Voda v. Cordis Corp.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-1297, -1343

JAN K. VODA, M.D.,

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,

v.

CORDIS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

Mitchell G. Stockwell, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, of Atlanta, Georgia, argued for
plaintiff-cross appellant. With him on the brief was D. Clay Holloway. Of counsel was
Jacqueline R. Knapp. Of counsel on the brief was John A. Kenney, McAfee & Taft, of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

John M. DiMatteo, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, of New York, New York, argued
for defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were Kelsey I. Nix, Diane C. Ragosa,
and Adam R. Steinert. Of counsel on the brief was Constantine L. Trela, Jr., Sidley
Austin LLP, of Chicago, Illinois.

Mathias W. Samuel, Fish & Richardson P.C., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for
amicus curiae Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. With him on the brief were John A.
Dragseth and Christian A. Chu.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma

Senior Judge Tim Leonard
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-1297, -1343

JAN K. VODA, M.D.,

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,

v.

CORDIS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in
case no. 03-CV-1512, Senior Judge Tim Leonard.

___________________________

DECIDED: August 18, 2008
___________________________

Before MAYER, BRYSON, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

This is a patent infringement case involving catheters used in interventional

cardiology. The issues on appeal and cross-appeal include claim construction, patent

validity, infringement, willfulness, and the district court’s denial of a permanent

injunction. Because we find no reversible error in the decision below with respect to the

issues of claim construction, patent validity, and the denial of a permanent injunction,

we affirm those aspects of the judgment. The judgment of infringement, however, is

affirmed-in-part and reversed-in-part. Lastly, because the willfulness finding was based

on a jury instruction that is erroneous under our intervening decision in In re Seagate
Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), we vacate the judgment

with respect to willfulness and remand for reconsideration under the Seagate standard.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Dr. Jan K. Voda, M.D., (“Voda”) sued Cordis Corporation (“Cordis”) for

infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,445,625 (“the ’625 patent”), 6,083,213 (“the ’213

patent”), and 6,475,195 (“the ’195 patent”) in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Oklahoma. 1 Specifically, Voda alleged that Cordis’s “XB” catheters

infringe claim 1 of the ’625 patent, claims 1 through 5 of the ’213 patent, and claims 1

through 6 of the ’195 patent. The parties tried the case to a jury, and it returned a

verdict finding that Cordis willfully infringed all asserted claims of the patents-in-suit and

that claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent are not invalid. The jury also determined that

Voda was entitled to a reasonable royalty of 7.5% of Cordis’s gross sales of the

infringing XB catheters. Following the jury verdict, the district court denied Cordis’s

motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) that claims 1 through 3 of the ’213

patent are invalid and that Cordis’s XB catheters do not infringe any of the asserted

claims of the patents-in-suit. The district court also granted Voda’s motion for enhanced

damages and attorneys’ fees but denied Voda’s request for a permanent injunction.

On appeal, Cordis challenges the district court’s construction of the term “along a

line” in claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent. Cordis also challenges the district court’s

denial of JMOL that claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent are invalid and that Cordis’s

XB catheters do not infringe any of the asserted claims of the patents-in-suit. Finally,

1
This is the second time that this case has been before the court. The first
appeal involved a procedural matter. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir.
2007).

2007-1297, -1343 2
Cordis argues that the finding of willfulness should be vacated on the ground that the

jury instruction on willfulness was erroneous under our recent Seagate decision. On

cross-appeal, Voda argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Voda’s

request for a permanent injunction. Voda also argues that the district court erred in

construing the “substantially straight leg” limitation in claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent

and claims 1 through 6 of the ’195 patent.

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

BACKGROUND

Cardiac guide catheters have been used to diagnose and treat heart disease

since the late 1960s. A cardiac guide catheter is a long thin plastic tube with a

preformed tip that comes in a variety of sizes and configurations. The method of using

a cardiac guide catheter involves first inserting a wire into the catheter to straighten the

preformed tip. Once the wire is inside the catheter, the catheter is inserted into the

femoral artery and advanced to the aorta of the heart. The catheter is further advanced

up the descending aorta, over the aortic arch, and down the ascending aorta until the tip

of the catheter reaches a position at or near the opening (i.e., “ostium”) of the coronary

artery. The wire is then removed from the catheter, which allows the tip of the catheter

to return to its preformed shape. As the catheter tip returns to its shape, it moves into

the desired position: specifically, the tip of the catheter is inserted into the coronary

ostium while another portion of the catheter rests against the opposing wall of the aorta

to provide support. Hereinafter, the portion of a guide catheter that rests against the

opposing wall of the aorta is referred to as the “contact portion” of the guide catheter.

2007-1297, -1343 3
1. Voda’s Patents

The three patents-in-suit are all directed to an “advantageous orientation of the

guide catheter in the aortic complex.” ’625 patent col.8 ll.51-52; ’213 patent col.8 ll.21-

22; ’195 patent col.8 ll.25-26. All three patents issued from continuation-in-part

applications of a common parent application, namely, U.S. Patent App. No. 07/622,873.

