Anderson v. Apfel

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                       _____________________

                            No. 99-50916
                          Summary Calendar
                       _____________________

                       ANDREW C. ANDERSON,

                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,

                              versus

                         KENNETH S. APFEL,
                 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                              Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the Western District of Texas
                          (A-98-CV-576-JN)
_________________________________________________________________

                            May 2, 2000

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     Andrew C. Anderson appeals the district court’s judgment for

the Commissioner in his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for

review of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision denying

his request for Supplemental Security Income benefits.     We review

the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is supported by

substantial evidence in the record and whether the Commissioner

applied the proper legal standards in evaluating the evidence.

E.g., Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990).

     Notwithstanding   Anderson’s      contention   that   the   ALJ


     *
      Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
“disregarded the great weight of objective medical evidence,”

substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding that

Anderson had the residual functional capacity to perform medium

work. Furthermore, because the ALJ’s determination that Anderson’s

capacity for work was not compromised by nonexertional limitations

is supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ was entitled to rely

exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines.     See Fraga v.

Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987).   Finally, Anderson’s

contention that the ALJ erred in not considering the combined

effects of his impairments is belied by the record.



                                                      AFFIRMED




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