Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA

CORRECTED: July 27, 2007

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2002-1052, -1065

INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. and THE BURNHAM INSTITUTE,

Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,
and

TELIOS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCK KGaA,

Defendant-Appellant,
and

THE SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE and DR. DAVID A. CHERESH,

Defendants.

Donald R. Dunner, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, L.L.P., of
Washington, DC, for defendant-appellant Merck KGaA. With him on the brief were
Thomas H. Jenkins, David A. Manspeizer, and Rachel H. Townsend. Of counsel on the
brief were M. Patricia Thayer, Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe, LLP, of San Francisco,
California; and William C. Rooklidge, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP, of Irvine,
California. Of counsel was Esther H. Lim, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett &
Dunner, L.L.P., of Washington, DC.

Mauricio A. Flores, Campbell & Flores LLP, of San Diego, California, for plaintiffs-
cross appellants Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd. and The Burnham Institute. With him on the
brief was David M. Beckwith. Of counsel on the brief were Raphael V. Lupo, Mark G.
Davis, and Natalia V. Blinkova, McDermott, Will & Emery, of Washington, DC. Of counsel
was Donna M. Tanguay.

Kelly L. Morron, Schiff Hardin LLP, of New York, New York, for amicus curiae
Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Of counsel on the brief was Charles E.
Miller, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP, of New York, New York.
 Edward A. Pennington, Swidler Berlin LLP, of Washington, DC, for amicus curiae
Bavarian Nordic A/S. With him on the brief was Robert C. Bertin. Of counsel was
Li Westerlund, Director of Intellectual Property, of Kvistgård, Denmark.

Joshua D. Sarnoff, Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic, of
Washington, DC, for amici curiae Consumer Project on Technology, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, and Public Knowledge.

William R. Boudreaux, Eli Lilly and Company, of Indianapolis, Indiana, for amicus
curiae Eli Lilly & Company. With him on the brief was Mark J. Stewart.

Lynn E. Eccleston, The Eccleston Law Firm, of Washington, DC, for amicus curiae
Bar Association of the District of Columbia. With him on the brief was Susan M. Dadio,
Buchanan Ingersoll PC, of Alexandria, Virginia.

Stanton T. Lawrence, III, Arnold & Porter, of Washington, DC, for amicus curiae
Wyeth. With him on the brief were Paul J. Zegger and Todd A. Wagner.

On remand from: The Supreme Court of the United States
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2002-1052, -1065

INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. and THE BURNHAM INSTITUTE,

Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,

and

TELIOS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCK KGaA,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

THE SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE and DR. DAVID A. CHERESH,

Defendants.

__________________________

DECIDED: July 27, 2007
__________________________

Before NEWMAN, RADER, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. Dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-
part opinion filed by Circuit Judge RADER.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case returns to us upon vacatur by the Supreme Court of the judgment of the

Federal Circuit, accompanied by remand with instructions to review the appeal in light of
the Court's statutory construction of 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1). 1 We received further briefing

and argument, and now reverse the district court's judgment of infringement.

BACKGROUND

Reference is made to the prior opinions, see n.1, for the history of this case,

discussion of the science, and the issues and arguments raised at earlier stages of the

litigation. The five patents in suit, owned by Integra Life Sciences Corporation, relate to

certain peptides that contain the RGD sequence of amino acids, viz. the contiguous

sequence of arginine (R), glycine (G), and aspartic acid (D) within a peptide chain. The

patented inventions are described as demonstrating various cell interactions with the

extracellular peptide matrix, including ways of promoting cell attachment, blocking cell

attachment, and disrupting cell attachment. The validity of the Integra patents was

sustained at trial but for one claim, and is not here at issue.

In activities preceding this litigation, Merck KGaA (a German company) and Scripps

Research Institute were collaborating in research related to studies that Dr. David Cheresh

and others at Scripps were conducting on the inhibition of angiogenesis. 2 The

development and growth of undesired blood vessels is a factor in several diseases,

including solid tumor cancers, diabetic retinopathy, and rheumatoid arthritis. Dr. Cheresh,

in the course of research using monoclonal antibodies, had discovered that angiogenesis is

1 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005), vacating
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal
Circuit had affirmed, other than the amount of damages, the judgment in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 96-CV-1307 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2001).

2 Angiogenesis is defined as "the development of the blood vessels." The
American Heritage Stedman's Medical Dictionary 45 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995).

2002-1052, -1065 2
affected by blocking the αvβ3 integrin cell surface receptors on endothelial cells, thereby

depriving the cells of blood. In 1994 Dr. Cheresh evaluated a cyclic RGD peptide that was

provided by Merck, and found that it was effective in inhibiting angiogenesis. Merck and

Scripps then entered into a sponsorship agreement directed to the goal of progressing,

within three years, to clinical trials with human subjects. Clinical trials require the prior

approval of the Food and Drug Administration, which is obtained through the mechanism of

an Investigational New Drug (IND) application in accordance with FDA Regulations.

During the collaboration with Merck, Dr. Cheresh and others at Scripps conducted

the experiments here charged with infringement. As the work proceeded they studied the

efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and safety of three

structurally related RGD peptides. The collaborators duly selected the peptide designated

EMD 121974 as having optimum properties for development. In October 1998 the National

Cancer Institute agreed to sponsor clinical trials for EMD 121974.

In 1996 Integra sued Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh for infringement of one or

more of the five Integra patents, reportedly after failed negotiations. In the district court two

principal defenses were presented: first, that the early scientific studies at Scripps on RGD

peptides are not subject to patent infringement, based on the common law research

exemption; and second, that the ensuing studies were conducted in furtherance of drug

development and the projected clinical trials, and are exempt from infringement under the

FDA Exemption (or "safe harbor") established by 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1):

35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1). It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use,
offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.

2002-1052, -1065 3
As to the first defense, the district court ruled that all but one of the experiments conducted

by Dr. Cheresh before 1995, that is, his initial studies of angiogenesis inhibition by the first

cyclic RGD peptide provided by Merck (designated EMD 66203), were of the nature of

basic scientific research and within the common law research exemption. No appeal was

taken from this ruling, and these early experiments are not included in the subject matter

charged with infringement. Although in the district court Scripps had argued that at least

some of the ensuing studies were also shielded from infringement by the common law

research exemption, this argument was not presented on appeal to the Federal Circuit or

the Supreme Court, and is not at issue.

