United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1134
MEDRAD, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MRI DEVICES CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
W. Thomas McGough, Jr., Reed Smith LLP, of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, argued
for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief were Frederick H. Colen; Kirsten R.
Rydstrom; and Robert D. Kucler. Of counsel on the brief was Gregory L. Bradley,
Medrad, Inc., of Indianola, Pennsylvania.
James F. Hurst, Winston & Strawn LLP, of Chicago, Illinois, argued for
defendant-appellee. With him on the brief were Derek J. Sarafa and Brian R. Pollack.
Appealed from: United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Judge Terrence F. McVerry
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
04-1134
MEDRAD, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MRI DEVICES CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
DECIDED: March 16, 2005
___________________________
Before RADER, Circuit Judge, FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRYSON, Circuit
Judge.
BRYSON, Circuit Judge.
Medrad, Inc., brought this action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, CA No. 02-2044, alleging that MRI Devices Corp.
(“MRIDC”) was infringing Medrad’s patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,396,273 (“the ’273
patent”). The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that MRIDC’s motion
for partial summary judgment of invalidity be granted and that Medrad’s motion for a
preliminary injunction be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation. We affirm.
I
This case arises from a dispute over devices known as radio frequency coils (“RF
coils”), which are used in magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”). MRI uses nuclear
magnetic resonance to create detailed images of a patient’s internal anatomy. See
generally David D. Stark & William G. Bradley, Jr., 1 Magnetic Resonance Imaging 1-14
(3d ed. 1999). In the MRI process, a portion of the patient’s body is placed in an
extremely strong magnetic field. The magnetic field causes the nuclei within the atoms
of the body to partially align with the magnetic field in equilibrium. The partial alignment
of the nuclei creates a net magnetization within the body in the direction of the magnetic
field. A second, time-varying, magnetic field is then created in an orthogonal direction
by applying electrical current in pulses to RF coils that surround the body. The second
magnetic field drags the net magnetization of the body away from the direction of the
main magnetic field. According to the laws of quantum mechanics, the affected nuclei,
and thus the net magnetization, will precess around the direction of the main magnetic
field at a rate known as the Larmor frequency, before dephasing and eventually
realigning with the main magnetic field. E. Mark Haacke, Magnetic Resonance Imaging:
Physical Principles and Sequence Design 5-8 (1999). The precession induces a current
in the RF coils, which can be measured. That signal can then be used to reconstruct an
image of the internal tissues of the portion of the patient’s body that was under study.
It was well known in the prior art that the current in the RF coils could be
detected at a much higher signal-to-noise ratio if many small overlapping RF coils were
used in a “phased array” to receive the signal from the precessing nuclei. It was
advantageous for the same coils to be used both to create the time-varying magnetic
04-1134 2
field (“transmission”) and to receive the resulting signal from the precessing nuclei
(“reception”). The problem, however, was that identical pulses of current could not be
passed through the overlapping coils during transmission, because that would result in
the magnetic field in the overlap region being roughly twice as large as in the areas of
the coil outside of the overlap. According to the inventor, George J. Misic, that is the
problem the ’273 patent was meant to solve.
II
Claim 1 of the ’273 patent is representative of the six claims that Medrad
asserted against MRIDC. It provides as follows:
A magnetic resonance imaging system for forming images of a region of
interest, comprising:
a first phased array coil formed of a plurality of electrically
conductive members and defining a first array volume;
a second phased array coil formed of a second plurality of
electrically conductive members and defining a second array volume, said
second phased array coil disposed at least partially within the first array
volume, said first and second array phased array coils cooperating to
define a coil subsystem; and
a coil interface subsystem operably coupled to the coil subsystem,
said coil interface subsystem, in a first selectable state, processing RF
power such that a substantially uniform first magnetic field is applied to the
region of interest, and, in a second selectable state, receiving a response
of the region of interest to the first magnetic field.
