Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-1023, -1024

FINISAR CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,

v.

THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC., DIRECTV HOLDINGS LLC,
DIRECTV ENTERPRISES LLC, DIRECTV OPERATIONS LLC,
HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC., and DIRECTV, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Larry R. Laycock, Workman Nydegger, of Salt Lake City, Utah, argued for
plaintiff-cross appellant. With him on the brief were Charles L. Roberts, C.J. Veverka,
and David R. Todd. Of counsel on the brief was Stanley J. Panikowski, DLA Piper US
LLP, of San Diego, California

Gregory A. Castanias, Jones Day, of Washington, DC, argued for defendants-
appellants. With him on the brief were Jennifer L. Swize, of Washington, DC, and
Victor G. Savikas, Louis L. Touton, and Kevin G. McBride, of Los Angeles, California.

Appealed from: United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

Judge Ron Clark
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2007-1023, -1024

FINISAR CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Cross Appellant,

v.

THE DIRECTV GROUP, INC., DIRECTV HOLDINGS LLC,
DIRECTV ENTERPRISES LLC, DIRECTV OPERATIONS LLC,
HUGHES NETWORK SYSTEMS, INC., and DIRECTV, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in case
no. 1:05-CV-00264, Judge Ron Clark.

___________________________

DECIDED: April 18, 2008
___________________________

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, RADER and MOORE, Circuit Judges.

RADER, Circuit Judge.

By a jury verdict, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

found that The DirecTV Group, Inc., DirecTV Holdings, LLC, DirecTV Enterprises, LLC,

DirecTV Operations, LLC, and DirecTV, Inc. (collectively DirecTV) had infringed U.S.

Patent No. 5,404,505 (the ’505 patent), assigned to Finisar Corporation (Finisar).

Finding DirecTV’s infringement to have been willful, the jury awarded $78.9 million in

reasonable royalty damages. The district court sustained the jury’s verdict, except with

respect to induced and contributory infringement, denied Finisar’s request for injunctive
relief, imposed a compulsory license, and awarded Finisar $25 million in enhanced

damages. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-00264 (E.D. Tex. July 7,

2006) (Final Judgment). The district court also denied DirecTV’s post-judgment motions

for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or a new trial. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group,

Inc., Case No. 1:05-CV-00264 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006) (JMOL Order).

Because the district court incorrectly construed a vital term featured prominently

in each asserted claim, this court vacates the verdict of infringement. Furthermore, the

district court erred in ruling that the prior art did not anticipate claim 16. This error also

infects the scope of the prior art for assessing the validity of the rest of the claims.

Therefore, this court remands for a new trial on both infringement and validity of claims

17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44.

I

The ’505 patent, issued on April 4, 1995 from an application filed on November 1,

1991, claims systems and methods for scheduling transmission of database tiers upon

specific demand or at specific times and rates of repetition. The ’505 patent describes

an information broadcasting system that gives subscribers access to video and audio

programs through high-speed satellite or cable links. See ’505 patent, Abstract; col.1

l.68 – col.2 l.2. Under the patented system, subscribers do not need to request the

most popular and trendy movies, for example, or other programs. Instead the system

anticipates likely (more popular) requests and broadcasts those programs to users on

an announced schedule at regular intervals. Thus, most of the interaction between the

user and the information server is unidirectional, meaning that the server sends most of

the data to the subscriber without even receiving a request.

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 For scheduled transmissions, i.e. those not responsive to a specific user request,

the system sends more popular data more frequently. To make this work, the system

divides the information database into different tiers based on likely popularity. Then the

system broadcasts each tier of data at a particular repetition rate. See id., col.14 ll.2-18.

Thus, the system arranges all information in the database in a hierarchical structure.

See id., col.6 ll.28-40. In this regard, the ’505 specification analogizes the claimed

invention to accessing information in a large library:

It is important to note that while a user has access to perhaps a terabtye,
or even 100 terabytes or more, of data, the total amount of data that
systems in accordance with the present invention system can transmit in
any one day is much more limited, as will be described below. This is not
unlike visiting the main library of a major university, such as Yale or
Harvard University, having stacks containing several million volumes of
books. Having “access” to all those books every single day does not
means [sic] that a user can receive them all in one day, nor does it mean
that all the users can receive all the books in a single day. Nevertheless,
each particular book (file or program) is available on relatively short notice,
and having access to such a large collection of books (data) is still very
useful.

Id., col.2 ll.9-23. The ’505 specification also compares the claimed invention to other

information distribution systems, like books and CDs, estimating that the system saves

vast amounts in distribution costs by avoiding shipment of each individual copy of the

desired data. See id., col.2 ll.24-43.

DirecTV began offering direct-to-home satellite broadcasting in the United States

in 1994. A DirecTV subscriber accesses the broadcasting system through a small

antenna (generally a small satellite dish affixed to the exterior of a subscriber’s home)

and its associated electronics, along with a set-top box, which attaches to the

subscriber’s television set. DirecTV generally broadcasts four types of information:

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turnaround programming, playback programming, conditional access information, and

program guide information.

Turnaround programming constitutes the bulk of DirecTV’s broadcasts. This

category of programming re-broadcasts or “turns around” content from other television

channels like CNN, Comedy Central, ESPN, and Animal Planet, to name a few. The

owners of these channels, rather than DirecTV, schedule the airing of their programs.

