United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-7196
VERNON D. WILLIAMS,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Respondent-Appellee.
Michael P. Toomey, of Sunbury, Pennsylvania, argued for claimant-appellant.
Brian T. Edmunds, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for respondent-
appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Martin F.
Hockey, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel was Michael S. Dufault, Trial Attorney. Of
counsel on the brief was Michael J. Timinski, Deputy Assistant General Counsel,
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC.
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
Judge Mary J. Schoelen
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2007-7196
VERNON D. WILLIAMS,
Claimant-Appellant,
v.
JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D.,
Secretary of Veterans Affairs,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
in case no. 05-0575, Judge Mary J. Schoelen
___________________________
DECIDED: April 3, 2008
___________________________
Before LOURIE, Circuit Judge, CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge, and PROST, Circuit
Judge.
CLEVENGER, Senior Circuit Judge
Vernon D. Williams ("Williams") appeals from the final decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("Veterans Court") affirming the decision of
the Board of Veterans' Appeals ("BVA"). The BVA denied Williams an effective date
earlier than May 2, 1994, for the award of a 100 percent disability rating for
schizophrenia. We affirm.
I
Williams served on active duty in the United States Army from November 1972
until November 1974. On March 2, 1977, Williams filed an application for compensation
for service connection for a nervous condition with the agency of original jurisdiction,
which was the Regional Office ("RO") in Chicago. On April 29, 1977, the RO wrote
Williams asking for additional information necessary to process his claim. When the
requested information was not supplied, the RO disallowed Williams's claim on June 2,
1977, not on its merits but for failure to have provided information regarding his reserve
or retired status. Williams did not receive notice that his claim had been disallowed.
On October 4, 1978, Williams filed with the RO another request for compensation
for service connection for the same claim of a nervous condition. By letter dated
December 12, 1979, Williams was informed that his claim had been disallowed on the
merits after reviewing his medical history on the ground that his nervous condition had
first been noted in September 1978, a time too remote from his service to be related
thereto. Williams did not appeal this adverse ruling by the RO.
On May 2, 1994, Williams moved to reopen his claim for service connection.
When his claim was disallowed, he appealed to the BVA, which ruled in his favor. He
was awarded a rating of 100 percent disability for schizophrenia effective May 2, 1994,
the date he moved to reopen the claim that had been disallowed on December 12,
1979.
Because Williams was never notified that his March 2, 1977 claim had been
disallowed, he considered that claim still open and unadjudicated. He thus considered
that the effective date for his disability rating should relate back to the date he filed his
original claim. Based on his view of the situation, Williams filed a claim with the RO for
the earlier effective date. His claim was denied by letter in May of 2002, and his appeal
to the BVA was unsuccessful.
2007-7196 2
II
Williams then appealed to the Veterans Court. Under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a), the
effective date of an award based on an original claim cannot be earlier than the date of
the application for the original claim. He again argued that without notification to him
that his March 2, 1977 claim had been disallowed, it must necessarily remain still
pending. A "pending claim" is "[a]n application, formal or informal, which has not been
finally adjudicated." 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) (2006). Consequently, Williams argued that
his 1977 claim was not finally adjudicated and remained pending under section
3.160(c).
The Veterans Court disagreed. When a veteran receives no decision on a claim
and then files the same claim again, the Veterans Court has held that the final
adjudication of the identical second claim subsumes the initial, identical claim and
constitutes a final adjudication of the initial claim as well. The Veterans Court relied on
its holding in Ingram v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 156, 164 (2006), that a claim remains
open until there is an express adjudication of the claim or an explicit adjudication of a
subsequent claim for the same disability. This holding was rephrased in a subsequent,
superseding opinion in Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 232, 243 (2007), as follows:
"a reasonably raised claim remains pending until there is either a recognition of the
substance of the claim in an RO decision from which a claimant could deduce that the
claim was adjudicated or an explicit adjudication of a subsequent 'claim' for the same
disability."
