IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-11196
(Summary Calendar)
LORETTA ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF DALLAS, doing business as Civil
Service Department,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:98-CV-793-D)
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May 26, 2000
Before POLITZ, HIGGINBOTHAM, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Loretta Anderson, proceeding pro se in the
district court and in this appeal, asks us to reverse the district
court’s dismissal of her claims against Defendant-Appellee City of
Dallas d/b/a Civil Service Department (“the City”) arising from the
unintentional omission of her name from the list of certified
eligible applicants for the position of Computer Operations
Specialist in the City’s ECI Department. As a result of that
omission, she was not considered for the opening, and it was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
ultimately filled by another applicant. We affirm the rulings of
the district court which culminated in the dismissal of Anderson’s
action against the City.
Liberally construing Anderson’s pleadings, the district court
determined that her procedural and substantive due process claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
could only succeed if Anderson could establish a constitutionally
protected property interest in the proceedings of the City’s
Grievance Committee or in her potential promotion to Computer
Operations Specialist. Initially, the court allowed Anderson an
additional thirty days following the filing of its Memorandum
Opinion and Order on August 19, 1999 in which to respond to the
court’s sua sponte concern about Anderson’s property interest.
Following Anderson’s timely response, the court filed another
Order, on September 22, granting the City’s Motion for Summary
Judgment by dismissing Anderson’s substantive and procedural due
process claims. Relying principally on Cabrol v. Town of
Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1997), the court concluded that
Anderson failed to establish a property right, first by relying on
procedural rights as a property interest and then by relying on
those rights to create an entitlement to promotion. We agree with
the court’s determination in this regard.1
1
We also agree with the court’s rejection of Anderson’s
contention that the City’s motion was untimely under N.D.Tex.
Civ. R. 56.2(a), given the court’s setting of September 1, 1999
as the deadline and the City’s filing of its motion on June 23,
1999, well ahead of that deadline.
2
In its earlier ruling, the district court dismissed on grounds
of sovereign immunity Anderson’s negligence claim against the City
for its employee’s failure to include Anderson’s name on the list
of certified eligible candidates for the position she sought.
Because this state law claim runs afoul of the Texas Tort Claims
Act (“TCA”),2 under State v. Terrell, 588 S.W. 2d 784 (Tex. 1979),
there is no doubt that the City is entitled to sovereign immunity
absent a waiver —— and the district court correctly determined that
neither the City nor the Statutes of Texas have waived such
immunity. The district court was equally correct in rejecting
Anderson’s reliance on the City Charter as a source of her cause of
action. As noted by the court, the City Charter does not expressly
authorize a private right of action under the circumstances of this
case, see Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Becker, 930 S.W. 2d 748, 754
(Tex. App. 1996, writ denied); and there is no basis under the
instant facts for the court to impute a private right of action
under the City Charter.
In conclusion, our review of the record in this case and the
analysis of the facts and law as presented by the appellate briefs
of the parties satisfies us that the judgments of the district
court, as reflected in its Memorandum Opinion and Order of August
19, 1999 and its Order of September 22, 1999, should be affirmed
essentially for the reasons set forth therein.
AFFIRMED.
2
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rm. Code Ann. §§ 101.001-109 (West 1997
& Supp. 1999).
3