As to the second defense, the district court submitted to the jury the question of

whether the challenged activities were protected by the FDA Exemption. The court

instructed the jury as follows:

Merck contends that it does not infringe or induce the infringement of
any of the patents-in-suit, based upon the Food and Drug Administration or
"FDA" Exemption. To prevail on this defense, Merck must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would be objectively reasonable for a
party in Merck's and Scripps' situation to believe that there was a decent
prospect that the accused activities would contribute, relatively directly, to the
generation of the kinds of information that are likely to be relevant in the
processes by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product in
question.
Each of the accused activities must be evaluated separately to
determine whether the exemption applies.
Merck does not need to show that the information gathered from a
particular activity was actually submitted to the FDA.

Neither side assigned error to this instruction, although Merck objected to the verdict form

which grouped the accused activities such that if any one experiment were found not

entitled to the FDA Exemption, infringement could be found by the jury. Although the

2002-1052, -1065 4
parties continue to argue about this aspect, it is mooted by the Court's rulings and our

conclusion in light thereof.

At the trial both sides presented expert testimony concerning the FDA Exemption,

and argued theory, fact, and application of '271(e)(1). Integra's position was that the FDA

Exemption did not apply to the Scripps experiments or to most of them. Some of the

experiments were with RGD peptides that were not the subject of an IND application, and

Integra presented opinion testimony that most or all of the experiments could not be the

basis of an IND application because the work did not conform to the Good Laboratory

Practices protocols of the FDA, and in all events that the FDA Exemption at the IND stage

applies only to studies of safety for administration to human subjects and thus did not

include the majority of the experiments, which concerned the properties and mode of action

but not the safety of the candidate angiogenesis inhibitor. Integra argued that the FDA

Exemption must be narrowly construed, explaining that the purpose of '271(e)(1) is to

shield generic drug producers from patent infringement while they are preparing to enter

the market on expiration of the patents on established products -- a purpose quite removed

from the activities for which Merck and Scripps were now seeking to invoke the Exemption.

Merck and Scripps presented a contrary position as to all of these aspects. They

argued, and their witnesses testified, that '271(e)(1) is not limited to studies of safety for

human subjects, and that information about efficacy, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and

mechanism of action is properly included in the IND application and thus subject to the FDA

Exemption. They argued that the Exemption includes all of the studies conducted with all

of the candidate RGD peptides, whether or not the particular compound was ultimately

proposed for clinical trials with human subjects. They state that the kinds of studies

2002-1052, -1065 5
conducted at Scripps were selected in consultation with FDA officials and other advisors,

and were designed to comply with FDA requirements for the IND application.

The jury found infringement. The district court, sustaining the verdict, described the

challenged experiments as "insufficiently direct to qualify" for the FDA Exemption, and

referred specifically to Integra's expert's testimony that the purpose of requiring FDA

approval of clinical trials is to assure the safety of an experimental drug for administration to

human subjects; the court observed that many of the Scripps experiments were unrelated

to human safety evaluations. The district court also referred to the expert testimony that for

FDA approval of an IND application the studies must be carried out in accordance with the

Good Laboratory Practices protocols established by the FDA, and that the Scripps

experiments were not so conducted. The district court, observing various conflicts in the

testimony presented by the parties, stated that it deferred to the credibility findings of the

jury. A split panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that "the Scripps work sponsored

by Merck was not clinical testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general

biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds." Integra, 331 F.3d at 866.

In its presentation to the Supreme Court, Integra conceded that the information that

was included in the IND application for clinical trials using the selected RGD peptide EMD

121974 was within the FDA Exemption. Thus the Court stated the question as follows:

This case presents the question whether uses of patented inventions in
preclinical research, the results of which are not ultimately included in a
submission to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), are exempted from
infringement by 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1).

Merck, 545 U.S. at 195. This was a narrower question than had been litigated in the district

court and the Federal Circuit, and was limited to the infringement status of experiments

2002-1052, -1065 6
using the RGD peptides that were not selected for clinical trials, and any studies using EMD

121974 that were not included in the IND application.

The Court, analyzing the statute, explained that '271(e)(1) "exempted from

infringement all uses of patented compounds 'reasonably related' to the process of

developing information for submission" to the FDA. Merck, 545 U.S. at 206 (emphasis in

original). The Court explained that "reasonably related" includes uses in research that are

conducted after the biological mechanism and physiological effect of a candidate drug have

been recognized, such that if the research is successful it would appropriately be included

in a submission to the FDA:

At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a
patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to
produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in research
that, if successful, would be appropriate in a submission to the FDA, that use
is "reasonably related" to the "development and submission of information
under . . . Federal law." '271(e)(1).

Id. at 207.

Before the Court, Integra had stressed that '271(e)(1) was never intended as a

broad authorization to investigators to infringe the patents of others, and that the statute

should be strictly construed. On this remand Integra repeats this argument, observing that

a significant amount of the accused experimental work was with RGD peptides that were

not ultimately selected for clinical trials; Integra argues that these experiments constitute

infringement even on the Court's construction of '271(e)(1). Merck responds that the

Court's consistent view has been that '271(e)(1) warrants a liberal construction, and that

the Court now explicitly held that the FDA Exemption is not limited to experiments whose

results are actually submitted to the FDA, or to compounds that are ultimately selected for

2002-1052, -1065 7
clinical authorization. Merck states that application of the Court's statutory interpretation to

the experiments here at issue permits only one conclusion, and requires judgment of

noninfringement as a matter of law.

All of the work here at issue was done after the initial recognition at Scripps of the

"particular biological process" whereby the RGD peptide blocks the cell surface receptors,

and the recognition of the "particular physiological effect" of angiogenesis inhibition.

Integra summarized in its brief to the Court that "[by April 1994] Dr. Cheresh demonstrated

that blocking the αvβ3 receptor would inhibit angiogenesis in tumors, depriving them of the

blood supply they need to grow," Brief at 12, meeting the Court's criteria of recognition of

biological and physiological properties. Merck points out that the property of angiogenesis

inhibition by blocking a specific receptor was known to it and to Scripps before the first

experiment that is charged with infringement, citing a letter from Dr. Cheresh to Merck

dated June 24, 1994. Integra did not dispute this point; indeed, it stressed to the Court, as

discussed supra, that by April 1994 Dr. Cheresh had demonstrated this angiogenesis

inhibition in tumors, Integra citing a Cheresh publication in the journal Science. Integra

does not dispute on this remand that the accused experiments produced information

relevant to efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics.

The Court observed that the FDA Exemption is not directed to basic scientific

research unrelated to development of a particular drug:

Basic scientific research on a particular compound, performed without the
intent to develop a particular drug or a reasonable belief that the compound
will cause the sort of physiological effect the researcher intends to induce, is
surely not "reasonably related to the development and submission of
information" to the FDA.