The ’625 patent claims guide catheters with “a significant change in the overall

shape/configuration” of the catheter in order to “maximize backup support for distal

advancement of a balloon catheter through the guide catheter.” ’625 patent col.7 ll.60-

67. Claim 1 of the ’625 patent reads as follows:

1. A femoral approach angioplasty guide catheter adapted for selective
catheterization of a left main coronary artery within a cardiovascular
system comprising:
an elongate flexible tubular member in a relaxed state prior to
insertion in the cardiovascular system further comprising in consecutive
arrangement:
a first straight proximal portion extending distally from a proximal
end of the tubular member;
a second straight portion joined to the first straight portion and
having a length of about 1.5 to 2.5 centimeters;
a tertiary curved portion defining a junction of the first straight
portion and the second straight portion and defining a vertex of an obtuse
angle of 130° to 150° between the first and second straight portions;
a secondary curved portion joined to the second straight portion
and having an arcuate curvature of about 150° to 180° and a radius of
curvature of about 1 centimeter;
a third straight portion joined to the secondary curved portion;
a fourth straight portion joined to the third straight portion and
having a distal end defining a terminal distal tip of the tubular member;
and
a primary curved portion a junction of the third straight portion and
the fourth straight portion and defining a vertex of an obtuse angle of 140°
to 160° between the third and fourth straight portions,
wherein the interiors of the tertiary curved portion and every curve
portion distal thereof, including the secondary curved portion and the
primary curved portion, all generally face each other,
wherein the first straight portion, second straight portion, third
straight portion, and fourth straight portion all lie in generally the same

2007-1297, -1343 4
 plane, the third straight portion and the fourth straight portion extending
slightly out of plane to the extent that the fourth straight portion overlaps
the first straight portion, and
wherein the length of the fourth straight portion is approximately
equal to the sum of the length of the third straight portion and the radius of
curvature of the secondary curved portion.

’625 patent cols.32-33 (emphasis added). In the written description of the ’625 patent,

the “second straight portion” is identified as the portion of the catheter that engages the

wall of the aorta opposite the coronary ostium during use (along with a proximal portion

of the secondary curve portion). Id. at col.9 l.50-col.10 l.4. The engagement of the

second straight portion with the wall of the aorta is described as providing “a large area

of general backup support . . . which makes it quite difficult to dislodge the guide

catheter from its desired orientation” during use. Id. Cordis argues that its XB catheters

do not infringe claim 1 of the ’625 patent because they do not meet the “second straight

portion” limitation. For discussion purposes, this opinion will refer to claim 1 of the ’625

patent as the “straight claim.”

Claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent are method claims. Claim 1 is

representative:

1. A method for advancing a catheter through the aorta and into a
coronary ostium, the aorta having an arch and an inner wall opposite the
ostium, comprising the steps of:
providing a catheter including an elongate catheter body having a
proximal end and a distal end and having a central lumen from the
proximal end to the distal end adapted to slidably receive a therapeutic
catheter, the catheter body including a tip at the distal end of the catheter
body adapted to removably lodge in the coronary artery ostium;
advancing the catheter body distal end through the aortic arch; and
engaging the aorta inner wall with a portion of the catheter body
such that when the distal end of the catheter is positioned in the ostium,
the catheter body engages the opposite wall of the aorta along a line
having a length of about 1.5 cm or greater.

2007-1297, -1343 5
’213 patent col.30 ll.49-67 (emphasis added). With respect to claims 1 through 3 of the

’213 patent, Cordis argues (1) that the district court misconstrued “along a line”; (2) that

Cordis does not infringe claims 1 through 3 under a proper construction of “along a line”;

and (3) that under the district court’s construction of “along a line,” claims 1 through 3 of

the ’213 patent are invalid for obviousness or anticipation.

The ’195 patent includes both apparatus and method claims. For purposes of

this discussion, claim 1 is representative of both the method and apparatus claims:

1. An assembly for guiding the path of a therapeutic catheter,
comprising:
an elongate tubular member including a proximal shaft portion, a
profiled portion, and a substantially straight tip portion;
the profiled portion comprising, in order from the proximal shaft
portion to the tip portion, a first bend, a first substantially straight leg, a
second bend, a second substantially straight leg, and a third bend;
the first bend, the first substantially straight leg, the second bend,
the second substantially straight leg, and the third bend being disposed
within a chamber of an aorta;
a distal end of the tip portion being disposed within an ostium
defined by the aorta;
the first substantially straight leg seating against a wall of the aorta
opposite the ostium of the coronary artery; and
the elongate tubular member defining a lumen extending from a
distal end of the elongate tubular member to a proximal end of the
elongate tubular member, wherein the lumen is constructed and arranged
to receive the therapeutic catheter.

’195 patent cols.28-29 (emphases added). Here, the “first substantially straight leg”

corresponds to the “second straight portion” of the ’625 patent (as well as the “second

straight portion” of the ’195 patent’s written description). Cordis argues that its XB

catheters do not infringe the ’195 patent because the XB catheters do not meet the “first

substantially straight leg” limitation, which appears in all the claims of the ’195 patent.

In addition, as with the claims of the ’195 patent, claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent

contain a “first substantially straight leg” limitation. Thus, Cordis also argues that its XB

2007-1297, -1343 6
catheters do not infringe claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent for failure to meet the “first

substantially straight leg” limitation. For the sake of discussion, this opinion will refer to

all claims of the ’195 patent and claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent as the “substantially

straight claims.”