As discussed below with respect to infringement, the parties dispute the degree to

which DirecTV controls, or “programs,” the turnaround programming. A different

company, Tribune Media Services, collects scheduling information from the various

channels. DirecTV adopts the Tribune schedule.

As noted above, DirecTV also offers “playback” programming, which comprises

pay-per-view movies and the like. DirecTV itself schedules the broadcast of playback

programming. DirecTV’s broadcasts also include “conditional access” information,

which allows an authorized subscriber to pay for and receive selected programs.

DirecTV controls access to this information by broadcasting it in an encrypted format.

Finally, DirecTV’s broadcasts also include an electronic program guide, which provides

the user with information about current and upcoming programs on the various

channels.

Finisar sued DirecTV for infringement of the ’505 patent, initially asserting that

DirecTV’s direct broadcast satellite system infringed fifteen of the ’505 patent’s forty-

eight total claims. After a Markman hearing and a claim construction order, Finisar

Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (Markman Order),

the district court concluded on summary judgment that seven of the asserted claims

2007-1023, -1024 4
(claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 37, all means-plus-function claims) were invalid for

indefiniteness. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., Case No. 1:05-CV-00264 (E.D.

Tex. May 2, 2006) (Invalidity Order). Before trial, Finisar dropped its allegation of

infringement of one claim (claim 25).

A jury heard evidence on infringement of the remaining seven asserted claims

(claims 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44). The jury concluded that DirecTV infringed all

seven claims (directly and by inducement and contribution). Finding DirecTV’s

infringement to have been willful, the jury awarded $78.9 million in reasonable royalty

damages. The district court sustained the jury’s verdict, except with respect to induced

and contributory infringement, denied Finisar’s request for injunctive relief, imposed a

compulsory license, and awarded $25 million in enhanced damages. Final Judgment.

The district court also denied DirecTV’s post-judgment motions for JMOL or a new trial.

JMOL Order.

II

Between DirecTV’s appeal and Finisar’s cross-appeal, this court confronts a

variety of issues. DirecTV’s appeal challenges the district court’s construction of two

claim terms (“information database” and “downloading into a memory storage device”)

and the jury’s findings of literal infringement, validity (novelty and non-obviousness), and

willfulness. Finisar cross-appeals the district court’s denial of Finisar’s motion for a

permanent injunction, imposition of a compulsory license at a rate of $1.60 per set-top

box, and grant of summary judgment of invalidity on claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 37 as

indefinite.

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 The district court denied DirecTV’s post-trial motions for JMOL or a new trial on

non-infringement, invalidity, and non-willfulness. On the motions for JMOL or a new

trial, this court applies the law of the regional circuit, in this case the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1248

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (JMOL); Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner

GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (new trial). Our sister circuit reviews a

JMOL motion without deference. Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios, 495

F.3d 169, 179 (5th Cir. 2007). JMOL “is appropriate only when a ‘reasonable jury would

not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.’” Id.

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). To this end, “the Fifth Circuit describes appellate

review of a JMOL denial as a determination whether ‘the facts and inferences point so

strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court concludes that

reasonable jurors could not arrive at a contrary verdict.’” Harris, 417 F.3d at 1248

(quoting Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d 268, 273 (5th Cir. 1997)). In contrast, a

district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Industrias Magromer Cueros y Pieles S.A. v. La. Bayou Furs Inc., 293 F.3d 912, 924

(5th Cir. 2002).

1. Claim Construction

This court reviews claim construction without deference. Cybor Corp. v. FAS

Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Generally this court gives

claim terms their ordinary and customary meanings, according to the customary

understanding of an artisan of ordinary skill at the time of the invention. See Phillips v.

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). And “the person of

2007-1023, -1024 6
ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the

particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire

patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. When construing claims, the claims

and the rest of the patent, along with the patent’s prosecution history (together, the

intrinsic evidence of the meaning of the claims) are the primary resources; while helpful,

extrinsic sources like dictionaries and expert testimony cannot overcome more

persuasive intrinsic evidence. See id. at 1318.

In this instance, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas

was not the only trial court to have construed the claims of the ’505 patent, including the

two terms disputed on appeal. The United States District Court for the Northern District

of California issued a Markman order in a declaratory judgment action filed by Comcast

Cable Communications Corp. (Comcast) against Finisar for patent non-infringement.

Comcast Cable Commc’ns Corp. v. Finisar Corp., No. C 06-04206, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 28994 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2007) (Comcast Markman Order). Given “the

importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent,” Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996), this court would be remiss to overlook

another district court’s construction of the same claim terms in the same patent as part

of this separate appeal. In the interest of uniformity and correctness, this court consults

the claim analysis of different district courts on the identical terms in the context of the

same patent. Here, the Northern District of California’s efforts in the Comcast case are

particularly helpful because that court repeatedly referred back to the Eastern District of

Texas’s constructions—the subjects of this appeal. See, e.g., Comcast Markman

Order, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994, at *6, 7, 10, 18, 27, 30, 36.