The district court granted summary judgment of invalidity of the six asserted
claims based on its construction of certain terms in those claims. The magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, on which the district court’s ruling was predicated,
found that Medrad’s invention was anticipated by a prior art publication and invention.
Interpreting the claim term “region of interest” to refer to the portion of the patient’s body
being scanned and the claim term “substantially uniform first magnetic field” to mean “a
sufficient uniformity to give a good image,” the magistrate judge concluded that all of the
04-1134 3
elements of the invention were found in the cited prior art. The magistrate judge
rejected Medrad’s argument on invalidity because he concluded that Medrad’s
proposed definitions of the pertinent claim terms were “not supported by the ordinary
use of the language or the language of the ’273 patent.” In addition to granting
summary judgment of invalidity, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary
injunction and dismissed the motion for summary judgment of noninfringement as moot.
For purposes of invalidity, the parties contest the court’s construction of the terms
“substantially uniform magnetic field” and “region of interest.” For purposes of
infringement and the preliminary injunction, the parties additionally contest the court’s
construction of the terms “selectable state” and “phased array coil.” We review the
district court’s construction of claims de novo. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
A
As Mr. Misic explained, the ’273 patent sought to address how to make the time-
varying magnetic field spatially uniform across the imaged area in an arrangement with
overlapping RF coils. A uniform magnetic field is a benefit to magnetic resonance
imaging because it “provides greater image uniformity.” ’273 patent, col. 2, ll. 38-39.
The patent solves that problem by pulsing the current to the overlapping coils with a
phase delay. Id., col. 5, ll. 56-57. When an appropriate delay is applied to the pulses,
the magnetic field from one coil partially constructively interferes and partially
deconstructively interferes with the magnetic field from the second coil in the overlap
region “to provide the most uniform transmit field possible.” Id., col. 6, ll. 6-7. The main
04-1134 4
dispute among the parties is how uniform the magnetic field has to be and over what
spatial extent, or region of interest.
1. The district court defined the claim term “region of interest” as “the portion of
the body that is being scanned.” Medrad insists that such a definition is inconsistent
with the purpose of the invention, which is to make it possible to take MRI images over
overlapping coils. See id., col. 5, ll. 49-52. In other words, as claim 1 states, the
invention concerns a phased array “for forming images of a region of interest” and a
phased array must include at least two coils. Thus, Medrad maintains it is impossible to
define “region of interest” in such a way that permits the region of interest to be located
within only one coil, as the district court’s definition implicitly does. Medrad therefore
urges us to construe the region of interest as the entire three-dimensional volume of the
coil array system or, at the very least, the portion of the patient’s anatomy lying within
both coils.
Medrad’s restrictive construction fails for a number of reasons. First, the claim
calls for “phased array coils”; it does not call for a phased array. The coils may act in
certain instances as a phased array, but that does not mean they must always act as a
phased array. Instead, they could act individually, allowing the region of interest to lie
only within one coil. By analogy, a car may have four-wheel drive, but that does not
mean that the car is incapable of delivering power to only two wheels.
Second, it is impossible to read both claim 1 and dependent claim 2 together
while maintaining Medrad’s definition. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122
F.3d 1440, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“We must not interpret an independent claim in a way
that is inconsistent with a claim which depends from it.”). Claim 1 states that in the “first
04-1134 5
selectable state” the coil interface subsystem “process[es] RF power such that a
substantially uniform first magnetic field is applied to the region of interest.” Claim 2
claims the imaging system of claim 1, but with the further limitation that the coil interface
subsystem is required to process and direct the RF power to “said first phased array coil
or said second phased array coil” in the first selectable state. In the invention of claim
2, the RF power thus goes to one coil or the other, but not both. The magnetic field is
created by one coil and is substantially uniform only within that coil. That means that
the region of interest may lie entirely within one coil and does not have to be the entire
three-dimensional volume of the coil subsystem, as Medrad maintains.