2. Cordis’s XB Catheter

The accused product in this case is Cordis’s XB catheter. The original version of

Cordis’s XB catheter, which was made and sold prior to the issuance of Voda’s patents,

included a “second straight portion” as claimed in the ’625 patent. However, before the

Voda patents issued, Cordis redesigned its XB catheter by replacing the second straight

portion with a curved portion. For discussion purposes, this opinion will refer to this

curved portion as the “redesigned curve portion.” The only aspects of the infringement

judgment that Cordis challenges are whether the redesigned curve portion of the XB

catheter meets the “along a line” limitation of claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent under

a proper claim construction and whether it meets the straight and substantially straight

limitations of the ’625, ’213, and ’195 patents under the doctrine of equivalents.

DISCUSSION

1. Standards of Review

Claim construction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Cybor Corp. v.

FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Markman v.

Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).

This court reviews the denial of a motion for JMOL or a new trial under the law of

the regional circuit where the district court sits—here, the Tenth Circuit. Finisar Corp. v.

DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit reviews a

2007-1297, -1343 7
denial of a motion for JMOL de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district

court. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1160

(10th Cir. 2006). JMOL is appropriate when “a party has been fully heard on an issue

during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1);

Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Meraj Int’l Inv. Corp., 315 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir.

2003). The Tenth Circuit has explained that “[w]hen a jury verdict is challenged on

appeal, our review is limited to determining whether the record—viewed in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party—contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s

decision.” United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1227

(10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted); see also Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140

F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In reviewing factual issues for substantial evidence,

the inquiry is whether a reasonable jury, given the record before it viewed as a whole,

could have arrived at the conclusion it did.”). In addition, the Tenth Circuit reviews a

denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lamy, 521

F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2008).

Finally, this court reviews a denial of a permanent injunction in a patent case for

abuse of discretion, applying Federal Circuit law. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Elecs.

Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). “An abuse of discretion may be established

under Federal Circuit law by showing that the court made a clear error of judgment in

weighing the relevant factors or exercised its discretion based on an error of law or

clearly erroneous fact finding.” Id.

2007-1297, -1343 8
2. Claim Construction of the ’213 Patent

Claim terms must be given “the meaning that the term would have to a person of

ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp.,

415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). That meaning is determined by

reference to several sources, including “‘the words of the claims themselves, the

remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence

concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of

the art.’” Id. at 1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys.,

Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). This court has further explained that

“Phillips teaches that these sources should be accorded relative weights depending on

the circumstances of the case, with intrinsic sources being the most relevant.”

Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1378

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314-19).

Here, Cordis challenges the district court’s construction of “along a line” in claims

1 through 3 of the ’213 patent. The district court construed “along a line” as:

Contacting the aorta inner wall with a portion of the tube body such that
when the end of the catheter lodges within the opening in the coronary
artery, an about 1.5 cm or greater length of the tube body bears upon the
wall of the aorta opposite the opening.

Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. 03-CV-1512 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 15, 2005) (Claim Construction

Order). Cordis argues that the district court’s construction of “along a line” is erroneous

because it does not require “that a straight portion of the catheter engage the wall of the

aorta.” Appellant Br. at 34-39. Cordis further argues that the claims, the specification,

and the prosecution history of the ’213 patent support its proposed construction of

2007-1297, -1343 9
“along a line.” We disagree. The following discussion will address each of Cordis’s

arguments in turn.

a. The Words of the Claims Themselves

Cordis argues that the use of the words “along a line” in claim 1 of the ’213

patent requires the contact portion of the catheter to be straight in its rest state because

“‘straight’ is inherent in the word ‘line.’” However, Cordis’s argument ignores the context

in which the phrase “along a line” is used in claim 1. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314

(“[T]he context in which a term is used in the asserted claim can be highly instructive.”).

As the district court observed, Cordis’s argument fails to recognize that claim 1 refers to

the position of the catheter as it is being used in the human body rather than the shape

of the catheter in its rest state. Because “along a line” describes the contact portion of

the catheter in its engaged state, claim 1 does not inherently require the contact portion

of the catheter to be straight in its rest state.

In addition, Cordis concedes that “claim 1 does not expressly recite a ‘straight

portion.’” Appellant Reply Br. at 6. By contrast, claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent

specifically require that the contact portion of the catheter be a “substantially straight

leg” in its rest state. ’213 patent col.32 ll.1-2. Therefore, the fact that claim 1—and

dependent claims 2 and 3—does not expressly recite a “straight” or “substantially

straight” portion strongly implies that claims 1 through 3 do not require the contact

portion of the catheter to be straight in its rest state. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314

(“Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of

particular claim terms.”); see also Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438

2007-1297, -1343 10
F.3d 1374, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (discussing the doctrine of claim differentiation as

applied to independent claims).

In sum, the use of the words “along a line” in claims 1 through 3 does not, by

itself, limit the claimed methods to those in which the contact portion of the catheter is

straight in its rest state.

b. The Specification

Although the use of “along a line” does not by itself support Cordis’s construction,

the words of the claims “must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a

part.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quotation omitted). Indeed, “the specification may

reveal an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor.” Id. at

1316. However, any such disclaimer “must be clear.” Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl.

Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am.

Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The patentee may demonstrate an intent

to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by including in

the specification expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a clear

disavowal of claim scope.”) However, this court has cautioned against importing

limitations from the specification into the claims. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. Moreover,

this court has recognized that “the distinction between using the specification to

interpret the meaning of a claim and importing limitations from the specification into the

claim can be a difficult one to apply in practice.” Id.; see also Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v.

Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Here, Cordis argues that the ’213 patent’s written description limits the scope of

claims 1 through 3 to methods in which the contact portion of the catheter is straight in

2007-1297, -1343 11
its rest state. To support its argument, Cordis cites to portions of the written description

that describe the contact portion “of the catheter of the present invention” as a “straight

portion.” Appellant Br. at 34-35 (citing ’213 patent cols.9-10). Cordis also states that

“nowhere does the patent suggest that the claimed invention can only use a curved

portion to engage the wall.” Id. at 34.

We do not agree with Cordis that the written description provides “a clear

disavowal of claim scope,” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. Although the written description

often discusses “providing a straight portion . . . that contacts the aortic wall,” e.g. ’213

patent col.7 ll.55-58 (emphasis added), the specification also discusses the contact

portion without requiring that it be straight in its rest state. For example, the

specification provides that:

The primary feature of the superior (i.e., better) orientation of the
guide catheters of the present invention is that, when disposed in the
aortic complex, a contact portion of the guide catheter is established in a
substantially contiguous manner against the aortic wall for a substantial
length (at least about 1.5 centimeters).

’213 patent col.8 ll.53-58 (emphasis added). Other portions of the written description

also discuss the contact portion without requiring that it be straight in its rest state. See,

e.g., ’213 patent col.7 ll.49-52 (“The factors determining the support provided by the

guide catheter include . . . a large supportive segment of the guide catheter that rests

against the wall of the ascending aorta to increase stability of the guide catheter within

the aortic complex.” (emphasis added)); ’213 patent col.8 ll.6-12 (“The guide catheter

has a distal end portion such that with the distal tip of the distal end portion . . . fully

disposed within the cardiovascular system[], a portion of the distal end portion contacts

2007-1297, -1343 12
and rests against and is substantially contiguous with a wall of the ascending aorta

. . . .” (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, the written description of the ’213 patent does not clearly limit the

scope of claims 1 through 3 to methods in which the contact portion of the catheter is

straight in its rest state.

c. The Prosecution History

In construing patent claims, a court may consult the patent’s prosecution history,

if it is in evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. The prosecution history can assist the

court in understanding how an inventor understood and described his invention and

whether the inventor disclaimed or disavowed certain subject matter from the scope of

his claims. Id. This court has emphasized, however, that in order to disavow claim

scope during prosecution “a patent applicant must clearly and unambiguously express

surrender of subject matter.” Sorensen v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375, 1378-79

(Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Omega Eng’g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1325-26

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[F]or prosecution disclaimer to attach, our precedent requires that the

alleged disavowing actions or statements made during prosecution be both clear and

unmistakable.”).

In this case, claim 1 of the ’213 patent was amended during prosecution to

overcome a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 for anticipation by U.S. Patent No.

5,163,921 (“the Feiring reference”), U.S. Patent No. 5,299,574 (“the Bower reference”),

and U.S. Patent No. 4,822,345 (“the Danforth reference”). The amendment changed

the third step of the method of claim 1 as follows:

engaging the aorta inner wall with a portion of the catheter body such that
when the distal end of the catheter is positioned in the ostium, the catheter

2007-1297, -1343 13
 body engages the opposite wall of the aorta along a line [wherein the line
is proximate of the ostium of the coronary artery] having a length of about
1.5 cm or greater.

Amdt. to U.S. Patent App. No. 08/854,996 at *2 (Filed May 13, 1997) (deletion

bracketed; insertion underlined). In the remarks accompanying this amendment, the

applicant stated:

Applicant respectfully submits that his invention, unlike the
catheters disclosed by Feiring, Bower and Danforth engages the wall of
the aorta, opposite the distal end of the catheter when the distal end of the
catheter is positioned in the ostium, along a line having a length of about
1.5 cm or greater. Each of the catheters disclosed by Feiring, Bower and
Danforth engage the ascending aorta at a bend or curve along the
catheter. None provide support along a line of about 1.5 cm or greater.

Id. at *3.

Cordis argues that the amendment to claims 1 through 3 and the accompanying

remarks demonstrate Voda’s intent to limit the claimed methods to those in which the

contact portion of the catheter is straight in its rest state. We disagree. Although

Voda’s amendment specifically limited his claims to methods where the catheter

engages the wall of the aorta for “a length of about 1.5 cm or greater,” the amendment

makes no reference to the shape of the contact portion of the catheter in its rest state.

Id. at *2. The remarks accompanying this amendment also make no reference to the

shape of the contact portion of the catheter in its rest state. Rather, the remarks

distinguish the prior art catheters based on the shape and length of the contact portion

of the catheter during use. For instance, Voda explained that his claimed methods were

“unlike” the Feiring, Bower, and Danforth methods because the claimed methods

require “engage[ing] the wall of the aorta, opposite the . . . ostium, along a line having a

2007-1297, -1343 14
length of about 1.5 cm or greater.” Id. In addition, Voda states that “[n]one [of the prior

art methods] provide support along a line of about 1.5 cm or greater.” Id.