2007-1023, -1024 7
 DirecTV appeals the district court’s construction of two terms, “information

database” and “downloading into a memory storage device.” Independent claim 16

shows these terms in context:

16. An information transmission method comprising the steps of:

storing an information database on one or more memory devices;

generating and storing on said memory devices a hierarchically arranged
set of indices for referencing data in said information database, including
distinct indices for referencing distinct portions thereof, and embedding
said indices in said information database;

scheduling transmission of selected portions of said information database,
including assigning each selected portion of said information database
one or more scheduled transmission times;

transmitting a stream of data packets containing said selected portions of
said information database in accordance with said scheduled transmission
times;

said scheduling step including dividing said selected portions of said
information database into a prioritized set of tiers, wherein all the selected
portions of said information database in each tier are transmitted at a
corresponding repetition rate, wherein the repetition rate for higher priority
tiers is higher than the repetition rate for lower priority tiers;

receiving said transmitted stream of data packets at subscriber stations;

at each subscriber stations, storing filter data corresponding to a subset of
said indices, said filter data specifying a set of requested data packets
which comprises a subset of said transmitted data packets; and

at each subscriber station, downloading into a memory storage device
those of said received data packets which match said specified set of
requested data packets.

’505 patent, col.21 ll.34-68 (emphases added).

2007-1023, -1024 8
 “information database”

The Eastern District of Texas construed “information database” to mean “a

collection of computerized information which can be accessed.” Markman Order, 416 F.

Supp. 2d at 517. The Northern District of California construed this term somewhat

differently, as “a dynamic, structured collection of digitized data capable of being held in

computer storage.” Comcast Markman Order, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994, at *16-17.

The construction reached by the district court in this case is unjustifiably broad

because the information database as claimed requires searchability and retrievability

beyond mere accessibility. In isolation, the term “information database” suggests a very

broad coverage. In context, however, this claim term repeatedly appears within a

framework that requires referencing, embedding, assigning, and transmitting portions of

the database. These database functions and capabilities, in turn, presuppose

searchability and retrievability.

Beyond the context of the claim language, the ’505 patent specification supports

this narrower reading of the term. As discussed, the specification analogizes the

invention to a large library. This analogy suggests that a user can quickly obtain

specific data from a large database. Indeed, the ’505 specification confirms that the

user has “reasonably quick access to all the contents of the large database,” but the

amount of data available to a given library patron/user at any given time “is much more

limited,” allowing the user to borrow a “particular book (file or program)” on “relatively

short notice.” ’505 patent, col.3 ll.3-5; col.2 ll.9-23. Once again, the specification

underscores the searchability and retrievability of the database. This court emphasizes

that its construction does not necessarily entail the full-text searching available with

2007-1023, -1024 9
electronic legal research systems (e.g. LexisNexis or Westlaw). The district court

expressed some concerns on this point. See Markman Order, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 516-

17 (“For example, common legal research systems allow very narrow searches, such as

by case name, by judge name, and even by a particular word. In contrast, some of the

data in the ’505 system can only be referenced in broader terms, such as a search for a

movie by title, but not necessarily by words used in a movie or group of movies.”). And

in the Comcast case, the Northern District of California did not require a fully-searchable

database of this sort. Comcast Markman Order, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994, at *16-

17. Rather, the Northern District observed that claim 16 does not indicate any

searchability “beyond the navigability implied by the index itself,” and that “the requests

are based on the system of indices.” Id.

The hierarchical indices recited later in the claims for “referencing data” in the

information database actually confirm, rather than refute, that the claimed method must

include search and retrieval features. Such hierarchical indices facilitate the search and

retrieval of data from the information database. Thus the claims envision a more

specific “information database” than provided by the district court’s construction. To

return to the book analogy, an index at the back of a book correlates specific terms or

concepts to the pages where they appear in the main text of the book by page number.

Such an index would have little or no value if the pages of the main text were not

numbered or arranged sequentially.

The district court rejected the analogy of an index found at the back of a book

referring to sequentially ordered pages because “an index can be a single data item.”

Markman Order, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 517. Specifically, the district court cited the

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following passage from the ’505 specification: “indices (each of which contains a packet

ID plus additional information) . . . form a single hierarchical structure that encompasses

the entire information database.” ’505 patent, col. 6 ll.31-36. Even if this passage may

suggest that the ’505 patent allows for the possibility that one data item can refer to the

entire information database, the next sentence specifically requires a plurality of indices:

“[m]ore specifically, software . . . generates a hierarchical set of indices referencing all

the data in the information database.” Id., col.6 ll.36-39. Thus according to the ’505

patent, the index is composed of a hierarchical set of indices that, taken together,

reference all the data in the information database. Continuing with the library analogy,

the ’505 patent’s hierarchical set of indices is akin to a card catalog system, and the

“information database” is like a library’s collection of books. To make the card catalog

system relevant, the library must shelve the books according to some order, like the

Dewey Decimal or Library of Congress systems. This court cannot envision carefully

organizing each book’s card catalog records, but then randomly heaping the books

themselves into an inaccessible pile in the center of the library rather than shelving

them by call number. Likewise, the information database of the asserted claims must

include search and retrieval features at least commensurate with “the navigability

implied by the index itself,” as the Northern District of California put it. This court

therefore construes “information database” as used in the ’505 patent as “a collection of

computerized information which can be accessed and searched, and from which

selected information can be retrieved, and where the search and retrieval capabilities

are at least as specific as those of the hierarchically arranged set of indices.”

