions that “there may be no simple relationship between the

results obtained with one type of [indentor] and those obtained with another type,”

undercutting Acushnet’s argument that a material measuring Shore C 72 would

necessarily measure 64 or less if tested with a type D indentor. Id.; see also Trial Tr.

2009-1076 14
1162:3–24 (testimony of Callaway’s expert, Dr. Risen, that accurate Shore C to Shore D

conversions were not possible). 8

Equally importantly, the Shore C range disclosed by Molitor ’751 indicates a

desired hardness measurement of the cover on a two-piece ball, rather than on the

cover of a three-piece ball with a hard ionomer-resin inner cover layer. Testimony at

trial established that the hardness measurement of a material depends to some degree

on what is underneath the material being tested, such that an on-the-ball measurement

of a thin polyurethane cover with a hard layer underneath is likely to be harder than an

off-the-ball measurement. Acushnet’s witness, Jeff Dalton, agreed that “what’s

underneath the layer you’re measuring can also influence the measurement.” Trial Tr.

516:17–18; see also id. at 516:23–24 (agreeing that thin covers are more subject to

such influence than thick covers); id. at 517:1–12 (agreeing that on-the-ball

measurements are often harder than off-the-ball measurements). Acushnet’s expert,

Dr. Statz, similarly agreed that hardness measurements could be impacted by a number

of factors, including thickness and the material composition of adjacent layers. Trial Tr.

720:6–19; id. 616:8–9 (noting that “the hardness will go up in the case of a thinner layer

on another material”). The jury was entitled to determine that the imprecision of the

ASTM chart, coupled with uncertainty as to how much additional hardness would be

imparted by a hard intermediate cover layer, was sufficient to undermine Acushnet’s

8
To be sure, there was contrary evidence as well, including examples of
Shore C to Shore D comparisons in the Sullivan patents and evidence, as noted above,
that such a comparison was made in the course of the patents’ prosecution. See, e.g.,
’293 patent col.3 ll.51–53. This evidence, however, did not rise to the level of an
admission that an accurate conversion between Shore C and Shore D is always
possible.

2009-1076 15
claim that the Shore C hardness of 72–76 present in the prior art would necessarily

translate to an on-the-ball Shore D hardness no greater than 64 on a three-piece, two-

cover ball.

Second, Acushnet contended that the Wu patent demonstrates the necessary

hardness limitation, because expert testimony established that the polyurethane cover

material it teaches has a Shore D hardness of about 48 when measured off the ball, or

of about 56 when measured on the single-cover golf ball discussed in the patent. But

while Wu discloses the hardness of the polyurethane material itself, and an on-the-ball

hardness of Shore D 56, it (like Molitor ’751) is not directed to a three-piece ball having

a relatively hard ionomer-resin inner cover layer. As noted, evidence at trial showed

that the measured hardness of a thin outer cover layer is impacted by the hardness and

composition of the underlying layer. Thus, as with Molitor ’751, the jury could have

reasonably found that Acushnet failed to show that the necessary hardness limitation

was known in the prior art.

In summary, whether the prior art disclosed the necessary hardness limitation

claimed in the Sullivan patents was an issue of fact genuinely contested before the jury.

The district court did not err in concluding that substantial evidence supports the jury’s

implicit resolution of that factual issue in Callaway’s favor.

B

Acushnet also challenges two subsidiary evidentiary rulings made by the district

court in the course of the trial on obviousness. We review the district court’s evidentiary

rulings for abuse of discretion. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 749 (3d

Cir. 1994).