Accordingly, we read the amendment and the accompanying remarks to

distinguish the prior art based on the length of the engagement with the ascending aorta

during use, rather than the shape of the contact portion of the catheter in its rest state.

The ’213 patent’s prosecution history thus does not clearly and unmistakably limit the

scope of claims 1 through 3 to methods in which the contact portion of the catheter is

straight in its rest state.

* * *

In sum, we affirm the district court’s construction of “along a line” with respect to

claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent. In addition, because Cordis has waived any

argument that its XB catheters do not infringe claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent

under the district court’s claim construction, we affirm the judgment of infringement with

respect to these claims.

3. Validity of Claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 Patent

Patents are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. § 282. A party challenging the

validity of a patent bears the burden of proving invalidity by clear and convincing

evidence. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Cordis argues that under the district court’s construction of “along a line,” claims

1 through 3 of the ’213 patent are invalid for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or

invalid for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Specifically, Cordis argues that, under

the district court’s claim construction, claims 1 through 3 are anticipated by the “Amplatz

2007-1297, -1343 15
references” 2 and are anticipated or obvious in view of the “Bourassa reference.” 3

Despite Cordis’s arguments, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that claims

1 through 3 are not invalid based upon the evidence adduced at trial. Accordingly, we

affirm the finding that claims 1 through 3 are not invalid.

a. Anticipation

Anticipation is a question of fact that is reviewed for substantial evidence when

tried to a jury. Finisar, 523 F.3d at 1334. “Anticipation requires disclosure of each and

every claim limitation in a single prior art reference, either explicitly or inherently.” In re

Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Here, the parties only dispute whether a reasonable jury could have found that

neither the Amplatz nor the Bourassa references disclose the third limitation of claims

1 through 3 of the ’213 patent. The third limitation of representative claim 1 requires

“engaging the aorta inner wall with a portion of the catheter body such that when the

distal end of the catheter is positioned in the ostium, the catheter body engages the

opposite wall of the aorta along a line having a length of about 1.5 cm or greater.” ’213

patent col.30 ll.63-67.

In arguing for anticipation by the Amplatz references, Cordis notes Voda’s

concession that “in one of the working positions of the Amplatz catheter . . . a significant

2
The Amplatz references are: Kurt Amplatz et al., Mechanics of Selective
Coronary Artery Catheterization via Femoral Approach, 89 Radiology 1040 (1967);
United States Catheter and Instrument Co., PTCA in Perspective, USCI Technical
Perspective 23-42 (1986); and United States Catheter and Instrument Co., USCI
Positrol II® and Nycore™ Cardiovascular Catheters . . . A Discernible Difference,
Brochure 1-20 (1990).
3
The Bourassa reference is: Martial G. Bourassa et al., Selective Coronary
Arteriography by the Percutaneous Femoral Artery Approach, 107 American Journal of
Roentgenology 377 (1969).

2007-1297, -1343 16
segment is leaning on the opposite side of the aorta.” J.A. 14265. This concession,

however, fails to establish that any of the Amplatz references disclose the third limitation

of claim 1. First, Voda did not concede that the contact portion of the Amplatz catheter

was “1.5 cm or greater.” Second, Voda did not concede that the Amplatz catheter leans

against the wall of the aorta opposite the ostium “when the distal end of the catheter is

positioned in the ostium.” Rather, Voda testified that the prior art method of positioning

the end of the Amplatz catheter in the ostium required pulling back on the catheter such

that the catheter lost contact with the wall of the aorta. Given this record, a reasonable

jury could conclude that Cordis failed to show that the Amplatz references disclosed the

third limitation of claims 1 through 3 by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the

district court did not err in denying Cordis’s motion for JMOL that claims 1 through 3 of

the ’213 patent were anticipated by the Amplatz references.

In arguing for anticipation by the Bourassa reference, Cordis places substantial

reliance on the testimony of Mr. Thomas Trotta, one of its experts, regarding the method

of using the Bourassa catheter. However, as the district court observed, Mr. Trotta is a

catheter engineer, not an interventional cardiologist. Accordingly, the district court

instructed the jury that Mr. Trotter has no education or training in the proper use of

guiding catheters in the human body and has never used a catheter in a human. This

instruction was not an abuse of discretion. Cordis also relies on the testimony of Dr.

Frank Hildner, another one of its experts, that the length of contact between the

Bourassa catheter and the wall of the aorta opposite the coronary ostium was 1.5 cm or

more. However, on cross-examination Dr. Hildner admitted that his estimates as to the

length of contact between the Bourassa catheter and the aortic wall were “very

2007-1297, -1343 17
inaccurate,” and that he did not represent his estimates “to be accurate in any way.” In

addition, Voda testified that the images in the Bourassa reference did not clearly depict

whether there was any contact between the Bourassa catheter and the wall of the aorta

opposite the ostium during use. Given this record, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Cordis failed to show that the Bourassa reference disclosed the third limitation of

claims 1 through 3 by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the district court did

not err in denying Cordis’s motion for JMOL that claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent

were anticipated by the Bourassa reference.

b. Obviousness

Section 103 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code “forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the

differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such

that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention

was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,

127 S. Ct. 1727, 1729 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103). “When reviewing a district

court’s JMOL determination as to obviousness, ‘[t]his court reviews a jury’s conclusions

on obviousness, a question of law, without deference, and the underlying findings of

fact, whether explicit or implicit within the verdict, for substantial evidence.’” Finisar, 523

F.3d at 1338 (quoting Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007)

(quotation omitted)).