2007-1023, -1024 11
 “downloading into a memory storage device”

The district court construed the “downloading” step in claim 16 (“downloading into

a memory storage device those of said received data packets which match said

specified set of requested data packets”) to mean “the data filter transfers into a

memory storage device the data packets specified in the filter data.” Markman Order,

416 F. Supp. 2d at 522. In contrast, the Northern District of California construed

“downloading into a memory storage device” as “transferring the desired data into a

device capable of saving it for later access.” Comcast Markman Order, 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 28994, at *35.

This court perceives that “downloading into a memory storage device” requires

more than the mere transfer of data, but retention of data as well. Thus the claims

require a downloading that preserves the data for later use or retrieval of the transferred

data. Once again, the language of the claims, in context, specifies that the data

downloads “into a memory storage device.” Thus, the claim itself associates

“downloading” with memory, retention, and preservation. Indeed the Northern District of

California construed the term to require capacity for later access.

The ’505 patent specification supports this reading. In its description, the ’505

specification refers to the invention as an alternative to CDs or paper publications. ’505

patent, col.2 ll.24-43. Both of these alternative forms entail preservation and retention

of the downloaded or published data. Similarly, the library analogy supports this court’s

reading. When patrons borrow a book, they have access to the entire work until they

return it to the library; they could flip back and forth or reread portions at will, rather than

only reading straight through the book at a predetermined time.

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 In this instance, the doctrine of claim differentiation also bolsters this court’s

interpretation. Indeed the Northern District of California relied in part on the doctrine of

claim differentiation to arrive at its construction of “downloading into a memory storage

device.” Comcast Markman Order, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994, at *30-35.

Specifically, the Comcast court compared claim 16, recited above, with claim 26, which

further modifies the “receiving” and “downloading” steps of claim 16:

26. The information transmission method of claim 16, said receiving and
downloading steps including:

at each subscriber stations, temporarily storing received data packets in a
buffer, storing a filter list comprising said filter data referencing said
specified set of requested data packets, comparing said data packets
temporarily stored in said buffer with said filter data and then forwarding
those data packets in said buffer which match said filter data to a
predefined destination;

whereby each subscriber station receives all transmitted data packets but
forwards only requested data packets to said predefined destination.

’505 patent, col.23 ll.15-27 (emphases added). Reasoning that the “predefined

destination” recited at the end of claim 26 must be a “memory storage device” by

comparing claim 26 to claim 16, the Northern District of California noted that “the use of

the buffer in claim 26 was not as a memory storage device. Rather, it was a refinement

on the filtering step.” Comcast Markman Order, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28994, at *33

(emphasis in original). Turning to the specification’s consistently separate references to

the filtering step and the downloading step, the Northern District of California observed

that “[s]torage need not be permanent, but being able to view content at a time after it

has been downloaded is a key feature of this invention,” id. at *34, and that “the buffer

used in the filter step will not do double duty as the storage memory device for the

downloading step,” id. at *34-35. For all of the reasons outlined above, this court

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agrees. As such, this court adopts the Northern District of California’s construction of

“downloading into a memory storage device” as “transferring the desired data into a

device capable of saving it for later access.”

This court observes that fleeting or transient retention does not qualify as the

kind of downloading defined by these claims. The ’505 specification at one point

describes the “download[ing]” of data corresponding to anticipated information requests

into a “smart cache,” which is used as a temporary buffer, and which is overwritten upon

receipt of new information in a later request. ’505 patent, col.9 ll.4-13. This discussion

of the smart cache in column 9 is thus further evidence that “downloading” requires

capacity for non-transient data retention, because only retained data could be used to

service the user’s “future information requests.” Id., col.9 ll.1-3. Also, the specification

describes that selected data from the smart cache “can be moved to other areas of the

user’s hard disk,” while unused data from the smart cache are overwritten with new

data. ’505 patent, col.16 ll.31-44. Furthermore, column 11 of the ’505 patent

distinguishes fairly clearly between buffering and downloading: the data packets

received from the satellite are stored in a “ring buffer,” which in turn may vary in size,

depending on “the maximum possible delay before a selected packet is downloaded

onto the subscriber’s host computer.” Id., col.11 ll.34-46. Thus, “downloading” as used

in the patent requires something more than just transient retention of data.

2. Literal Infringement

Literal infringement is a question of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence when

tried to a jury. ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Mfrs. Co., 501 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed.

Cir. 2007). Where an infringement verdict relies on incorrect construction of the

2007-1023, -1024 14
disputed claim terms, this court may grant JMOL or order a new trial to correct the error,

depending on the degree of difference between the incorrect construction and the

correct construction. If no reasonable jury could have found infringement under the

proper claim construction, this court may reverse a district court’s denial of JMOL

without remand. See Harris, 417 F.3d at 1255-57. Here, DirecTV argues that it does

not infringe under the proper construction of “information database” and “downloading

into a memory storage device.” Also, without disputing the district court’s construction

of any particular additional term, DirecTV asserts that its system does not satisfy the

“scheduling” step recited in the asserted claims.

