IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-40928
Summary Calendar
MARK HARRY GABRIEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF PLANO; ET AL
Defendants,
CITY OF PLANO; MARK HUNT, in his official
capacity as City of Plano police officer;
TERRY PAULEY, in his official
capacity as City of Plano Police Department;
ROBERT LEITZ, in his official capacity as
City of Plano police officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 00-40021
Summary Calendar
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MARK HARRY GABRIEL,
Plaintiff,
versus
CITY OF PLANO; ET AL
Defendants,
CITY OF PLANO; MARK HUNT, in his official
capacity as City of Plano police officer;
TERRY PAULEY, in his official capacity
as City of Plano Police Dept;
ROBERT LEITZ, in his official capacity
as City of Plano police officer,
Defendants-Appellees,
versus
BRUCE W. GREEN; BRIAN FAHLING; MICHAEL J.
DEPRIMO; BRYAN J. BROWN; PHIL PRESCOTT,
Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(4:96-CV-362)
June 13, 2000
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
These appeals concern sanctions issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 against the attorneys of the plaintiff, Mark Harry Gabriel.
Because we find that the district court’s awards were not an abuse
of discretion, we AFFIRM the awards.
Gabriel brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City of Plano, the mayor, and several police officers for alleged
abridgements of his right to free speech. The police had removed
Gabriel, an anti-abortion protester, from a public area near a
local high school.
The litigation apparently became uncivil early on. The
behavior by Gabriel’s counsel relevant to this appeal included
repeated requests for document discovery; the filing of an
opposition to Plano’s motion for leave to designate expert
witnesses; and the filing of disciplinary charges against one of
the attorneys for Plano. Two issues also arose regarding allegedly
frivolous claims: Gabriel’s attorneys’ failure to dismiss Plano’s
mayor, who had been sued only in his official capacity and had no
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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involvement with the incident; and the failure to abandon an
excessive force claim until the first day of trial.
After a bench trial in which the district court found the
claims to be without merit, the defendants moved for sanctions for
16 different acts by Gabriel’s attorneys. The district court
granted the motion regarding six of the alleged acts, for a total
sanction of $52,820.50. The court also noted that fees were
available for the City’s preparation of the motion, and after the
City sought clarification of an amount, the court awarded $15,000
for preparation time. Gabriel timely appealed both awards.
We first address whether we may hear this appeal on behalf of
all the appellants. While the first appeal was brought in
Gabriel’s name, the appeal is actually on behalf of his five
attorneys. Even if a notice of appeal does not list the parties
who actually intend to appeal, it is sufficient if it is
objectively clear that a party intended to appeal. See FED. R. APP.
P. 3(c) advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendments (2000). In
Garcia v. Wash, we held that a notice of appeal of sanctions was
sufficient where only the attorney, not the litigant himself,
received sanctions. 20 F.3d 608, 610 (5th Cir. 1994).
We find that it is clear that all of Gabriel’s attorneys
intended to appeal the order. The district court’s sanctions order
does not distinguish among them. As Gabriel was not a sanctioned
party, it is obvious that his attorneys and not Gabriel are the
actual appellants.
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Turning to the merits, we find no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s awards of sanctions. Sanctions under § 1927 are
allowed for actions that are both unreasonable and vexatious.
See Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th Cir.
1998). The district court’s account enjoys factual support and its
legal basis was not in error. Moreover, it set forth detailed
reasons for each of the sanctions and awarded amounts based on an
itemized motion filed by Plano. That it rejected sanctioning
Gabriel’s attorneys for most of the complained-of conduct indicates
that it sanctioned them only when § 1927 sanctions were required.
Gabriel’s attorneys raise no specific challenge to the award
for the preparation of the City’s motion, and we find no error in
it.
AFFIRMED AS TO BOTH APPEALS.
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