2009-1076 16
 First, Acushnet challenges the exclusion of testimony concerning measurements

performed on certain test golf balls prepared in anticipation of trial. The test balls in

question were assembled using elements from various prior art references; for example,

Acushnet created a ball with Proudfit’s solid core and ionomer-blend inner cover, but

with the addition of the polyurethane outer cover taught by Molitor ’751. Acushnet

sought to have a materials expert, Dr. MacKnight, testify as to the testing of the balls in

order to demonstrate that the Shore D hardness limitations of the asserted claims were

inherently met by golf balls made through combination of the prior art. Before trial,

however, the district court noted that “Dr. MacKnight neither prepared nor tested” the

balls, and hence could not actually vouch for the reliability of the test results. Callaway

Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., No. 06-CV-091, 2007 WL 4165401, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 20,

2007) (“Daubert Order”). Accordingly, it excluded Dr. MacKnight’s testimony and the

test results “to the extent that the reliability of the test results derives from Dr.

MacKnight’s voucher.” Id.

At trial, Acushnet again tried to introduce the test ball evidence, this time

proffering foundational testimony from the Acushnet employee who supervised

production of the test balls and delivered them to the independent laboratory for testing.

The district court again excluded the evidence, however, apparently under Rule 403 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although the district court did not formally state the

basis for its ruling, it noted at sidebar that the introduction of evidence of “a physical

object that combines the prior art” ran a high risk of causing “undue prejudice” by

leading the jury to give Acushnet’s obviousness argument excessive weight. Trial Tr.

749:3–13. It further noted that “this testimony . . . has a danger of outweighing what

2009-1076 17
was really in the art at the time.” Id. at 754:11–12. On appeal, Acushnet challenges the

exclusion of the test ball evidence at trial.

We see no error in the district court’s exclusion of the test-ball testimony on the

issue of obviousness. The introduction of evidence concerning the test balls ran a

substantial risk of leading the jury towards the inappropriate use of hindsight and

towards unduly weighting Acushnet’s arguments concerning motivation to combine the

prior art; the likely outcome, as the district court perceived it, was the jury understanding

Acushnet’s argument concerning the combination of prior art as “[w]e did it, here it is,

anyone can do this.” Trial Tr. 749:8–9. Nor does the record indicate that Callaway

made arguments that would have been directly refuted by the test ball evidence, such

as a contention that it would have been impossible to combine the prior art. The district

court was in the best position in this case to determine whether in the context of the

obviousness trial the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the

test ball evidence. We cannot say that excluding the evidence here was an abuse of

discretion. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; see also Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special

Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1145–46 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Second, Acushnet contends that the district court abused its discretion by

refusing to allow it to introduce before the jury evidence of a parallel inter partes re-

examination of the Sullivan patents proceeding before the Patent and Trademark Office

(“PTO”). In the course of the re-examination, before trial, the PTO rejected each

asserted claim of the Sullivan patents. In doing so, the PTO relied on essentially the

same prior art relied upon by Acushnet in this litigation. Acushnet sought to introduce

the re-examination at trial to counter Callaway’s statements in opening arguments that,

2009-1076 18
by approving the four Sullivan patents, “three patent examiners” had concluded that

they were valid. The district court rejected Acushnet’s request, stating that giving

evidence of the re-examination to the jury would be “really confusing,” not least because

the results of the non-final parallel proceeding were “not binding” on the district court.

Trial Tr. 354:16–17. The court did, however, preclude Callaway from further bolstering

the validity of the patents by further repeating the “three examiners” statements.

On appeal, Acushnet argues that it must be granted a new trial because

“allow[ing] Callaway to argue . . . that multiple patent examiners had reviewed the

patents . . . without revealing that the asserted claims stood rejected by multiple other

examiners . . . was entirely unfair.” Def.-Appellant’s Br. 62. Acushnet is correct that

Callaway’s opening statement, while truthful, nevertheless had potential to mislead the

jury by implying that every expert examiner to have considered the patents had

concluded that they were valid. However, Acushnet does not appear to have actually

objected to Callaway’s opening argument itself (specifically, the “three patent

examiners” statements) as unfairly prejudicial. Acushnet instead contended only that

the argument “provided perhaps the most compelling reason yet to admit th[e re-

examination] evidence” and that the district court should have allowed the re-

examination evidence before the jury.