Cordis offers only a perfunctory argument that it would have been obvious at the

time of Voda’s invention to increase the length of the contact portion of prior art

catheters to 1.5 cm or more to provide additional support during use. Appellant Br. at

46. Cordis makes no argument and cites no evidence to support this conclusion.

2007-1297, -1343 18
Accordingly, Cordis has failed to show any reason to reverse the jury findings of

obviousness nor any reason to grant a new trial on obviousness in light of the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in KSR. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439

F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (treating insufficiently developed arguments as

waived).

* * *

In sum, we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that claims 1 through 3 are

not invalid based upon the evidence adduced at trial. Accordingly, we affirm the district

court’s denial of JMOL that claims 1 through 3 are invalid.

4. Infringement of the Straight and Substantially Straight Claims under the
Doctrine of Equivalents 4

Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally

infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe

if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process and

the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton

Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air

Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)); see also Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc.,

140 F.3d 1009, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that to prove infringement under the

4
On cross-appeal, Voda also argues that the Cordis literally infringes the
substantially straight claims. However, where an argument is merely an alternative
basis to support a judgment of infringement, it is not a proper basis for cross-appeal and
should be dismissed. Nautilus Group, Inc. v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 437 F.3d
1376, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 366 F.3d 1336, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (dismissing a cross-appeal as improper where it merely raised an
alternative ground for affirmance); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247,
1252 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (treating appellee’s claim construction argument as an alternative
ground for affirmance, and not an issue properly raised on cross-appeal). Accordingly,
we dismiss Voda’s argument with respect to literal infringement of the substantially
straight claims as improperly raised on cross-appeal.

2007-1297, -1343 19
doctrine of equivalents, “the accused device must be shown to include an equivalent for

each literally absent claim limitation”). However, the use of the doctrine of equivalents

to establish infringement is limited by the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.

Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 30. In particular, “prosecution history estoppel limits the

broad application of the doctrine of equivalents by barring an equivalents argument for

subject matter relinquished when a patent claim is narrowed during prosecution.”

Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted).

Here, the parties dispute whether Cordis’s accused XB catheters have a portion

that is equivalent to the “second straight portion” limitation of claim 1 of the ’625 patent

(i.e., the straight claim) or the “first substantially straight leg” limitation of claims 4 and 5

of the ’213 patent and all claims of the ’195 patent (i.e., the substantially straight

claims). Cordis makes two arguments in support of noninfringement. First, Cordis

argues that prosecution history estoppel bars Voda from arguing that the “redesigned

curve portion,” see discussion supra Background Section 3, of the XB catheter meets

the straight and substantially straight limitations. Second, Cordis argues that the finding

of infringement should be overturned because no reasonable jury could find that the

redesigned curve portion of its XB catheter is equivalent to the straight or substantially

straight limitations. 5 We will address each argument in turn.

5
More precisely, Cordis argues that treating the redesigned curve portion
“as an equivalent to the claims’ ‘straight’ or ‘substantially straight’ portion would vitiate
that limitation.” Appellant Br. at 48 (emphasis added). However, this court has
explained that claim vitiation arguments are nothing more than arguments “that the
evidence is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that an element of an accused
device is equivalent to an element called for in the claim, or that the theory of
equivalence to support the conclusion of infringement otherwise lacks legal sufficiency.”
DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1018-19 (Fed. Cir.
2006).

2007-1297, -1343 20
 a. Prosecution History Estoppel

This court has explained that “prosecution history estoppel can occur during

prosecution in one of two ways, either (1) [when the applicant makes] a narrowing

amendment to the claim (‘amendment-based estoppel’) or (2) [when the applicant

surrenders] claim scope through argument to the patent examiner (‘argument-based

estoppel’).” Conoco, 460 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted). Here, Cordis argues that

both amendment-based estoppel and argument-based estoppel apply to the

substantially straight claims of the ’213 patent. 6

Under amendment-based estoppel, “[a] patentee’s decision to narrow his claims

through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory

between the original claim and the amended claim.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku

Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (citations omitted). However,

“the patentee can overcome the presumption that prosecution history estoppel bars a

finding of equivalence” by showing: (1) that the equivalent was unforeseeable at the

time of the patent application; (2) that the rationale underlying the amendment bore “no

more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question”; or (3) “some other reason

suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the

insubstantial substitute in question.” Id.

During prosecution of claim 4 of the ’213 patent, Voda amended claim 4 as

follows:

6
Cordis also argues that prosecution history estoppel applies to the straight
and substantially straight claims of the ’625 and ’195 patents. However, the district
court correctly found that Cordis waived those arguments by failing to raise them in its
post-trial motion for JMOL. Because those arguments were waived below, we decline
to address them here in the first instance. See Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc.,
126 F.3d 1420, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

2007-1297, -1343 21
 4. A method for advancing a catheter through an aorta and into a branch
artery, the aorta having an arch and an inner wall opposite the branch
artery, comprising the steps of:
providing a catheter including a tubular member having a shaft, an
integral profiled portion, and an integral, substantially straight tip portion,
the tip portion being adapted to axially engage the branch artery;
wherein the catheter profiled portion comprises, in order from the
shaft portion to the tip portion, a first bend, a first substantially straight leg,
a second bend, a second substantially straight leg, and a third bend;
advancing the catheter tip portion through the aorta; and
engaging the branch artery with the tip portion, such that when the
tip portion is engaged with the branch artery, the profiled portion engages
the aorta wall opposite the branch artery along a line.