Under that holding, the final adjudication of the subsequent, same claim stood as
the final adjudication of the initial claim, thus ending its pending status. Because
2007-7196 3
Williams's claim to the earlier effective date depended on proving that the original 1977
claim never was finally adjudicated and remained pending, the Veterans Court affirmed
the BVA's denial of the requested earlier effective date.
III
Williams timely appealed to this court. He contends that the Veterans Court
misinterpreted 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(c) and (d), and that under the correct interpretation of
the regulations, his 1977 claim remains pending to this day, thus qualifying him for the
earlier effective date he seeks. We are authorized to resolve challenges to
interpretation of law. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2002).
Section 3.160 of Chapter 38 of the Federal Register relates to the "Status of
Claims." Subsection (c) defines "[p]ending claim" as "[a]n application, formal or
informal, which has not been finally adjudicated." Subsection (d) defines "[f]inally
adjudicated claim" as:
An application, formal or informal, which has been allowed or disallowed
by the agency of original jurisdiction, the action having become final by the
expiration of 1 year after the date of notice of an award or disallowance, or
by denial on appellate review, whichever is the earlier.
Final adjudication of a claim thus requires allowance or disallowance by the
agency of original jurisdiction coupled with notice to the veteran of the agency's
decision, with finality of the adjudication occurring one year after the date of the notice
of allowance or disallowance. In this case, it is undisputed that Williams's October 4,
1978 claim was finally adjudicated. It is assumed that the agency of original jurisdiction
never gave Williams notice of the agency's decision of disallowance, and thus
Williams's initial March 2, 1977 claim was a "pending claim" at the time he filed his
identical claim on October 4, 1978.
2007-7196 4
The question of interpretation presented by Williams is whether a finally
adjudicated claim on a subsequent identical claim serves as a final adjudication of an
earlier pending identical claim. Williams asserts that each claim must be treated
separately, and that absent an express final adjudication of a claim, that claim remains
pending. The Secretary argues to the contrary that a final adjudication of a claim
necessarily constitutes final adjudication of an earlier filed claim for the same disability
that was pending at the time of the final adjudication of the later identical claim, and that
notice of such final adjudication serves as notice that the earlier identical claim is
disallowed.
The express language of the pertinent regulations does not clearly resolve this
dispute. Neither party points to any authority beyond the express words of the
regulation, and we have found no source of information that contributes to the decision
of the interpretative issue before us.
Williams argues that a veteran should have the choice of when to appeal a
disallowed claim, and that absent notice of disallowance, the veteran cannot perfect an
appeal until such a time that he has received a final disallowance. But Williams
recognizes that he was afforded the opportunity for appeal when his identical October
1978 claim was disallowed.
The Secretary argues that Williams was given the opportunity for appeal upon
disallowance of the October 1978 claim, which he did not pursue, and that a pending
claim for the same alleged disability should be considered finally adjudicated, and
hence no longer pending, upon final adjudication of the identical claim. Since Williams
2007-7196 5
was given notice in October 1978 that his claim was disallowed, the Secretary argues
that such notice suffices as notice that his earlier identical claim was also disallowed.
The Veterans Court's decision found support from its earlier holding in Ingram v.
Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. at 164, that the pending status of a claim is extinguished when
a later claim for the same disability is finally adjudicated. When notice is given of the
final adjudication of the later claim, the veteran's right to appeal the disallowance exists.
When the veteran prevails on such an appeal, the effective date of his relief relates
back to the date of the filing of his original claim.
We agree with the Veterans Court that a subsequent final adjudication of a claim
which is identical to a pending claim that had not been finally adjudicated terminates the
pending status of the earlier claim. The later disposition, denying the claim on its
merits, also decides that the earlier identical claim must fail. The notice given that the
later claim has been disallowed informs the veteran that his claim for service connection
has failed. This notice affords the veteran the opportunity for appeal to the BVA, and if
necessary to the Veterans Court and this court, so that he might demonstrate that his
claim for service connection should have been sustained.
We therefore affirm the final judgment of the Veterans Court.
COSTS
No costs.
AFFIRMED
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