2002-1052, -1065 8
Id. at 205-06. However, the Court did not thereby remove from the scope of the FDA

Exemption all experiments that are not actually submitted to the FDA. The Court stated:

It does not follow from this, however, that '271(e)(1)'s exemption from
infringement categorically excludes either (1) experimentation on drugs that
are not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission or (2) use of patented
compounds in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA.

Id. at 206. The Court remarked on "the reality that, even at late stages in the development

of a new drug, scientific testing is a process of trial and error," id., stating that:

Properly construed, '271(e)(1)'s safe harbor leaves adequate space for
experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory approval . . . .

Id. at 207. The Court thus rejected, as a matter of statutory interpretation, Integra's position

that the Scripps experiments that were not included in the IND application, such as the

experiments with the RGD peptides that were superceded by EMD 121974, are excluded

from the FDA Exemption:

There is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain information from
the exemption on the basis of the phase of research in which it is developed
or the particular submission in which it could be included.

Id. at 202. The Court held that if it was reasonable to believe that the compound under

study may work in the intended use and that the experiments will produce the types of

information that are relevant to an IND, then the FDA Exemption applies to studies that are

appropriate for submission. Id. at 208. The Court summarized:

'271(e)(1)'s exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission of
any information under the FDCA. . . . This necessarily includes preclinical
studies of patented compounds that are appropriate for submission to the
FDA in the regulatory process.

Id. at 202 (emphasis in original).

DISCUSSION

2002-1052, -1065 9
 I

The focus of this remand is to apply the Court's statutory interpretation and rulings of

law to the facts of this case. Of particular significance to the issues requiring resolution is

the Court's ruling that the FDA Exemption includes experimentation on products that are

not ultimately the subject of an FDA submission, provided that the particular biological

process and physiological effect had been identified and the work was reasonably related

to that appropriate for inclusion in an IND application.

All of the experiments charged with infringement were conducted for the purposes of

determining the optimum candidate angiogenesis inhibitor and proceeding with commercial

development of the selected candidate in compliance with regulatory procedures, initially

using three structurally related RGD peptides. Integra argues that Scripps' experiments on

the two RGD peptides other than EMD 121974 are not within the FDA Exemption because

the other peptides were not the subject of an IND application. This position is negated by

the Court's holding that for a compound for which there was a reasonable basis for

believing that it may have the desired biological property, research that "if successful would

be appropriate for FDA submission" is within the FDA Exemption. Merck, 545 U.S. at 207.

The Court placed this holding in the context of the uncertainties of scientific investigation:

In the vast majority of cases, neither the drugmaker nor its scientists have
any way of knowing whether an initially promising candidate will prove
successful over a battery of experiments. That is the reason they conduct
experiments . . . . One can not know at the outset that a particular compound
will be the subject of an eventual application to the FDA.

Id. at 206.

The Court explained that the criterion of whether the experimental investigation of a

patented compound is reasonably related to the development of information for submission

2002-1052, -1065 10
to the FDA is established at the time of the experiment, and does not depend on the

success or failure of the experimentation or actual submission of the experimental results.

Thus studies of compounds that are not ultimately proposed for clinical trials are within the

FDA Exemption, when there was a reasonable basis for identifying the compounds as

working through a particular biological process to produce a particular physiological effect.

On the Court's statutory interpretation, the FDA Exemption applies to experiments

conducted to determine the optimum candidate drug, including experiments with rejected

candidates. Applying this understanding of the statute, the Scripps experiments with the

RGD compounds that were not taken to clinical trials did not become infringing when EMD

121974 was selected as the IND candidate.

The Court also rejected Integra's position that the FDA Exemption, at the IND

application stage, applies only to experiments conducted to show that the candidate drug

can safely be administered to human subjects in clinical trials:

To the contrary, the FDA requires that applicants include in an IND
summaries of the pharmacological, toxicological, pharmacokinetic, and
biological qualities of the drug in animals . . . includ[ing] preclinical studies of
a drug's efficacy in achieving particular results.

Merck, 545 U.S. at 203-04. The Court cited 21 C.F.R. '312.23(a), which states, inter alia,

that an IND should include information about the rationale for the drug, its structure, its

toxicology, its mode of action, its effectiveness under different conditions, its side effects, its

formulation, its administration, and like information. Integra's position at the trial was that

safety is "almost the only concern of the FDA," Tr. at 3505, and that efficacy is not

considered at the IND stage. Integra told the jury that the chicken embryo studies, which

were the subject of many of the challenged experiments, are not relevant to human safety

2002-1052, -1065 11
and thus are not eligible for application of the FDA Exemption. The Court held that this

position is incorrect in law. FDA regulation 21 C.F.R. '312.23(a)(8)(i) states that an IND

must include

adequate information about pharmacological and toxicological studies of the
drug involving laboratory animals or in vitro, [including the] pharmacological
effects and mechanism(s) of action of the drug in animals, and information on
the absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion of the drug, if known.

Integra now presses the argument that even if its witness' position on this point were

inaccurate, the jury verdict must be sustained because the jury could have believed his

testimony and disbelieved the conflicting testimony presented by Merck. Integra argues

that to the extent that conflicting evidence was before the jury, the jury could have found

that only human safety data are relevant to FDA authorization of clinical trials, and that the

other experiments were infringing. Thus Integra argues that the jury verdict must be

sustained, for it is not disputed that most of the Scripps experiments were directed to

obtaining information other than relevant to human safety. However, when an expert

witness' statement of the law is incorrect, that view of the law cannot be relied upon to

support the verdict. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509

U.S. 209, 242 (1993) ("When an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to

validate it in the eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise

render the opinion unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict.") The jury's verdict of

infringement cannot be sustained on the incorrect position that only experiments related to

safety in humans are subject to the FDA Exemption at the IND application stage.

The Court also rejected Integra's argument that the FDA Exemption can apply only

to studies that meet the FDA's "good laboratory practices" protocols. Citing the legislative

2002-1052, -1065 12
and regulatory background contained in the amicus curiae brief filed by the United States,

the Court observed that the FDA's Good Laboratory Practices regulations "do not apply to

preclinical studies of a drug's efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, or

pharmacokinetics," and that "FDA regulations do not provide that even safety-related

experiments not conducted in compliance with good laboratory practices regulations are not

suitable for submission in an IND." Merck, 545 U.S. at 204-05. Although Scripps conceded

that its laboratory did not meet the requirements of this protocol, the position presented at

the trial was contrary to law.