Amdt. to U.S. Patent App. No. 08/854,996 at *2 (Filed May 13, 1997) (insertions

underlined). Thus, this amendment added, among other things, a requirement that the

claimed methods must be performed with catheters having a “first substantially straight

leg.” 7 Under amendment-based estoppel, Voda is presumed to have disclaimed

methods that do not involve catheters with a first substantially straight leg. See Festo,

535 U.S. at 740-41. Moreover, Voda has failed to make any argument to overcome this

presumption. Accordingly, the prosecution history of claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent

bars a finding of equivalence between the redesigned curve portion of the Cordis

catheters and “first substantially straight leg” limitation. 8 The district court therefore

erred in denying Cordis’s post-trial motion for JMOL that it does not infringe claims 4

and 5 of the ’213 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. We therefore reverse the

finding of infringement with respect to these claims.

7
As noted earlier, the first substantially straight leg engages the wall of the
aorta opposite the coronary ostium.
8
Because we find that Voda’s doctrine of equivalents argument with
respect to claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent is barred by amendment-based estoppel,
we need not address argument-based estoppel with respect to these claims.

2007-1297, -1343 22
 b. Application of the Doctrine of Equivalents

This court applies two articulations of the test for equivalence. See Warner-

Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40 (explaining that different phrasings of the test for equivalence

may be “more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts”). Under

the insubstantial differences test, “[a]n element in the accused device is equivalent to a

claim limitation if the only differences between the two are insubstantial.” Honeywell

Int’l Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir 2004).

Alternatively, under the function-way-result test, an element in the accused device is

equivalent to a claim limitation if it “performs substantially the same function in

substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result.” Schoell v. Regal

Marine Indus., Inc., 247 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

As discussed, the only limitations that Cordis argues have no equivalent in its XB

catheters are the second straight portion limitation of claim 1 of the ’625 patent and the

first substantially straight leg limitation of all claims of the ’195 patent. 9 However, we

conclude that Voda introduced substantial evidence establishing that the redesigned

curve portion of the XB catheter meets the straight and substantially straight limitations

under the doctrine of equivalents. One of Voda’s experts testified that the difference in

shape between the redesigned curve portion and a straight portion was so insubstantial

that cardiologists would have difficulty distinguishing the two during use. There was

also testimony that the redesigned curve portion performed the same function as a

straight portion, in the same way, to achieve the same result. First, one of Voda’s

9
Because we find that Voda’s doctrine of equivalents argument with
respect to claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent is barred by amendment-based estoppel,
we need not address the application of the doctrine of equivalents to these claims.

2007-1297, -1343 23
experts explained that the redesigned curve portion of the XB catheter provides the

same function as the straight and substantially straight portions in Voda’s claims

because it provides extra backup support for the catheter during use. Indeed, the name

“XB” stands for “extra backup.” There was also testimony that Cordis’s substitution of

the redesigned curve portion in the accused XB catheter made the product easier to

manufacture, but did not alter the XB catheter’s functionality. Second, one of Voda’s

experts testified that the redesigned curve portion of the XB catheter functions in the

same way as the straight and substantially straight portions in Voda’s claims because it

engages the wall of the aorta opposite the coronary ostium for a substantial length

during use. The length of engagement by the redesigned curve portion during use was

explained to be indistinguishable from the length of engagement in Voda’s claims.

Third, there was testimony that the redesigned curve portion achieves the same result

as the straight or substantially straight elements by making it “difficult to dislodge the

guide catheter from its desired orientation” during use.

Given this record, we find that substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings

that Cordis’s XB catheters infringe the straight and substantially straight claims of the

’625 and ’195 patents under the doctrine of equivalents. Accordingly, we affirm the

jury’s findings of infringement with respect to these claims.

5. Willfulness

In In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc), this court overruled

the standard of willfulness adopted in Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen

Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Underwater Devices standard for willfulness

imposed an affirmative duty of care on potential infringers to determine whether their

2007-1297, -1343 24
conduct was infringing if they had notice of another party’s patent rights. 717 F.2d at

1389-90. Under the new Seagate standard for willfulness, “proof of willful infringement

permitting enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.”

497 F.3d at 1371. “[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear

and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood

that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.” Id. “If this threshold objective

standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined

risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either

known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.” Id. The

Seagate decision also clarified that there is “no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of

counsel” in order to avoid liability for willful infringement. Id.

In this case, the district court issued its jury instruction on the standard for willful

infringement prior to the issuance of Seagate. The district court instructed the jury, inter

alia, that “[w]hen a person becomes aware that a patent may have relevance to his or

her activities, that person has a duty to exercise due care and to investigate whether or

not his or her activities or proposed activities infringe any valid, enforceable claim of the

patent.” Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. 03-CV-1512, slip op. at *46 (W.D. Okla. May 25,

2006) (Jury Instructions). Cordis did not object to this jury instruction at trial. However,

on appeal, Cordis seeks a new trial on willfulness under the new standard for willfulness

adopted in Seagate.

