UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
GARY ALLEN KIRKPATRICK,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (2:03-cr-00017-LHT-1)
Submitted: April 9, 2010 Decided: April 20, 2010
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Ross H. Richardson,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Edward R. Ryan, Acting United
States Attorney, Don D. Gast, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Allen Kirkpatrick appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
twenty-four months in prison. On appeal, Kirkpatrick contends
that his sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. In this initial inquiry, we take a more deferential
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences. United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if
we find the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable
must we decide whether it is “plainly” so. Id. at 657.
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven
policy statements and the statutory factors applicable to
revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2006),
the court need not robotically tick through every subsection,
and ultimately, the court has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Id. at 656-57. Moreover, while a district
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence, the
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court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as when imposing a post-conviction sentence.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, Kirkpatrick does not challenge the district
court’s findings that he willfully violated the terms of his
supervised release in the manner set forth in the revocation
petition, lied at the revocation hearing about the violations,
and refused to cooperate with custodial authorities; nor does he
challenge the revocation of his supervised release. Rather, he
contends that in imposing the statutory maximum 24-month prison
term, the district court failed to carefully consider and weigh
the required factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (2006) in
accordance with our decision in Crudup. We disagree.
The district court explained its decision to reject
the Chapter Seven policy statement range and impose a 24-month
sentence was based on Kirkpatrick’s perjury in court at the
hearing and his past behavior as indicated in the violation
report and the testimony of the supervising probation officer.
Kirkpatrick not only violated the conditions of his supervised
release by possessing a knife and lying about it to the
probation officer, but he also threatened three people with the
knife and then lied to the district court. He furthermore
refused to cooperate with custodial authorities and other
individuals assigned to supervise or assist him. The district
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court’s explanation indicated its consideration of the nature
and circumstances of Kirkpatrick’s offense, his history and
characteristics, and the need for the sentence to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. Thus, we conclude that
the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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