Thus the Court expressly rejected the three legal grounds mentioned by the district

court as its reasons for sustaining the jury verdict: the ground that the purpose of an IND

application is to establish safety for administration to humans, such that experiments not

directed to human safety do not have the protection of '271(e)(1); the ground that only

studies that meet the "good laboratory practices" protocol can be submitted to the FDA,

thereby excluding the Scripps studies from '271(e)(1); and the ground that experiments not

included in an IND are not subject to the safe harbor of '271(e)(1), whereby the Scripps

experiments using other RGD peptides would be infringing. However, the Court did not

undertake to review the accused experiments on the correct construction of '271(e)(1), the

Court observing that this had not yet been done through the standard appellate process.

We thus review the issues presented on appeal, with application of the correct law.

2002-1052, -1065 13
 II

Merck states that the experiments here challenged were designed in consultation

with the FDA or with consultants experienced in FDA submissions. The accused

experiments were divided into sixteen categories, as agreed by Integra and Merck, as

follows with Merck's statement of the purpose of the experiment in parentheses:

$αvβ3 receptor binding assay (efficacy);

$angiogenesis chick chorioallantoic membrane (CAM) assay (efficacy, mechanism
of action, and pharmacokinetics);

$angio-matrigel tests (efficacy and mechanism of action);

$cell adhesion assay (efficacy);

$chemotaxis assay (efficacy and mechanism of action);

$chick embryo pharmacokinetics assay (pharmacokinetics);

$fluorescence-activated cell sorting (FACS) analysis (mechanism of action and
efficacy);

$rabbit pharmacokinetics assay (pharmacokinetics);

$tumor growth in severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) mouse (efficacy,
mechanism of action, pharmacology);

$tumor growth nude mouse assay (efficacy, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and
mechanism of action);

$mice retina vasculo assay (efficacy, mechanism, pharmacology, and
pharmacokinetics);

$rabbit cornea assay (pharmacokinetics and efficacy);

$mouse retina IF vasculogenesis assays (pharmacokinetics);

$rabbit arthritis experiments (efficacy, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, safety and
mechanism of action);

$mice arthritis experiments (efficacy).

2002-1052, -1065 14
 $chick CAM tumor growth with melanoma cells (efficacy and mechanism of action).

Merck Suppl. Br. at App. A. There is no factual dispute concerning these experiments and

the information they produced.

Dr. Cherish testified that he supervised the work in eleven of the above categories,

and other witnesses testified as to the other categories. They explained how the tests were

performed and the nature of the information learned. Dr. Kessler of Scripps explained that

tests of efficacy were "to test whether or not a given drug could achieve a given effect in an

animal . . . pharmacokinetics to see how the potential drug would behave in a living

system, how it's metabolized, how it's excreted, . . . we tried to design experiments that

would give us some insight into mechanisms as well." Tr. at 1831-34. The witnesses

agreed that some of these tests also provided information relevant to human safety and

toxicity. Integra does not dispute that these experiments all yielded information concerning

efficacy, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and mechanism of action.

Integra argues, as it did at trial and before the Supreme Court, that all of this work

except that related to safety in humans is outside of the FDA Exemption, and that all work

that was not included in the IND application is outside of the FDA Exemption. Integra also

argues that much of this work is properly viewed as "discovery-based research" and is not

the "routine FDA-related work" that Integra states is the proper limit of '271(e)(1) even on

the Court's view of the statute. Integra takes particular issue with the angiogenesis chick

CAM assay and the tumor growth chick CAM assay, which total 93 of the 180 accused

experiments; Integra states that experiments with chick embryos do not necessarily or

reliably predict safety or efficacy in humans. Integra also argues that experiments using

2002-1052, -1065 15
chicken embryos relate to the threshold determination of whether angiogenesis is affected

by the candidate drug, and thus is properly viewed as basic science and is not insulated by

'271(e)(1).

The Court, responding to these same arguments, concluded that the challenged

experiments "were designed to evaluate the suitability of each of the peptides as potential

drug candidates . . . . Accordingly, the tests measured the efficacy, specificity, and toxicity

of the particular peptides as angiogenesis inhibitors, and evaluated their mechanism of

action and pharmacokinetics in animals." Merck, 545 U.S. at 198-99. Integra's expert Dr.

Dedhar testified that the chick CAM experiments demonstrated "a substantial amount of

inhibition or blockage of blood vessel growth with the RGD peptide," and that these

experiments demonstrated the mechanism of action "by disrupting the interaction of

endothelial cells with the extracellular matrix." Tr. at 910-937. Integra's expert Mr. Meyer

testified that the chicken CAM assays were relevant to the "physical, chemical and

biological characteristics" of the candidate drug. Tr. at S8469. Although Integra continues

to argue that safety is the sole concern of the FDA Exemption, the Court resolved that

question, and recognized the breadth of data obtained in these experiments and their

relevance to FDA approval.

The Court did not discuss all of the experiments, but observed that "it will not always

be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for their new product exactly which

kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to win that agency's approval."

Merck, 545 U.S. at 207 (quoting Intermedics, Inc. v. Vernitrex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269,

1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd , 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The evidence presented at

trial was extensive as to how and why all of these experiments were performed. For

2002-1052, -1065 16
example, Dr. Cheresh testified that after 1995 Scripps focused on testing the candidate

RGD peptide on a diseased condition in animals, including developing chicken embryos,

mice in which human tumor growth had been induced, and rabbits in which arthritis had

been induced, in order to ascertain the effect of the candidate RGD peptide on the

diseased condition.

There was testimony from several other Scripps scientists. For example, Dr.

Brooks, who conducted the chicken CAM experiments and some of the mouse

experiments, explained that the data related to efficacy, mechanism of action,

pharmacology, and pharmacokinetics. Dr. Friedlander testified as to the effect of the test

RGD peptide on proliferated blood vessels in mouse retina; Dr. Storgard as to the effect on

proliferated blood vessels in the joints of mice and rabbits. Each witness was asked to

review the protocols, results, and purposes of the accused experiments, and each witness

testified that all of the experiments were related to obtaining information about efficacy,

mechanism of action, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, safety, or some combination

thereof. Integra did not challenge the scientific conduct or purposes of the experiments, or

the reasonableness or relevance of the experiments to the purposes of determining the

properties of the angiogenesis inhibitor candidates. Even in its argument about Good

Laboratory Practices, Integra presented no criticism of the procedures used or the

information obtained and its relevance to drug development. Integra's argument was not

directed to the quality of the experiments or the validity of the information adduced, but to

the absence of FDA certification as to all three RGD peptides. This aspect was ruled by the

Court not to defeat the FDA Exemption.