Third, the district court’s definition is consistent with Mr. Misic’s own description
of the claimed invention. At his deposition, he asserted that his invention applied to
situations in which only one of the two coils was transmitting. In fact, at trial he
suggested that doing so might have unique benefits in curing certain artifacts in MRI
imaging, since the “best way to do that, if you can transmit [only] over the area that
you’re trying to image, you won’t get anything to fold in from way outside of that.”
Fourth, the district court’s interpretation of the “region of interest” as referring to
the “portion of the body being scanned” finds substantial support within the patent. The
preamble of claim 1 states that the invention is “for forming images of a region of
interest.” In describing the process of forming such images, the specification states that
the invention “can be used for imaging a knee, a foot, an ankle, a wrist or a hand.” ’273
patent, col. 5, ll. 36-38. Those examples strongly point to the “region of interest” as
being the portion of the anatomy being imaged. Furthermore, the patent lists, as an
object of the invention, providing “a method that eliminates soft tissue artifacts . . .
04-1134 6
created by prior art methods for imaging various regions of interest.” Id., col. 2, ll. 31-
33. The reference to the problem created by having “soft tissue” in the region of interest
also suggests that the region of interest is a portion of the body being imaged. In
addition, the reference to “forming images of a region of interest” forecloses Medrad’s
proposed definition of the region of interest as referring to the geometry of the cells
alone, since an arbitrary position within the coils forms no image until a portion of the
body is placed within it.
Finally, the evidence before the court established that persons of ordinary skill in
the art would concur with the court’s definition. Medrad’s own expert agreed with the
definition that the region of interest is “whatever particular part the doctor is attempting
to image.” MRIDC’s expert concurred, stating that “the region of interest [ ] is the part of
the anatomy that they would be interested in viewing.”
2. The district court defined a “substantially uniform magnetic field” as a
magnetic field that is “substantially uniform to obtain useful MRI images.” Medrad
proposes that a substantially uniform magnetic field is a magnetic field “that has largely,
but not wholly, the same form throughout.” Although Medrad may have waived that
construction by arguing it to the district court only after the magistrate judge made his
recommendation, we do not have to decide the waiver issue because we agree with the
magistrate judge’s definition.
Medrad bases its construction of “substantially uniform” on this court’s
interpretation of the same term in Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, Inc., 264 F.3d 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Ecolab involved a patent for a solid detergent cast used in commercial
dishwashing machines. The disputed claim term described the cast as a “substantially
04-1134 7
uniform alkaline detergent for ware and hard surface washing.” The district court
construed “substantially uniform” in that case to mean “a level of continuity of the
elements from top-to-bottom throughout the case such that a homogenous cleaning
solution is formed over the life of the cast.” Id. at 1365. This court reversed. We noted
that the claim at issue was entirely structural and contained no functional limitations. In
particular, we explained, the claim contained “no claimed functional requirement as to
forming a homogeneous wash solution throughout the cast life,” other than for the
detergent “to contain components capable of ‘ware and hard surface washing.’” Id. at
1366. In that setting, we held that there was “no basis on which to require adding a
functional limitation” under the guise of construing the term “substantially uniform.” A
more appropriate definition, we held, would be “largely, but not wholly the same in
form.” Id. at 1369.
A particular term used in one patent need not have the same meaning when
used in an entirely separate patent, particularly one involving different technology. In
fact, there are many situations in which the interpretations will necessarily diverge. A
patentee may define a particular term in a particular way, and in that event the term will
be defined in that fashion for purposes of that particular patent, no matter what its
meaning in other contexts. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
904 F.2d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Moreover, claim terms are typically given their
ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art, and the generally understood meaning of particular terms may vary from
art to art. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir.
04-1134 8
2001). Even absent an express definition of a term in the specification or prosecution
history, or a clearly established understanding of the meaning of the term in the art, the
manner in which the term is used in the patent may dictate a definition that differs from
the definition that would be given to the same term in a different patent with a different
specification or prosecution history. See Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods.,
Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The specification that is relevant to claim
construction is the specification of the patent in which the claims reside.”).