“information database”

Because the district court construed “information database” too broadly, this

court must evaluate the effects of this erroneous construction on the jury’s infringement

verdict, through which the jury necessarily concluded that DirecTV’s system met the

“information database” limitation. In this instance, this court’s reversal of the district

court’s construction has no discernible effect on the jury’s verdict, because the

difference between the correct construction of “information database” and the one relied

upon by the jury depends on the specificity of the hierarchically arranged set of indices.

Because DirecTV does not appeal the district court’s construction of “set of indices for

referencing data in said information database” or “hierarchically arranged set of indices,”

nor does DirecTV dispute the jury’s implicit finding that that DirecTV’s system met these

limitations as part of arriving at its infringement verdict, this court considers the district

court’s erroneous construction of “information database” as harmless.

2007-1023, -1024 15
 “downloading into a memory storage device”

This court’s construction of “downloading into a memory storage device” as

“transferring the desired data into a device capable of saving it for later access” is

markedly different than the construction used by the jury in its infringement inquiry. The

instruction followed by the jury did not require this capacity for retention, so the jury’s

verdict of infringement cannot necessarily be said to have been predicated on a finding

that DirecTV’s system included it. Moreover, the meaning of “downloading” necessarily

informs the treatment of the data in the memory storage device. As a result, the jury’s

infringement verdict must be vacated.

To be more specific, DirecTV’s broadcasts consist of four types of data:

turnaround programming, playback programming, conditional access information, and

the electronic program guide, as described above. The record shows that some

DirecTV subscribers use set-top boxes that also function as digital video recorders

(DVRs) (DVR set-top boxes), while others use standard set-top boxes. DVRs allow

users to select and record particular programs for later use, as well as to pause and

play back “live” video. The four broadcast data types and two set-top box types thus

represent two different ways to subdivide DirecTV’s service. The record and briefs on

appeal are insufficient to accurately sort out these overlapping subsets with respect to

the “downloading” limitation, especially in light of the new construction, thus

necessitating remand.

2007-1023, -1024 16
 “one or more scheduled transmission times”

The claims also require the infringer to assign “one or more scheduled

transmission times.” This limitation comes from the “scheduling” step, the third step in

claim 16. This step recites:

scheduling transmission of selected portions of said information database,
including assigning each selected portion of said information database
one or more scheduled transmission times;

’505 patent, col.21 ll.44-47. DirecTV alleges that the district court interpreted “selected

portions of [the] information database” as “each part of the information database

selected for transmission.” To the contrary, the district court construed “dividing said

selected portions of said information database into a prioritized set of tiers, wherein all

the selected portions of said information database in each tier are transmitted at a

corresponding repetition rate” to mean “placing each part of the information database

selected for transmission into one or more groups of information, and transmitting each

group at a chosen repetition rate.” Markman Order, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 520.

Relying on its interpretation of the district court’s construction of “each” in the

“dividing” step to inform the use of “each” in the “scheduling” step, or alternately on the

plain meaning of “each,” DirecTV argues that Finisar had to prove that the “selected

portions” of DirecTV’s database it identified are “each” assigned a scheduled

transmission time. The record shows that only 3% of DirecTV’s programming (i.e. its

data selected for transmission) comprises playback programming that fits within this

meaning of “scheduled.” The other 97% is turnaround programming, received from

third-party content providers like CNN, ESPN, and others. DirecTV argues, inter alia,

2007-1023, -1024 17
that it does not infringe because these third parties schedule the programming,

independently of DirecTV.

Nonetheless, even under DirecTV’s interpretation of the district court’s

construction, claim 16 does not require scheduling for all transmitted information.

Rather the claim specifies scheduling for “each part of the information database

selected for transmission.” Thus the claim leaves room for transmission of other data in

other, i.e. non-scheduled, ways because claim 16 is written using an open-ended

format, using the transitional term “comprising.” Claim 16 simply does not require

scheduling for all transmissions from the information database, but only for some, i.e.

“selected,” portions. Because both parties agree that DirecTV assigns scheduled

transmission times to its playback programming, comprising about 3% of its content, the

jury had substantial evidence to conclude that DirecTV’s accused system meets the

“scheduling” step of the asserted claims.

3. Anticipation

Anticipation is a question of fact, reviewed for substantial evidence when tried to

a jury. z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007). If the

claimed invention was “described in a printed publication” either before the date of

invention, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), or more than one year before the U.S. patent application

was filed, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), then that prior art anticipates the patent. Although § 102

refers to “the invention” generally, the anticipation inquiry proceeds on a claim-by-claim

basis. See Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, 479 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

To anticipate a claim, a single prior art reference must expressly or inherently disclose

each claim limitation. Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361

2007-1023, -1024 18
(Fed. Cir. 1998). But disclosure of each element is not quite enough—this court has

long held that “[a]nticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all

elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Soundscriber Corp. v. United States,

360 F.2d 954, 960 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (emphasis added)).

In this case, the prior art alleged to anticipate is The Architecture of Videotex

Systems (Videotex Architecture), a 1983 textbook by Jan Gecsei. This reference

describes videotex as a “mass-communication medium based on a blend of television,

communications, and computer technologies.” Id. at 3. The reference further notes that

videotex “is not a brand-new procedure based on some glamorous breakthrough; its

originality is rather in its combination of existing technologies.” Id. at 6.