2002-1052, -1065 17
 No challenge was raised to the conclusions presented by Merck's experts Dr.

Bynum, Dr. Huston, and Mr. Armitage, that all of the tests were relevant to FDA submission

as to the candidate that would be selected as optimal for clinical trials, the tests showing

mechanism of action, efficacy, pharmacology, pharmacokinetics, and safety, and

appropriate for meeting FDA regulatory requirements and for inclusion in an IND

application. To the extent that there was cross-examination of these witnesses it was

directed to general issues; for example, Integra asked Dr. Bynum whether the FDA cares

about efficacy at the IND stage (his answer was "yes").

Witnesses testified about the relationship between the work done at Scripps and that

done by Merck, for Integra argued that since Scripps was not ultimately responsible for

filing the IND, only work done by Merck, not by Scripps, can claim the safe harbor of

'271(e)(1). However, the argument that much of the IND application preparation was done

by Merck in Germany is irrelevant to the status of the Scripps work that is here charged

with infringement. None of the evidence was challenged on scientific grounds, or the

testimony as being incorrect or untrue. Instead, Integra argues that all of the Merck/Scripps

employee and expert witnesses should be disqualified and their testimony ignored for

purposes of review of the jury verdict, because they were "interested." Integra states that

the jury could have disbelieved the entire testimony presented on behalf of Merck and

Scripps, and that the rules of appellate review require that only evidence favoring the jury

verdict be considered, and all else must be disregarded. Integra cites Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000), for the proposition that a

court, in reviewing a jury verdict, is required under Federal Rule 50 to disregard "all

evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury was not required to believe," and Sartor

2002-1052, -1065 18
v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1944), to the effect that when a

witness is interested this creates a credibility determination for the jury. Integra states that

when the testimony of all of the witnesses on behalf of Merck is disregarded there is

inadequate remaining support for a "safe harbor" ruling, even on the Court's statutory

construction, and therefore that the jury verdict must be sustained.

The rule that a jury verdict is reviewed for support by "substantial evidence" does not

mean that the reviewing court must ignore the evidence that does not support the verdict.

See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-51 ("in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law,

the court should review all of the evidence in the record"). The Court in Reeves stated that

"[i]n the analogous context of summary judgment under Rule 56, we have stated that the

court must review the record 'taken as a whole'," citing Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and observed that "the standard for granting

summary judgment 'mirrors' the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that 'the

inquiry under each is the same',” citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-

251 (1986). Thus the Court pointed out that "the court must draw all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence," Reeves, 520 U.S. at 150, but cautioning that "although the court should review

the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the

jury is not required to believe. See 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure '2529, p. 299 (2d ed. 1995). That is, the court should give credence to the

evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party that

is uncontradicted and unimpeached'." Id. (citations omitted).

2002-1052, -1065 19
 Applying these criteria, there was no evidence at trial in conflict with the evidence

that all of the experiments here at issue were conducted after it had been discovered that a

RGD peptide shrank tumors in an animal model; indeed, Integra so conceded to the Court.

The primary Integra argument on this remand is that the FDA is interested only in safety

data at the IND application stage; although that argument was unambiguously disposed of

by the Court. At the jury trial, before the Court, and on this remand, Integra does not

dispute that the accused experiments yielded data relating to efficacy, mechanism of

action, pharmacology, or pharmacokinetics. At the trial the admissibility of the scientific

evidence and its premises were not challenged.

Integra's cross-examination of Dr. Cheresh was not directed to his scientific work,

but was limited to exploring his familiarity with FDA procedures and his laboratory's lack of

Good Laboratory Practices certification. Although Integra states that Dr. Cheresh changed

his position, between deposition and trial, concerning whether these experiments were for

basic scientific studies or for obtaining FDA approval, this criticism was not directed to the

validity of the information obtained. Dr. Friedlander was challenged on his understanding of

Good Laboratory Practices certification, and Integra also states that Dr. Friedlander's

testimony was inconsistent as to the purpose of the rabbit cornea assay experiments and

mice-retina-vasculo experiments. However, Integra provides no explanation and cites no

contrary testimony. We cannot discern an impeachment of credibility, and indeed the

extensive testimony as to the scientific bases of the experiments performed and the

information they produced was not challenged by any contrary witness.

Integra's only challenge to the credibility of the witnesses is that they were

"interested" in that they were either employees or paid experts (a challenge to which neither

2002-1052, -1065 20
side is immune). As we have observed, Integra presented no opposing evidence as to the

experiments charged with infringement. Integra has not raised credibility considerations

that could support ignoring the extensive uncontradicted scientific evidence. Merck states

in its brief that "Integra never disputed the relevance of the accused experiments to these

four topics [efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacology, and pharmacokinetics], nor so

much as cross-examined any of the ten witnesses on the subject. Nor did Integra present

any affirmative evidence to dispute that each experiment currently before the Court was

reasonably expected to yield evidence on at least one of these subjects. Even Integra's

key scientific expert conceded that each of the experiments revealed information on how

well the drug worked and by what mechanism." Merck Remand Brief at 14. Integra does

not challenge these statements. When the issue of experimental purpose was presented to

the Supreme Court, the Court concluded that "the tests measured the efficacy, specificity,

and toxicology of the particular peptides." Merck, 545 U.S. at 198-99.

Reviewing the proceedings at trial, Integra's principal argument to the jury was that

the FDA Exemption is directed to tests to demonstrate safety for humans in clinical trials.

The jury was told in closing argument that in considering an IND application "[s]afety at that

point is the overriding, almost the only concern, of the FDA . . . . And [Mr. Meyer]

emphasized over and over again how safety is the paramount thing. . . . " Tr. at 3496. The

jury was told: "Efficacy, as such, is not considered at that stage. Mechanism of action,

same thing. The touchstone is safety." Tr. at 3505. The district court declined Merck's

request to issue a corrective instruction. The evidence to this effect, shown by the Court to

be incorrect, cannot support the jury verdict. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440,

454 (2000) ("the authority of courts of appeal to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of

2002-1052, -1065 21
law extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously admitted, there

remains insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict").

Integra also told the jury that the FDA Exemption applies only after there has been a

final selection of the product that is proposed for clinical trials, stating that "Dr. Cheresh

himself said that, at least four or five times, in the course of the trial, that they were trying to

identify the best drug candidate. They weren't focused on FDA data approval for a

particular drug." Tr. at 3616. This argument too was disposed of by the Court, which

stated, in construing the statute, that "'271(e)(1)'s safe harbor leaves adequate space for

experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory approval." Merck, 545 U.S. at 207.