That is the situation in the present case. The use of a term in a patent on a
detergent is of little pertinence to the use of a similar term in a patent on MRI RF coils.
Rather, absent some particular reason to do otherwise, the claim terms must be
interpreted as would one of ordinary skill in the art of MRI technology and in light of the
particular patent in suit.
Apart from arguing that the Ecolab court’s definition of “substantially uniform”
should be applied in this case, Medrad invokes the Ecolab case in support of the broad
proposition that it is never proper for a court, when construing claim terms, to consider
how a claimed device functions. That is an overreading of Ecolab, however. The
Ecolab court found no reason to import the requirement that the substantially uniform
cast create a homogeneous cleaning solution over the life of the cast. Ecolab, 264 F.3d
at 1369. In so doing, the court set forth and applied the unremarkable proposition that
where a function “is not recited in the claim itself by the patentee, we do not import such
a limitation.” Ecolab, 264 F.3d at 1367. Medrad has taken the quoted language from
Ecolab and extended it to reach a nonsensical result. Medrad argues that a court may
not look to how an invention functions in determining the meaning of claim terms. Yet
04-1134 9
nothing in Ecolab or any other precedent of this court supports such a proposition,
which is as unsound as it is sweeping. As we stated in Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998), “ultimately, the interpretation
to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of
what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.” It is
therefore entirely proper to consider the functions of an invention in seeking to
determine the meaning of particular claim language.
Medrad would have us look at the words of the claim with no context of what an
RF coil does and how it works. We have repeatedly rejected that approach. “We
cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a vacuum. Rather, we must look
at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and the prosecution
history.” DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, 239 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also
K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The record in the instant case makes it clear that the district court’s construction
was correct. Unfortunately, the claim itself provides little guidance. The term
“substantially uniform first magnetic field” is ambiguous in that it fails to suggest how
much a magnetic field may deviate from absolute uniformity before it is no longer
uniform. That question is especially significant because Medrad’s own expert admits
that “magnetic field strength varies routinely in all RF coil systems.” Medrad implicitly
acknowledged the difficulty created by the use of the term “substantially uniform,” and it
contended before the magistrate judge that a substantially uniform magnetic field is one
that is similar to the magnetic field produced by a “single birdcage coil.” There is,
however, no support anywhere in the record for that construction. Medrad apparently
04-1134 10
employed that construction because a birdcage coil is the “gold standard” for coils that
generate uniform magnetic fields. But the patent itself rebuts Medrad’s suggestion that
a substantially uniform magnetic field is comparable to that produced by a birdcage coil.
The specification states that RF coils may be “crossed saddle quadrature coils or
Helmholtz pairs.” ’273 patent, col. 6, ll. 15-17. Yet Medrad’s own expert admitted that
crossed saddle quadrature coils or Helmholtz pairs cannot produce magnetic fields as
uniform as a birdcage coil, so by its terms the patent encompasses coils that are not as
uniform as birdcage coils. A “claim construction that does not encompass a disclosed
embodiment is . . . rarely, if ever, correct.” John Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 152 F.3d
1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Thus, the construction that Medrad proposed to the
magistrate judge fails as well.
The only guidance for the definition of “substantially uniform” in the claim
language comes from the preamble, which claims an “imaging system for forming
images of a region of interest.” Both parties’ experts agreed that it is important to
remove inhomogeneities in the magnetic field generated by the RF coils, or the resulting
MRI images will be permanently distorted. As Mr. Misic explained, if the coils do not
uniformly transmit, the contrast in the images suffers: “it makes things look different”
and “you can’t re-correct that after the fact.” The problem of image distortion puts an
upper bound on the degree of nonuniformity allowable in the magnetic field, which is
part of an “imaging system for forming images of a region of interest.” That
interpretation is further supported by the specification, which gives as an object of the
invention “to provide greater image uniformity than provided in the prior art.” ’273
patent, col. 2, ll. 38-39.