With respect to claim 16, Finisar’s expert, Doug Eaton, testified at trial that

Videotex Architecture did not teach the “scheduling,” “transmitting,” and “dividing” steps:

scheduling transmission of selected portions of said information database,
including assigning each selected portion of said information database
one or more scheduled transmission times;

transmitting a stream of data packets containing said selected portions of
said information database in accordance with said scheduled transmission
times;

said scheduling step including dividing said selected portions of said
information database into a prioritized set of tiers, wherein all the selected
portions of said information database in each tier are transmitted at a
corresponding repetition rate, wherein the repetition rate for higher priority
tiers is higher than the repetition rate for lower priority tiers;

’505 patent, col.21 ll.44-57. The reference thus discloses the division of information into

tiers, the transmission of information, and the scheduling of transmissions. The

question on appeal, however, focuses on the interrelationships between these elements

2007-1023, -1024 19
as claimed in claim 16. For instance, the claim requires “dividing said selected portions

of said information database into a prioritized set of tiers.” Therefore, to anticipate, a

reference must disclose division of the portions of the database into tiers and further

assignment of scheduled transmission times to the selected portions within the tiers.

To check for anticipation, this court examines the Videotex Architecture reference

in some detail. In a section entitled “Transmission Sequence” in Chapter 10,

“Databases for Videotex,” the reference explains:

On-line and off-line reception can be mixed by controlling the repetition
rate of transmitted pages. A few hundred pages of general interest can be
repeated in a short cycle, whereas less important or less frequently
updated pages are inserted in hourly or even daily intervals into specific
slots in the cycle, or according to a predetermined schedule. This . . .
permits for the dissemination of very large amounts of data.

Videotex Architecture at 175 (emphasis added). This passage discloses two tiers with

two corresponding repetition rates. Still the very specific requirements of anticipation

demand a further inquiry. Particularly, this court must consider whether the jury could

have reasonably concluded that this passage does not disclose assignment of

scheduled transmission times to the pages in both tiers. Because “or according to a

predetermined schedule” appears at the end of the sentence and after a comma, this

court must ask whether the jury could have reasonably construed this phrase as an

alternative only for the “less important or less frequently updated pages,” rather than

both tiers of pages mentioned in the preceding clauses. Id. at 39-40.

Although this reading of the reference seems a stretch even at first blush, this

court discussed an analogous situation in Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc. v. United

States, 130 F.3d 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In that case, this court used general

principles of English grammar for the proposition that “[r]eferential and qualifying words

2007-1023, -1024 20
and phrases, where no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent,

which consists of ‘the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent

without impairing the meaning of the sentence’” for purposes of statutory construction.

Id. (quoting 2A C. Dallas Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.33 (4th ed.

1984)) (emphasis added). Thus, this court has addressed this grammatical guideline

referred to as the doctrine of the last antecedent. In Anhydrides, a case without a

contrary intention in the passage at issue, this court construed the qualifying phrase to

apply only to the immediately preceding antecedent. 130 F.3d at 1483.

In contrast, “[w]hen a modifier is set off from a series of antecedents by a

comma, the modifier should be read to apply to each of those antecedents.” Kahn

Lucas Lancaster, Inc. v. Lark Int’l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on

other grounds as recognized by Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp., 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir.

2005). But while “the meaning of a statute will typically heed the commands of its

punctuation,” U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454

(1993), the doctrine of the last antecedent and its corollary, the rule of punctuation, see

Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 926 n.3 (11th Cir. 1984), are more

guidelines than absolute rules. See Kahn, 186 F.3d at 215 (“and in applying them we

are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘a purported plain-meaning analysis

based only on punctuation is necessarily incomplete and runs the risk of distorting a

statute’s true meaning’”) (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 454 (1993)).

Of course, Anhydrides and the other cases discussed above apply the rules of

English grammar to statutory construction, whereas the present dispute involves the

meaning of a prior art reference. These exercises are not entirely coterminous because

2007-1023, -1024 21
the meaning of a prior art reference requires analysis of the understanding of an artisan

of ordinary skill. See Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565,

1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (to anticipate, “[t]here must be no difference between the claimed

invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the

field of the invention”); cf. In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 483 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (a prior art reference must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make the

invention without undue experimentation to anticipate). In contrast, statutory

construction does not include a skilled artisan component but considers instead the

“object and policy” of the law. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 455 (internal citations omitted).

Still words, in context, receive their meaning according to their placement in

grammatical structure.

Therefore, to avoid slipping into a realm of ambiguity that could render jury

verdicts wholly unreviewable, this court imputes an understanding of English grammar

and usage to the jury. Moreover this court consults the overall context of the passage.

The passage discusses and explains the entire hierarchy of data, not isolated portions

of the database. Thus, one of skill would interpret the passage broadly to present many

varied options for each of the tiers under consideration. Therefore, this court perceives

that the comma before “or according to a predetermined schedule” (Videotex

Architecture at 175) refers to the general interest pages and the less frequently updated

pages. Thus, the passage means that either tier of data repeats at particular intervals

or according to a predetermined schedule.

This court finds more support than just the passage on page 175 to support

anticipation of the dividing limitation. The very next page provides additional and

2007-1023, -1024 22
unequivocal support. Figure 10.5 on page 176 discloses division into multiple tiers and

scheduling of those tiers:

Figure 10.5 Schematic view of teletext databases: (a) simple cyclic
online pages; (b) insertion of cyclic off-line, irregular offline and demand
pages.