On this point the district court did not err. The non-final re-examination

determinations were of little relevance to the jury’s independent deliberations on the

factual issues underlying the question of obviousness. In contrast, the risk of jury

confusion if evidence of the non-final PTO proceedings were introduced was high. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the prejudicial nature of

2009-1076 19
evidence concerning the ongoing parallel re-examination proceeding outweighed

whatever marginal probative or corrective value it might have had in this case.

III Inconsistent Jury Verdicts on Obviousness

Acushnet contends that a new trial as to obviousness is required because the

district court denied its timely request for JMOL or a new trial, instead entering judgment

on irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts. See JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 617.

The jury ruled dependent claim 5 of the ’293 patent invalid for obviousness while finding

all other asserted claims, including independent claim 4 from which claim 5 depends,

not invalid.

At the outset, Callaway contends that Acushnet waived its objection to the

allegedly inconsistent verdicts by failing to object before the jury was released. We

review inconsistent verdicts, an issue not unique to patent law, under regional circuit

law. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

The Third Circuit has not directly spoken to the question of whether an objection is

required to preserve error in the face of inconsistent general verdicts, and how that

court would rule if squarely presented with the issue is not entirely clear. 9 We need not

resolve this question, however, because even assuming that such an objection is

required, it is apparent that Acushnet did not waive its claim here.

9
Compare Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133,
144–45 (3d Cir. 1984) (no objection required for inconsistent special verdicts under Rule
49(a)), and Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1056–57 (3d Cir. 1991)
(suggesting in dicta that objection is required for inconsistent interrogatories under Rule
49(b)), with Mosely v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Rule 49(b) does not
address the issue before us here—that of inconsistent general verdicts. We have found
little precedent on this issue . . . .”).

2009-1076 20
 After the jury was polled at the conclusion of the trial, counsel for Callaway (not

Acushnet) called for a sidebar and the following exchange occurred:

[Callaway]: Your Honor, the issue is the one claim which they did find
invalid is a dependent claim.

THE COURT: [A]ll right. Do you want to send them back?

[Callaway]: I’m not sure that they understand—

THE COURT: I’m not going to do this. All right?

[Callaway]: I just wanted to raise it.

Trial Tr. 1427:22–1428:5. The jury was then excused without objection from Acushnet’s

counsel. Though it did not object on the record, Acushnet contends that because the

court rendered a final decision in response to Callaway’s objection—“I’m not going to do

this. All right?”—no purpose would have been served by repeating the point.

The district court evidently concluded here that there was no waiver. Callaway

argued waiver in its post-trial briefing before the district court, but the district court did

not adopt Callaway’s waiver theory, stating that it was “sensitive to [Acushnet’s]

argument that it was essentially ‘beaten to the punch’ by [Callaway’s] counsel and did

not feel the need to reiterate the same concerns following the court’s decision.” JMOL

Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 616. The district court then proceeded to decide Acushnet’s

claim concerning the inconsistency on the merits. Id. at 616–17. The district court here

was in the best position to evaluate the import of its statements at sidebar, and we see

no basis for disturbing its determination that a waiver did not occur.

Turning to the merits, we first must determine whether the verdicts were in fact

inconsistent. There is no dispute that the verdicts with respect to claim 5 of the ’293

patent (invalid) and claim 4 of that patent (not invalid) were inconsistent. A broader

2009-1076 21
independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that

independent claim is invalid for obviousness. See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498

F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Callaway contends, however, that the verdict is not

irreconcilably inconsistent with regard to five of the remaining asserted claims—claim 1

of the ’293 patent, claims 1–3 of the ’156 patent, and claim 1 of the ’873 patent. The

basis for Callaway’s argument is that unlike claims 4 and 5 of the ’293 patent, claim 5 of

the ’130 patent, and claim 3 of the ’873 patent, which require the inner cover layer to be

made of “an ionomer resin,” those five claims require the inner cover to contain a

“blend” of ionomer resins. Thus, Callaway argues, the jury could have rationally

concluded that the “blend” claims were not obvious even if Claim 5, lacking a “blend”

limitation, was obvious.