Reviewing the entirety of the record, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, and applying the

criteria of judgment as a matter of law, Liberty Lobby, 470 U.S. at 251, in the absence of

substantial evidence to support the verdict of infringement, judgment as a matter of law is

rendered in favor of Merck.

III

Integra alternatively proposes that each of the Scripps experiments should be

classified as either "discovery" or "routine," and that only those experiments devoid of

discovery, and entirely routine, can be subject to the FDA Exemption. However, in the

Court's explanation of the criteria of '271(e)(1), the safe harbor does not depend on a

distinction between "discovery" and "routine," but on whether the threshold biological

property and physiological effect had already been recognized as to the candidate drug.

The Court recognized that experiments are run in order to learn information, whatever the

stage of the research. Merck, 545 U.S. at 202. The variety of experimental activity that

may apply to any specific biologic or physiologic investigation reinforces the fact-

2002-1052, -1065 22
dependency of the inquiry. A Merck witness explained: "The transitions between research

and development are often flowing transitions, and in the pre-phase it may have been a

development project but not officially." (Testimony of Dr. Gabriele Noll.)

In this case, all of the challenged experiments were performed after the discovery

that a cyclic RGD peptide inhibited angiogenesis. Although Merck readily agrees that the

scientists never lost interest in the scientific understanding of their observations, and

agrees that the various experiments enhanced that understanding, this does not negate the

relevance of the studies to drug development and regulatory compliance. That the

experiments contributed to scientific knowledge does not deprive them of the safe-harbor

benefit of '271(e)(1) when the requirements therefor are met. See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron

Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (as long as the activity is reasonably related to

obtaining FDA approval, a competitive party's or a patented invention's "intent or alternative

uses are irrelevant to its qualification to invoke the section 271(e)(1) shield"); Amgen, Inc. v.

Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp.2d 104, 107-08 (D. Mass. 1998) (the safe harbor

under 35 U.S.C. '271(e)(1) permits a range of activities (such as animal testing, clinical

trials, or chemical analysis), even when a party may have "ulterior motives or alternative

purposes" that "may be related to FDA approval [or] other than, or in addition to, obtaining

FDA approval."); cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (a "reasonable relationship" is

one that is not arbitrary or irrational).

The Court held and all parties agree that the RGD peptides were not used as a

research tool. 3 The Court disposed of this aspect with the statement:

3 The National Institutes of Health defines "research tools" as "tools that
scientists use in the laboratory including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal

2002-1052, -1065 23
 Respondents have never argued the RGD peptides were used at Scripps as
research tools, and it is apparent from the record that they were not . . . . We
need not -- and do not -- express a view about whether, or to what extent,
'271(a)(1) exempts from infringement the use of 'research tools' in the
development of information for the regulatory process.

Merck, 545 U.S. at 205 n.7.

Contrary to the position of our colleague in dissent, the Court's ruling and our

application thereof casts no "large shadow" on the subject of "research tools." On remand

to this court, the parties emphatically confirmed that research tools were not at issue. See,

e.g., Letter from Mauricio A. Flores, Counsel for Integra, to the panel (June 13, 2006)

("Integra agrees with Merck that this is not an appropriate case in which to make new law

on the issue of whether patent claims to research tools (however that term may be defined)

are excluded from the ambit of Section 271(e)(1). The Supreme Court has ruled that this

case does not raise that issue. Hence, its resolution is outside the Supreme Court's

mandate. Integra has never argued, and does not now contend, that any of its claims at

issue belong to a class of patent claims outside the reach of that statutory exemption.").

There is no "devastating impact on research tool inventions," dissent at 5; indeed, the issue

is not present, and the criticism inapt.

Conclusion

On the entirety of the record, for the reasons we have discussed, there was not

substantial evidence on which to sustain the jury verdict on application of the Court's

statutory construction. The challenged experiments, all of which were conducted after

discovery of the anti-angiogenesis property of the experimental RGD peptide provided by

models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools
(such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines." 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090,
72092 n.1 (Dec. 23, 1999).

2002-1052, -1065 24
Merck, meet the criteria of being reasonably related to research that, if successful, would

be appropriate to include in a submission to the FDA. This statutory construction both

recognizes the nature of the scientific process and implements the legislative purpose of

encouraging the development of new drugs. On application of the law of 35 U.S.C.

'271(e)(1), no reasonable jury could find other than that the challenged experiments are

within the FDA Exemption. The district court's judgment of infringement is reversed.

REVERSED

2002-1052, -1065 25
 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
2002-1052, -1065

INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. and THE BURNHAM INSTITUTE,

Plaintiffs-Cross Appellants,

and

TELIOS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCK KGaA,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

THE SCRIPPS RESEARCH INSTITUTE and DR. DAVID A. CHERESH,

Defendants.

RADER, Circuit Judge, dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part.

This decision casts a large shadow over patent protection by its overly expansive

interpretation of the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) exemption. In particular, this court today

expands the exemption beyond the Supreme Court’s limits on the provision to eliminate

protection for research tool inventions. The Supreme Court stated "that § 271(e)(1)'s

exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented inventions that are

reasonably related to the development and submission of any information under the

[Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)]." Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I,

Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005). Thus, the exemption covers activities that develop

information that will ultimately be submitted to the FDA, not patented processes and
tools beyond the scope of the “patented compounds” that the Supreme Court placed

within the statutory exemption. In this case, two of the patents are research tools that

deserve protection. This court should remand with instructions that the district court

examine and protect these research tool patents.

Sadly this court does not even examine the patents at issue in this case. This

court, noted for its emphasis on claims as definers of patent scope, ironically does not

recite or analyze the claims of these patents in the slightest. Moreover this court

speaks in broad terms about the experiments and results without specifying which

patented compound or method was in use in the experiments. A careful examination of

the patents shows that two of them have no application at all outside of a laboratory. If

the patents in this case are not research tools, then of course this court could quickly

construe the claims and show that they claim drugs or other products likely to undergo

FDA clearance, not simply laboratory methods. Unfortunately even a cursory analysis

of the patents (undertaken in this dissent) shows that two of them have no application

outside the laboratory.

Rather than construe the claims, usually the first task in any patent case, this

court relies on a letter from one of the parties explaining that it does not wish to rely on

the research tool exception. This supposedly authoritative letter appeared after the oral

argument before this court in an attempt to rectify counsel's unresponsive performance.

With the patents already expired, Integra may pursue a strategy to protect its entire

multi-million-dollar verdict. If Integra had really not wished to rely on research tool

patents, then it would not have asserted them in the first place. In any event, because

four patents are part of this case, this court has a responsibility to construe their claims.