Id. at 176. The text notes that “Figure 10.5(b) is a schematic view of some cycles and

‘sub-cycles’ (possibly aperiodic) in teletext transmission. Other variations are also

feasible.” Id. Figure 10.5(b) thus shows scheduling of at least two tiers of varying

priorities: pages in the middle circle—the normal broadcast cycle—are transmitted more

frequently than the scheduled off-line pages, represented by the circle on the right.

2007-1023, -1024 23
Moreover, the reference permits precise counting of the difference in frequency or

priority of transmission. The system in the reference transmits only one “slot” of

scheduled off-line information per revolution of the on-line page cycle.

These two disclosures—the one on page 175 and the graphic on page 176—

both fall within the same chapter subheading “10.4 Databases for Teletext,” id. at 174,

and within the same sub-subheading “Transmission Sequence,” id. at 175. Indeed,

“Transmission Sequence” consists exclusively of text on pages 174 and 175. Thus the

author clearly indicated a linkage between the text on page 175 and Figure 10.5 on

page 176. These passages refer to the same subject matter. Accordingly, one of

ordinary skill in the art would read page 175 and Figure 10.5 on page 176 in concert.

Taken together, pages 175 and 176 clearly and convincingly teach both division

of portions of the database into tiers and assignment of scheduled transmission times to

portions of the database within those tiers. In other words, those passages disclose the

interrelated requirements of claim 16’s “scheduling,” “transmitting,” and “dividing” steps.

On this basis, and because Finisar does not dispute that Videotex Architecture

discloses the other limitations of claim 16, Videotex Architecture anticipates claim 16.

No reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise. This court reverses the district

court’s denial of DirecTV’s JMOL motion for invalidity on the basis of anticipation of

claim 16.

As for the other claims tried to the jury, claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44,

DirecTV limited its anticipation arguments in its opening brief to a single table, directing

this court to various pages of Videotex Architecture as allegedly disclosing each of the

remaining asserted claim steps. Appellant’s Br. at 50-51. As discussed above with

2007-1023, -1024 24
respect to claim 16, an anticipatory reference must disclose not only each limitation of

the claim, see Celeritas, 150 F.3d at 1361, but also each of those limitations as

“arranged as in the claim,” Connell, 722 F.2d at 1548. DirecTV’s table, which merely

correlates claim limitations from claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44 with corresponding

pages from Videotex Architecture, may very well disclose at least some of these

additional claim limitations. In some cases, the pages DirecTV cites for these

disclosures would place them in the same sections of text as the disclosures of the

claim 16 limitations discussed above, which could implicitly suggest arrangement of

these disclosures as in the claims. Without further analysis of these additional claim

limitations, however, this court cannot conclude from DirecTV’s table alone that

Videotex Architecture discloses the limitations of claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44, as

arranged in those claims. Therefore, in light of our holding that Videotex Architecture

anticipates claim 16, this court vacates the district court’s denial of DirecTV’s motion for

JMOL with respect to anticipation of claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44, and remands for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

4. Obviousness

“When reviewing a district court’s JMOL determination as to obviousness, ‘[t]his

court reviews a jury’s conclusions on obviousness, a question of law, without deference,

and the underlying findings of fact, whether explicit or implicit within the verdict, for

substantial evidence.’” Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (quoting LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc. v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d 1347, 1353

(Fed. Cir. 2001)). These underlying factual findings, in turn, include the familiar Graham

factors: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and

2007-1023, -1024 25
the claims at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, and secondary

considerations, otherwise known as objective indicia of nonobviousness. Graham v.

John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).

Because this court now reverses the district court’s denial of DirecTV’s motion for

JMOL that Videotex Architecture anticipates claim 16, as a matter of law the elements

of claim 16, arranged as in claim 16, are part of that prior art. Claims 17, 22, 24, and 26

all depend from claim 16, and claims 39 and 44 include some claim limitations either

identical or very similar to those of claim 16. Thus, in evaluating claims 17, 22, 24, 26,

39, and 44, the district court erroneously read Videotex Architecture too narrowly. This

court therefore vacates the district court’s denial of DirecTV’s motion for JMOL of

obviousness with respect to claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44, and remands for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

5. Willfulness

In In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en

banc), this court held that “proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages

requires at least a showing of objective recklessness.” Moreover this court imposes “no

affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.” Id.

DirecTV obtained an opinion of counsel, which concluded that DirecTV did not

infringe the ’505 patent, but took no position on validity. Based on that opinion, DirecTV

proceeded to practice its system. The district court faulted DirecTV in part for not

obtaining an opinion on validity, weighing its failure to do so in Finisar’s favor on the

question of willfulness. But the ’505 patent would only have been a problem for DirecTV

if DirecTV infringed it and it was valid. See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785,

2007-1023, -1024 26
793 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“There is no requirement that an opinion must address validity to

negate a finding of willful infringement.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Thus

a competent opinion of counsel concluding either that DirecTV did not infringe the ’505

patent or that it was invalid would provide a sufficient basis for DirecTV to proceed

without engaging in objectively reckless behavior with respect to the ’505 patent.