The district court properly rejected this theory, noting that Callaway’s reasoning,

which would at best render the verdict “consistent with respect to the 5 ‘blend’ claims,

but . . . inconsistent with respect to the four ‘non-blend’ claims,” did “not give the court

sufficient means to reconcile the verdicts.” JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 616.

Reconciliation of inconsistent verdicts must be consistent with the evidence and

theories adduced at trial. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 145–46. The contents of the

four Sullivan patents, which share essentially the same specification and claim priority

to the same parent application, were presented to the jury as a group. The evidence

and theories at trial were also advanced concerning the patents as a group, not on a

claim-by-claim basis. No party at trial asserted any patentable difference among the

asserted clams before the jury or otherwise meaningfully distinguished between claims

on the basis of the “blend” limitation.

2009-1076 22
 The district court recognized that under Third Circuit law a court faced with

inconsistent general verdicts after the jury is dismissed has an obligation to attempt to

read the verdicts in a manner that will resolve the inconsistencies. JMOL Order, 585 F.

Supp. 2d at 616–17; see Mosely, 102 F.3d at 90. Although the district court agreed with

Acushnet that the verdicts here were genuinely and irreconcilably inconsistent, it

nevertheless denied Acushnet’s motion for a new trial. The court noted that Acushnet

“stipulated that it infringes each of the Sullivan patents; three of which were held valid

by the jury without reservation,” and that the inconsistency therefore was harmless.

JMOL Order, 585 F. Supp. 2d at 617.

This reasoning is flawed. Although it is true that the jury found “without

reservation” that eight claims were not invalid, it is equally true that the jury found claim

5 invalid without reservation. Moreover, the evidence at trial was such that the jury

could have rationally reached either verdict with regard to the asserted claims; neither

party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Third Circuit law, in a case

where a reading of the verdicts that would solve the apparent inconsistency proves

impossible and the evidence might support either of the two inconsistent verdicts, “‘the

appropriate remedy is ordinarily, not simply to accept one verdict and dismiss the other,

but to order an entirely new trial.’” Mosely, 102 F.3d at 90 (quoting Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 806 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 10 In these circumstances,

10
The Third Circuit has noted that in rare cases apparently inconsistent
verdicts may be allowed to stand. Mosely, 102 F.3d at 90. That court has since
clarified that “[t]hose circumstances are where the verdict appears to be the result of
compromise as opposed to jury confusion.” Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs.,
Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 217 n.13 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). There is no
contention that the verdict here could plausibly be considered such a compromise.

2009-1076 23
Acushnet is correct that a new trial rather than entry of judgment was required as to

claims 4 and 5 of the ’293 patent.

In sum, we agree with Acushnet that the verdict form returned by the jury reflects

an irreconcilable inconsistency. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district

court and remand for a new trial on obviousness.

IV Anticipation

As noted above, the district court granted summary judgment that the claims

were not anticipated by Nesbitt. Nesbitt describes a three-piece ball with a core, a

relatively hard ionomer-resin inner cover, and a relatively soft ionomer-resin outer cover.

Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 395. Although Nesbitt itself does not

expressly disclose two limitations of the Sullivan claims (the use of polyurethane in the

outer cover and the use of a blend of ionomer resins in the inner cover), Acushnet

argued that Nesbitt contains these limitations because it incorporates Molitor ’637 by

reference. The relevant passage of Nesbitt describing the materials that may be used

in the cover layers of the Nesbitt golf ball is as follows:

The inner, intermediate, or first layer or ply 14 and the outer cover, second
layer or ply 16 or either of the layers may be cellular when formed of a
foamed natural or synthetic polymeric material. Polymeric materials are
preferably such as ionomer resins which are foamable. Reference is
made to the application Ser. No. 155,658, of Robert P. Molitor issued into
U.S. Pat. No. 4,274,637 which describes a number of foamable
compositions of a character which may be employed for one or both layers
14 and 16 for the golf ball of this invention.