04-1134 11
Additionally, that interpretation aligns with the conventional understanding of the
term in the MRI industry. MRIDC’s expert, Dr. Peter Roemer, explained that a
substantially uniform magnetic field “means a sufficient uniformity to give a good
image.” Dr. Roemer also was able to give a quantitative estimate for the amount of field
variation allowable that would “produce good images over a wide range of imaging
sequences,” putting that variation at around 200 percent. Medrad’s expert refused to
give quantitative estimates for the amount of field variation allowable. Rather, in
defining substantial uniformity, Medrad’s expert, Ken Belt, could only refer to the field
produced by a birdcage coil. As we stated above, the patent claims are not limited to
the uniformity of field produced by a birdcage coil. Still, Mr. Belt’s testimony is implicitly
consistent with Dr. Roemer’s definition. Specifically, Mr. Belt was giving the example of
an RF coil capable of producing a good image. Therefore, we hold that the claim
language, the specification, and the expert testimony all illustrate that a “substantially
uniform magnetic field” is a field that is sufficiently uniform to obtain useful MRI images.
B
Medrad also disputes the meanings of the terms “first selectable state” and “first
phased array coil,” but only for purposes of infringement. We do not need to construe
those two claim terms because we agree with the district court’s construction of the
terms “region of interest” and “substantially uniform” and we agree, based on the district
court’s construction of those terms, that Medrad’s asserted patent claims are invalid.
III
In his recommendation and report, the magistrate judge found that Medrad’s
invention was anticipated by an abstract and presentation that Dr. Arne Reykowski
04-1134 12
delivered before a meeting of the Society of Magnetic Resonance. In that presentation,
Dr. Reykowski described the construction of an MRI device that consisted of two
overlapping phased-array coils used to image a patient’s neck and head. The
magistrate judge also found that the coil itself qualified as prior art due to public use.
On appeal, Medrad asserts that the Reykowski references do not anticipate the
patent because Dr. Reykowski’s device does not produce a substantially uniform
magnetic field over the region of interest. In particular, Medrad contends that Dr.
Reykowski’s device does not generate a uniform magnetic field either in the coil that
mainly encompasses the patient’s neck or in the overlapping region of the two coils.
Medrad simply asserts that the neck coil cannot transmit a uniform magnetic field and
points to a spatial plot of the field strength produced by the neck coil. However, this is
no argument at all, as we cannot decipher whether the level of inhomogeneity shown in
the plot is small enough that a useful MRI image can be produced using Dr.
Reykowski’s device, especially over the region of interest, which in this case is the neck
and lower portion of the head of the patient. In fact, it appears that the coil produces a
substantially uniform field because Dr. Reykowski’s device actually allowed him to take
useful MRI images of the neck in practice.
In reply, Medrad makes two contentions. First, Medrad states that Dr. Reykowski
admitted that his neck coil cannot produce a uniform magnetic field. That, however, is a
mischaracterization of Dr. Reykowski’s testimony. He stated only that his neck coil
produced a less homogenous field than his head coil. He vigorously denied that the
neck coil produced a non-uniform field or that the field could not result in useful MRI
images of the neck.
04-1134 13
Second, Medrad claims that even if the neck coil produced a sufficiently uniform
field to obtain useful MRI images, the overlapping region of the two coils did not
produce a uniform magnetic field. In making that argument, Medrad is apparently
contending that the magnetic field strength generated by Dr. Reykowski’s device jumps
when going from the region of one coil to the region of overlapping coils. As explained
above, Mr. Misic claimed that he was the first to adjust the current to two overlapping
RF coils to produce a uniform magnetic field when going from one coil to the overlap
region. Mr. Misic explained that he was able to achieve that objective by inserting a
phase shift between the current pulses going to the two overlapping coils. By placing
the correct phase between the currents, the magnetic fields of each coil would partially
add and partially deconstructively interfere in the overlap region so that there would be
very little inhomogeneity when going from one coil to the overlap region. See ’273
patent, col. 6, ll. 2-7.