Finisar also asserts, as evidence of willfulness, that DirecTV knew of the ’505

patent as early as 1997 due to a letter sent to DirecTV’s parent company. Finisar

contends that DirecTV willfully “stonewalled” in response for many years. In fact,

Finisar also argues that DirecTV did not even obtain its attorney opinion letter until over

a year after Finisar sent a notice letter in January 2004. The record, however, shows

that Finisar responded successfully to DirecTV’s laches defense by acknowledging “no

evidence that Finisar reasonably should have known of its claim against DirecTV until

December 2003.” Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, see Biomedical Patent Mgmt.

Corp. v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Finisar

cannot suggest that DirecTV started “stonewalling” in 1997 when even Finisar did not

perceive a problem until nearly 2004. Thus, Finisar has not shown that DirecTV willfully

infringed the ’505 patent.

B. Finisar’s Cross-Appeal

Finisar cross-appeals several of the district court’s actions. After vacating the

jury’s verdict, this court must likewise vacate the district court’s grant of a compulsory

license. For the same reason, Finisar’s objection to the district court’s denial of

injunctive relief is moot. In contrast, Finisar’s cross-appeal with respect to

indefiniteness is independent of the vacated jury verdict.

2007-1023, -1024 27
 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 requires that claims “particularly point[] out and distinctly

claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” For means-

plus-function elements, which are statutorily limited to the “corresponding structure,

material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof,” 35 U.S.C.

§ 112, ¶ 6, section 112, ¶ 2 requires that the specification must permit one of ordinary

skill in the art to “know and understand what structure corresponds to the means

limitation.” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 949-50 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (internal citation omitted).

Claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 37, each individually or by dependency, include the

limitation “database editing means . . . for generating . . . and for embedding . . . .”

Claim 1 is representative:

1. An information transmission system comprising:

a set of one or more computer memory devices on which is stored an
information database;

database editing means, coupled to said one or more computer memory
devices, for generating a hierarchically arranged set of indices for
referencing data in said information database, including distinct indices for
referencing distinct portions thereof, and for embedding said indices in
said information database . . .

’505 patent, col.17 l.68 – col.18 l.36 (emphases added).

The district court applied the presumption that the patentee’s use of “means”

renders this step a means-plus-function claim term, falling within the purview of § 112,

¶ 6. The ’505 patent discloses very little about the purported structure corresponding to

this claim term. For instance, column 6, lines 37-40, of the ’505 patent recites that

“software 132 (executed by CPU 130) generates a hierarchical set of indices

referencing all the data in the information database 112 and embeds those indices in

2007-1023, -1024 28
the information database.” As the district court correctly noted, this passage provides

“nothing more than a restatement of the function, as recited in the claim.” Markman

Order, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 519. The specification also describes an alternate

embodiment wherein a block of packet ID values are assigned to an off-line information

provider, which then organizes them into a database. See ’505 patent, col.6 ll.48-51.

Once again, the district court correctly noted that this passage provides no algorithm or

description of structure corresponding to the claimed function. See Markman Order,

416 F. Supp. 2d at 519.

For computer-implemented means-plus-function claims where the disclosed

structure is a computer programmed to implement an algorithm, “the disclosed structure

is not the general purpose computer, but rather the special purpose computer

programmed to perform the disclosed algorithm.” WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game

Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Thus the patent must disclose, at least to

the satisfaction of one of ordinary skill in the art, enough of an algorithm to provide the

necessary structure under § 112, ¶ 6. This court permits a patentee to express that

algorithm in any understandable terms including as a mathematical formula, in prose,

see In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-46 (CCPA 1978), or as a flow chart, or in any

other manner that provides sufficient structure.

The district court correctly determined that the structure recited in the ’505

specification does not even meet the minimal disclosure necessary to make the claims

definite. Simply reciting “software” without providing some detail about the means to

accomplish the function is not enough. See Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty v. Int’l Game

Tech., __ F.3d __, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 6472, at *10 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 28, 2008) (“For a

2007-1023, -1024 29
patentee to claim a means for performing a particular function and then to disclose only

a general purpose computer as the structure designed to perform that function amounts

to pure functional claiming. Because general purpose computers can be programmed

to perform very different tasks in very different ways, simply disclosing a computer as

the structure designated to perform a particular function does not limit the scope of the

claim to ‘the corresponding structure, material, or acts’ that perform the function, as

required by section 112 paragraph 6.”). This court does not impose a lofty standard in

its indefiniteness cases. See, e.g., Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta

AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But in this case, the claims are already quite

vague. Without any corresponding structure, one of skill simply cannot perceive the

bounds of the invention. Thus the district court did not err in adjudging claims 1, 2, 7, 9,

10, 11, and 37 invalid for indefiniteness.

III

Because Videotex Architecture anticipates claim 16 and because the district

court correctly determined that claims 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 37 are indefinite, this court

remands for further consideration of claims 17, 22, 24, 26, 39, and 44 only. On remand,

in light of the proper construction of “downloading into a memory storage device” as well

as a proper understanding of Videotex Architecture as disclosing all the elements of

claim 16 as arranged in claim 16, the district court will need to reevaluate both

infringement and validity for these six claims.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

2007-1023, -1024 30
 COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

2007-1023, -1024 31