Nesbitt col.3 ll.51–61 (emphases added). Molitor ’637, in turn, undisputedly teaches

that many foamable materials, including both polyurethane and ionomer-resin blends,

may be used as golf ball cover materials:

2009-1076 24
 The range of synthetic polymeric materials which can be used in
accordance with this invention, other than the above described Surlyn
[ionomer] resins, is much broader than the range of natural materials.
Suitable polymer materials which may be adapted for use in this invention
are as follows:

Homopolymeric and copolymeric substances, such as (1) vinyl resins . . .;
(2) polyolefins such as polyethylene, polypropylene, polybutylene,
transpolyisoprene, and the like . . .; (3) polyurethanes . . .; (4)
polyamides . . .; (5) polystyrene . . .; (6) acrylic resins . . .; (7)
thermoplastic rubbers such as the urethanes . . .; and (8) polyphenylene
oxide resins. . . . This list is not meant to be limiting or exhaustive, but
merely illustrates the wide range of polymeric materials which may be
employed in the present invention. Mixtures of the above described
material may also be used.

Molitor ’637 col. 5 ll.33–55 (emphases added); see also id. col.1 ll.44–45 (“Mixtures of

various [ionomer] resins as cover stock materials are likewise highly advantageous.”).

The district court rejected Acushnet’s argument, holding that Nesbitt failed to

specifically incorporate polyurethane and ionomer-resin blends from Molitor ’637.

Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 396. Without the benefit of Molitor’s

teachings, Nesbitt failed to anticipate as a matter of law. The district court therefore

granted summary judgment of no anticipation. Id. at 398. On appeal, Acushnet

contends the district court erred in holding that Nesbitt does not incorporate Molitor

’637.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Whether material is

incorporated by reference into a host document is a question of law. Advanced Display

Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A patent claim is

invalid due to anticipation if, within “the four corners of a single, prior art

document . . . every element of the claimed invention [is described], either expressly or

inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice the invention

2009-1076 25
without undue experimentation.” Id. at 1282. However, “[m]aterial not explicitly

contained in the single, prior art document may still be considered for purposes of

anticipation if that material is incorporated by reference into the document.” Id.

To incorporate matter by reference, a host document must contain language

“clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found”;

a “mere reference to another application, or patent, or publication is not an incorporation

of anything therein . . . .” In re de Seversky, 474 F.2d 671, 674 (CCPA 1973). Put

differently, “the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific

material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various

documents.” Adv. Display Sys., 212 F.3d at 1282. Nesbitt identifies with specificity

both what material is being incorporated by reference (foamable polymeric compositions

suitable for golf ball cover layers) and where it may be found (the Molitor patent).

Nesbitt col.3 ll.51–61. We have previously held that language nearly identical to that

used in Nesbitt (“[r]eference is made to”) can be sufficient to indicate to one of skill in

the art that the referenced material is fully incorporated in the host document. See In re

Voss, 557 F.2d 812, 815–16 (CCPA 1977); In re Hughes, 550 F.2d 1273, 1275–76

(CCPA 1977). Here, however, the district court held that Nesbitt satisfies the

requirements for incorporation only with regard to the ionomer resins disclosed in

Molitor, stating that “Molitor ’673 is mentioned in Nesbitt to identify examples of suitable

resins, preferably ionomer resins, and not to specifically incorporate polyurethane.”

Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 396.

Callaway in support of the district court argues that even if Nesbitt incorporates

Molitor ’637 as to ionomer resins, it does not incorporate with respect to the use of

2009-1076 26
polyurethane for the outer cover because it refers to the use of ionomer resins as

“preferabl[e].” Nesbitt col.3 l.55. Polyurethane is not an ionomer resin. Although

Molitor ’637 does state that ionomer resins are the preferable material for such use, on

its face the reference to Molitor ’637 in Nesbitt is not limited to those resins. Rather,

Nesbitt states broadly that the layers of the golf ball disclosed therein may be made

from a “natural or synthetic polymeric material.” Id. col.3 ll.53–54. Nesbitt goes on to

directly indicate that such materials include all of the foamable polymeric materials

described in Molitor: “Reference is made to [Molitor ’637] which describes a number of

foamable compositions of a character which may be employed for one or both

layers . . . for the golf ball of this invention.” Id. col.3 ll.56–61 (emphasis added).