This court reviews challenges to jury instructions under the law of the regional

circuit where the district court sits. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352,

1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Generally, if the defendant fails to object to a jury instruction at

2007-1297, -1343 25
trial, the Tenth Circuit reviews the district court’s decision to administer the jury

instruction for plain error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2); Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc.,

497 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2007). Under the plain error standard, the Tenth Circuit

“will affirm unless the instructions were patently, plainly erroneous and prejudicial.” Id.

However, where, as here, the claimed error in the jury instruction is based on a change

in the law that arose after trial, the Tenth Circuit reviews the jury instruction de novo.

Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996); Key v.

Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880, 883 (10th Cir. 1981). If the jury instruction is erroneous, the

Tenth Circuit will nevertheless affirm if the error is “harmless in the context of the trial as

a whole.” World Wide Ass’n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1139

(10th Cir. 2006). An error in a jury instruction is harmless when it “could not have

changed the result of the case.” Id. (quoting Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 796 F.2d

1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1986)); see also CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424

F.3d 1168, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

The parties agree that the jury instruction on willfulness was erroneous under

Seagate. Nonetheless, Voda argues that the willfulness finding should be upheld

because the error in the jury instruction was harmless. 10 Specifically, Voda argues that

the instructional error was harmless because the evidence showed that Cordis’s XB

10
Voda also argues that Seagate should not be applied retroactively in this
case. This argument is without merit. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S.
298, 311-12 (1994) (“The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial
decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student . . . .”); Harper v.
Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (“When this Court applies a rule of
federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law
and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to
all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our announcement of
the rule.”).

2007-1297, -1343 26
catheters were intentional copies of the Voda catheters. However, Voda points to no

evidence that shows that the accused Cordis XB catheters are literal copies of Voda’s

patented catheters. Indeed, Voda admits that Cordis redesigned its XB catheters

before the issuance of the patents-in-suit, making “slight changes” to the original XB

catheter that had copied Voda’s catheters. Cross-Appellant Br. at 7. In addition, Cordis

points to evidence showing that it obtained several opinions of counsel regarding

whether its redesigned XB catheters infringed Voda’s patents. Given this record, we

find that a jury instruction in accord with the Seagate objective recklessness standard

may have changed the result of the jury verdict on willfulness. Accordingly, we vacate

the finding of willfulness and remand for a determination of whether Cordis’s

infringement was willful under the objective recklessness standard of Seagate. On

remand, the district court may at its discretion assess Voda’s evidence of willful

infringement under the Seagate standard to determine whether a new trial on willfulness

is necessary or whether Voda’s evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a

finding of willfulness. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 114

F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (remanding case to district court based on intervening

change in the law). Additionally, we reject Cordis’s argument that, under the Seventh

Amendment, a new trial on willfulness would require a new trial on infringement.

6. The Denial of a Permanent Injunction

In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff

seeking a permanent injunction in a patent case must demonstrate:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

2007-1297, -1343 27
 and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

In this case, the district court found that Voda had not identified any irreparable

injury to himself due to Cordis’s infringement of his patents and also failed to show that

monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for Cordis’s infringement. The

district court explained that Voda had attempted to prove irreparable injury by alleging

irreparable harm to his exclusive licensee, rather than himself.

Voda argues that the district court erred in adopting a categorical rule that

precludes a patent owner from proving its entitlement to an injunction by showing

irreparable harm to its exclusive licensee. Specifically, Voda argues that such a

categorical rule conflicts with eBay. In eBay, the Court explained that:

[S]ome patent holders, such as university researchers or self-made
inventors, might reasonably prefer to license their patents, rather than
undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to
market themselves. Such patent holders may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor test, and we see no basis for categorically denying
them the opportunity to do so. To the extent that the District Court
adopted such a categorical rule, then, its analysis cannot be squared with
the principles of equity adopted by Congress.

Id. at 393. We disagree with Voda that the denial of a permanent injunction in this case

conflicts with eBay. The Supreme Court held only that patent owners that license their

patents rather than practice them “may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test”

for a permanent injunction. Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in eBay eliminates the

requirement that the party seeking a permanent injunction must show that “it has

suffered an irreparable injury.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, we conclude that the

district court did not clearly err in finding that Voda failed to show that Cordis’s

2007-1297, -1343 28
infringement caused him irreparable injury. In addition, we find that the district court did

not clearly err or abuse its discretion in finding that monetary damages were adequate

to compensate Voda. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Voda’s request

for a permanent injunction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of infringement with respect to

claims 1 through 3 of the ’213 patent as well as the judgment that those claims are not

invalid. In addition, we affirm the judgment of infringement with respect to claim 1 of the

’625 patent and all claims of the ’195 patent. We also affirm the district court’s denial of

a permanent injunction. However, we reverse the finding of infringement with respect to

claims 4 and 5 of the ’213 patent. Lastly, we vacate the judgment of willfulness with

respect to all claims and remand for a determination of willfulness under the standard

recently adopted in Seagate.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

No costs.

2007-1297, -1343 29