Medrad appears to contend that the phase shift step is not present in Dr.
Reykowski’s device and that the overlapping region of the coils therefore cannot
produce a field that is uniform with the rest of the coils. In fact, there is ample evidence
that Dr. Reykowski phase-shifted the current pulses in his device. First, Dr.
Reykowski’s publication clearly shows an electronic phase-shifter for putting in a phase
shift between the current pulses going to the two coils. Additionally, it states that “the
power splitter has to compensate for the eventual phase shifts between the output RF
transmit signals [i.e. current pulses] causing partial cancellation between the transmitted
signal in the overlap region between the coils.” Medrad asserts that the quoted
statement means that Dr. Reykowski used the phase-shifter to align the phases of the
04-1134 14
current pulses to maximize the magnetic field in the overlap region, making the
magnetic field in the overlap roughly twice as large as the field not in the overlap, and
thus creating a non-uniform field. However, there is no support for that characterization
of the quoted statement. First, Medrad does not provide any explanation for why Dr.
Reykowski would intentionally set the phase to create the most non-uniform field
possible when he was trying to create a uniform image. Second, the description of the
phase-shifter lies in the portion of the publication describing how to create a
“homogeneous distribution of RF power” in order to create a homogenous magnetic
field. It is inconceivable that in the section of the publication in which Dr. Reykowski
describes how to make a uniform magnetic field, he would suggest that the phase-
shifter be set to create the most inhomogeneous field possible. Finally, Dr. Reykowski
testified that the point of the phase-shifter was to ensure “the right phase of the signal at
the input to the coil.” In sum, Medrad has failed to offer any proof that Dr. Reykowski’s
device does not create a substantially uniform magnetic field over the region of
interest.1
In a final effort to avoid invalidity, Medrad offered evidence to the district court
that the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) had issued a Notice of Allowance on a
patent application similar to the ’273 patent after the district court granted summary
judgment in this case. In view of that new evidence, Medrad made a motion to alter the
judgment and a motion for relief from the judgment under Rules 59 and 60 of the
1
Medrad attempted to offer proof of its contention through the declaration of
Dr. Cecil Hayes. The district court refused to consider Dr. Hayes’s declaration due to
improprieties in the manner in which that evidence was presented. Medrad does not
appeal the district court’s ruling, so we will not consider Dr. Hayes’s declaration either.
04-1134 15
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied those motions, and Medrad
asserts the same argument on appeal.
We review denial of such motions under the law of the regional circuit. Univ. of
W. Va. v. Vanvoorhies, 342 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit applies
an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the denials of motions under Rules 59 and
60. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 2001); In
re Cendent Corp. PRIDES Litig., 234 F.3d 166, 170 (3d Cir. 2000). In this case, we
cannot conclude under any standard that the district court erred in refusing to alter the
judgment, much less that the court abused its discretion. The main problem with
Medrad’s argument is that it fails to explain why the PTO’s allowance of the new
application should have any bearing on the present case. Contrary to Medrad’s
contention, the district court’s grant of summary judgment did not depend at all on the
new application or any prior disallowance by the PTO of that application. Furthermore,
a court is not bound by the PTO’s actions and must make its own independent
determination of patent validity. Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau Co., 115 F.3d 956, 960
(Fed. Cir. 1997). That is especially true when the PTO is acting on an entirely different
patent or application than the one before the court. We therefore uphold the district
court’s denial of Medrad’s motions.
IV
Finally, Medrad argues that the district court should have issued a preliminary
injunction against MRIDC for patent infringement. Because we have sustained the
judgment that Medrad’s asserted claims are invalid, that issue is moot.
AFFIRMED.
04-1134 16