Polyurethane is a foamable composition. Nesbitt incorporates the entire list of foamable

compounds (“a number of foamable compositions”) disclosed by Molitor ’637 as

appropriate materials for use in golf ball cover layers, including polyurethane and

mixtures of ionomer resins. We perceive no basis to differentiate between incorporation

of the ionomeric resins disclosed by Molitor ’637 and the other compositions in the list,

including polyurethane. Accordingly, we hold that Nesbitt incorporates by reference the

potential cover layer materials described in Molitor ’637, including polyurethane and

ionomer resin blends.

Callaway contends that even if the district court erred in concluding that Nesbitt

does not incorporate Molitor ’637, summary judgment of no anticipation was still

appropriate. That issue was not addressed by the district court, and it is not clear to us

that Callaway properly raised this issue in its motion for summary judgment before that

court. We are therefore reluctant to consider this issue on appeal. Nothing we say here

2009-1076 27
precludes the district court from permitting Callaway to file a new motion for summary

judgment on that issue, if the district court thinks it appropriate.

One matter, however, requires our attention. Callaway contends that the trial

court properly excluded the test ball evidence on the issue of anticipation. On this point

we disagree. This requires us to examine the grounds for the district court’s decision in

this respect. First, the district court refused to consider the test ball evidence on the

issue of anticipation because it found that Nesbitt did not incorporate the Molitor ’637

reference, and that the test balls therefore did not embody any single item of

anticipatory prior art. See Summary Judgment Order, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (“The

balls . . . were neither completely representative of Nesbitt, nor were they completely

representative of Proudfit . . . .”). This ground for excluding the evidence necessarily

fails in light of our holding that Nesbitt does incorporate Molitor. 11 Second, with respect

to obviousness, the district court refused to allow the test ball evidence at trial because

presentation of the evidence could lead the jury to give undue weight to Acushnet’s

arguments concerning motivation to combine and obviousness. This ground is

inapplicable to Acushnet’s anticipation argument, where motivation to combine is not an

issue. Third, at summary judgment, the district court excluded the testimony of

Acushnet’s expert, Dr. MacKnight, on the ground that MacKnight had not had sufficient

involvement in the preparation and testing of the balls to vouch for their reliability.

Daubert Order, 2007 WL 4165401, at *1 (“Dr. MacKnight neither prepared nor tested

11
Indeed, while challenging Acushnet’s test balls as an agglomeration of
prior art elements, Callaway appears to recognize that re-creations or “models of balls
described in individual prior art references” may be relevant. Pl.-Appellee’s Br. 58; see
id. at 25.

2009-1076 28
anything. . . . [T]o the extent that the reliability of the test results derives from Dr.

MacKnight’s voucher, such evidence is excluded”). As discussed above we find no

error in the district court’s ruling, but the fact remains that at trial Acushnet also

proffered the testimony of Jeff Dalton (who supervised preparation of the balls) and of

an employee of the testing laboratory. On remand, that testimony may be sufficient to

authenticate the balls, and support the admission into evidence of balls designed to

replicate Nesbitt on the issue of anticipation.

Because Nesbitt incorporates the compositions taught by Molitor ’637, we

reverse the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Callaway and

remand for further proceedings on that issue.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed-in-

part, reversed-in-part, and vacated-in-part. The permanent injunction against Acushnet

entered on November 10, 2008, is vacated and the case is remanded for further

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART,
VACATED-IN-PART, and REMANDED

COSTS

No costs.

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