2002-1052, -1065 2
By treating these research tools the same as drugs potentially needing FDA clearance,

this court's opinion poses a danger to the entire research tool industry.

I

After the Supreme Court “extend[ed] . . . [the exemption] to all uses of patented

inventions that are reasonably related to the [FDA clearance process]”, it explained that

its decision “provides a wide berth for the use of patented drugs in activities related to

the federal regulatory process.” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court then further

explained:

At least where a drugmaker has a reasonable basis for believing that a

patented compound may work, through a particular biological process, to

produce a particular physiological effect, and uses the compound in

research that, if successful, would be appropriate to include in a

submission to the FDA, that use is ‘reasonably related’ to the [exemption

criteria].”

Id. at 207 (emphases added). In the next few sentences, the Court reiterates

repeatedly that its decision affects “a patented compound in experiments that are not

themselves included in a ‘submission of information’” and “uncertainties” in “selection of

a specific drug” and “the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies.” Id. at 207-

208 (emphases added). Thus, the Supreme Court makes clear that its reading of the

exemption applies to the selection and perfection of patented compounds in preclinical

studies leading to FDA approval. The Supreme Court is not, however, addressing

patented methods or processes -- research tools -- that measure, analyze, and assess

the characteristics of those compounds during experimentation and development.

2002-1052, -1065 3
 In other words, the Supreme Court reversed this court's earlier decision that

would not have extended the exemption to embrace early experiments to find a drug

candidate. Instead the Supreme Court extended the exemption back up the

experimentation chain to include selection of particular species for FDA approval out of

a patented genus. The Supreme Court did not, however, extend the exemption to

encompass any method or process or other research tool that might be used in a

pharmaceutical laboratory.

To drive this point home with more than repetition, the Supreme Court included

an important footnote:

We therefore need not – and do not – express a view about whether, or to

what extent, § 271 (e) (1) exempts from infringement the use of “research

tools” in the development of information for the regulatory process.

Id. at 205 n.7 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court simply did not intend to even

address research tools, let alone, render research tools valueless for their one and only

use – to test and ascertain information about candidate compounds.

The exemption’s primary purpose is to permit generic manufacturers to perform

research on drugs in the pipeline for FDA approval. According to the House Committee

that initiated the provision, the exemption only deals with pre-market activity as "a

limited amount of testing so that generic manufacturers can establish the

bioequivalency of a generic substitute." H.R. Rep. No. 857, at 8, reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N at 2692. The House Committee noted that the "nature of the interference

with the rights of the patent holder" would not be "substantial," but "de minimus." Id. at

2002-1052, -1065 4
2692, 2714. The Supreme Court extended this statutory exemption to reach as well

activities reasonably related to that function. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 202.

II

Sadly this court’s devastating impact on research tool inventions is not even

really evident on the face of the opinion. As noted, this court, celebrated for its attention

to patent scope, does not analyze these claims. Even a passing examination of the

claims leaves the unmistakable conclusion that two of the patents apply only to

laboratory methods without any possibility of submission to the FDA. Two of the

patents, under any definition, would be research tools.

An analysis of the patents in this case shows that Merck’s use of the ‘525 and

‘997 patents may fall within the exemption as “reasonably related” to the submission of

FDA information. On the other hand, the ‘237 and ‘734 patents are research tools that

deserve protection and bear little, if any, relationship to FDA processes.

Although this court should have remanded to the district court to analyze the

patents for their reasonable relationship to FDA submissions, a brief examination of the

patents shows the tenuous relationship of the research tools to any FDA processes.

The '237 and '734 patents claim methods for specific laboratory experiments, not

compounds subject to FDA processes. These inventive methods are pure research

tools. For example, the '237 patent claims:

4. A method for detaching animal cells from a substrate to which they are

bound in an Arg-Gly-Asp mediated manner, comprising contacting said

bound cells with a solution containing non-naturally occurring peptide

consisting essentially of the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp-Y, [wherein

2002-1052, -1065 5
 Y][sic] is any amino acid such that the peptide has cell-detachment

activity.

8. A method for detaching animal cells from a substrate to which they are

bound in an Arg-Gly-Asp mediated manner, comprising contacting said

bound cells with a peptide consisting essentially of the amino acid

sequence X-Arg-Gly-Asp-Y wherein X is zero to thirty amino acids and Y

is one of thirty amino acids, such that the peptide has cell detachment

promoting activity.

'237 Patent col.10 ll.62-68, col.11 l.16-col.12 l.5 (emphases added). The claims of the

'237 patent begin: "A method for detaching animal cells from a substrate." A substrate

is a laboratory medium for growing or maintaining organisms, tissues, or cell cultures.

In this instance, as the specification explains, the substrate sustains cells that must be

attached and detached for study and testing. In simple terms, this inventive method

does not encompass any substances that enter the human body and need FDA

clearance. This invention instead is simply a laboratory method facilitating study of cells

on a substrate.

The '237 specification further characterizes the invention as a method to facilitate

research by controlling the attachment or detachment of cells on substrates. '237

Patent col.4, ll.1-15. Also, the specification points out that "[t]his invention finds

application in the production of cell lines for research." '237 Patent col.10 ll.34-37

(emphasis added). In the discussion section, the '237 patent explains use of the

inventive method to control cell attachment according to time, rate, location, or amount.

'237 Patent col.9 ll.53-54.

2002-1052, -1065 6
 Thus, this method operates only as a tool for research, not a "patented

compound" for FDA approval. The patented method is analogous to a patent on a

microscope; the microscope's sole use is as a tool for research. Clearly, a patent on an

innovative microscope should not be rendered useless by the § 271(e)(1) exemption.

Similarly, the '237 patent has only one use – as a research tool.

The '734 patent has only one claim:

1. A substantially purified cell surface receptor derived from

mesenchymal tissue and capable of binding to a peptide containing the

amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Asp, comprising a glycoprotein

composed of at least two polypeptides of about 115 and 125 kD,

respectively, as determined by SDS-PAGE under reducing conditions

which selectively binds to vitronectin, but not to fibronectin.

'734 Patent col.6 ll.58-65. Similar to the '237 patent, the '734 patent covers a purified

cell receptor. In the words of the patent, the '734 patent is "[a] method of isolating cell

surface receptors utilizing a short peptide sequence bound to an affinity column." '734

Patent Abstract. Purified cell receptors operate in a laboratory to determine compounds

that will bind to it (and thus may be useful as drugs). Many pharmaceutical drugs work

by binding to receptors on the surface of certain human cells. Therefore, a laboratory

needs methods to study the binding process and to choose drug candidates. These

purified cell receptors do not operate as "patented compounds" for FDA approval

themselves, but rather as experimental targets to test for attachment characteristics.

'734 Patent col.1 ll.56-58. The regulation of cell growth and differentiation by selectively

manipulating the research environment (i.e., cell types, cell functions) of the invention

2002-1052, -1065 7
advances the state of the art of research in the laboratory environment. As such, this

method of isolating cell surface receptors is only a tool to conduct research on biological

and chemical systems.

The '234 and '734 patents claim only methods for use in laboratory settings. As

research tools, these patents deserve protection. As such, I respectfully dissent with

respect to the '237 and '734 patents and would remand back to the district court to

determine what portion of the damages judgment applies to the use of these protected

research tools.

This court also needs to properly analyze the claims of the other two patents in

this case. First, the ‘525 patent is a genus covering a large number of compounds.

Representative claim 8 of the '525 patent reads:

8. A substantially pure peptide including as the cell-attachment-promoting

constituent the amino acid sequence Arg-Gly-Arg-R wherein R is Ser,

Cys, Thr or other amino acid, said peptide having cell-attachment-

promoting activity, and said peptide not being a naturally occurring

peptide.

'525 Patent col.8 ll.50-55. As a patent covering a genus, the '525 patent is an invitation

to find the beneficial species in a broad genus. A species within the broad genus of this

patent could serve as a drug requiring FDA approval. The selection of a suitable

species from a patented genus is apparently the situation which the Supreme Court

placed within the § 271(e)(1) exemption. Thus, activities involving this patent could well

fall within the exemption as defined by the Supreme Court. Indeed this court's opinion

makes that finding. That finding should have been made by a district court in proper

2002-1052, -1065 8
fact finding procedures, rather than at the appellate level, but at least the '525 invention

may support a finding of activities within the exemption.

The '997 patent "contemplates a new composition, a polypeptide which alters the

cell attachment activity of cells to various substrates independent of its binding to

collagen, affects cell phagocytosis, and which consists essentially of an isolated

tetrapeptide X-Arg-Gly-Asp-Ser-Y wherein X is H or one or more amino acids and Y is

OH or one or more amino acids." '997 Patent col.2 ll.21-27. This patent embraces a

medical method with a compound having a RGD group. Although some fact-finding at

the district court level would improve this court's understanding of this invention, it could

apparently have a reasonable relationship to FDA processes. Thus, while I concur with

the majority with respect to the '525 and '997 patents, this court might more wisely

remand these patents and this case to ascertain the proper application of the Supreme

Court's standards for the exemption.

III

A hypothetical example will help illustrate the importance of protecting research

tool patent rights. Suppose a university professor or small independent research

company invents and obtains a patent for a novel and extremely useful research tool.

This invention represents the work of a lifetime for its inventors and perhaps most of the

research budget for the university department or the small company – perhaps millions

of dollars in investment. The only use of the invention tests other pharmaceutical

compounds for effectiveness in fighting cancer. The invention does not itself fight

cancer, but instead simply identifies the cancer fighting characteristics in other

compounds. This patented invention would, of course, be of great use to the

2002-1052, -1065 9
pharmaceutical industry. It would also benefit the public by identifying cancer

treatments. The patent system of course would wish to protect this invention and give

incentives for more investment in developing this kind of valuable research tool.

Sadly today’s opinion misreads the Supreme Court’s decision. This court reads

the Supreme Court's decision too broadly because it includes within the exemption the

'237 and '734 patents, which are obviously research tools. This overbroad interpretation

could obliterate all value for the hypothetical invention discussed above and with it the

incentives for development of these inventions outside of the pharmaceutical industry

itself. The pharmaceutical industry itself, of course, still needs these tools and will

invest in their development, but outside that community, research tools will have no

value. In other words, this opinion could shift all control of research and the patented

tools that facilitate research to the insular pharmaceutical industry. Universities and

independent researchers will have to understand that their work on research tools is

likely to amount only to a charitable (but nondeductible) gift to the pharmaceutical

industry.

The university professor or small company might expect a reward for the lifetime

of labor and investment that produced the research tool. The inventor might also hope

to use that reward to further his pioneer research. These benefits to the public and that

inventor would flow from the patent's right to exclude that would produce reasonable

royalties. However, under today’s opinion, the exemption would swallow that lifetime of

labor and investment because the nature of the use itself, without any concern for the

object of the patented invention, would be the gauge upon which the exemption would

be measured. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 11. In effect, any use of the

2002-1052, -1065 10
hypothetical invention would automatically translate to non-infringement based on this

court’s expansive application of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).

The Supreme Court in Merck did not expect such a broad result. Instead, as

noted above, the Supreme Court specifically did not address “whether, or to what

extent, § 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of ‘research tools’ in the

development of information for the regulatory process.” Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 205

n.7. Thus, upon remand, this court has the responsibility to analyze carefully the claims

and apply the exemption to protect the selection of “patented compounds” even in the

preclinical stage, while continuing to protect research tools. This court has the

responsibility to protect FDA processes and research tool patents alike.

IV

Lastly, this court does not need to address these issues in a vacuum. Several

noted opinions from other courts of international distinction show the value of protecting

research tools while exempting some activities from infringement. These decisions from

other national courts examine research tools in more detail and fashion proper

protections for these inventions. In particular, these decisions protect research tool

inventions when used for their intended purpose while allowing experimentation to

improve the tool itself. Jonathan McPherson, The Impact of the Hatch-Waxman Act's

Safe Harbor Provision on Biomedical Research Tools after Merck Kgaa v. Integra

Lifesciences I, Ltd., 10 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 369, 382-383 (2006). For example, in

Germany, the statutory research exemption for patents finds its origin in Article 31 of the

Community Patent Convention. 1 To paraphrase the law and a seminal case interpreting

1
The Community Patent Convention influences German patent law.

2002-1052, -1065 11
this law, these tools obtain protection when used to conduct research as specified by

the invention, but fall within an experimental exemption when studied to learn their

method of operation or to improve their operation. See Klinische Versuche (Clinical

Trials I), Federal Supreme Court of Germany, July 11, 1995, [1997] R.P.C. 623; Klinishe

Versuche (Clinical Trials II), Federal Supreme Court of Germany, April 17, 1998, [1998]

R.P.C. 423.

I concur in the result with respect to the '525 and '997 patents and respectfully

dissent with respect to the '237 and '734 patents with a recommendation to remand to

the district court for further analysis in view of the Supreme Court opinion.

2002-1052, -1065 12