IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-11297
Summary Calendar
KEITH ANDRE WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RICHARD DILL; GENNIFER FRISH,
also known as, Gennifer Frisk,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 2:97-CV-281
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June 14, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:*
Keith Wilson (Texas prisoner #755744) appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. In connection with his appeal, Wilson has filed a
motion to amend his original complaint and a motion for a jury
trial. Wilson’s motions are DENIED.
The district court dismissed Wilson’s claims as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). On appeal, Wilson does not
brief all of the claims that he raised below. Accordingly, we
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-11297
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address only the claims briefed by Wilson as he has abandoned the
rest. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1993).
Wilson first contends that he was denied indigent writing
supplies while in solitary confinement in retaliation for a
prison grievance he had filed. Although Wilson submitted written
documentation indicating that he was denied indigent writing
supplies, that evidence does not indicate that he was denied
supplies in retaliation for the filing of a prison grievance.
Rather, it indicates that he was denied writing supplies because
he was not, in fact, indigent at the time and was not on
commissary restriction. Accordingly, his retaliation claim lacks
both legal and factual support. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1999).
Wilson next contends that his due-process rights were
violated because he was placed in institutional lockdown without
being charged with a violation of a disciplinary rule and without
a hearing. He maintains that his placement in institutional
lockdown was the result of retaliation and racial discrimination.
Wilson, however, acknowledged in the district court that he was a
medium-custody inmate at the time and that all medium-custody
inmates were placed in the lockdown. Accordingly, he has not
shown that his placement in institutional lockdown was the result
of a retaliatory or discriminatory motive. See Jones, 188 F.3d
at 324-25; Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 1995).
Moreover, as the district court concluded, Wilson has not shown
that his due-process rights were violated because his placement
No. 99-11297
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in institutional lockdown, without more, did not implicate a
constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Luken v.
Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995).
Wilson also argues that the defendants failed to return a
prison grievance pertaining to his placement in institutional
lockdown. He maintains that the defendants acted in retaliation
for his initial filing of the grievance and effectively
obstructed his First Amendment right to seek redress through the
prison grievance system. Wilson, however, fails to identify any
particular defendant responsible for the unreturned grievance.
See Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights
cause of action”). His allegations fail to state a valid
retaliation claim because they are wholly conclusional and
indicate nothing more than a personal belief that he was the
victim of retaliation. See Jones, 188 F.3d at 324-25.
Finally, Wilson maintains for the first time on appeal that
the defendants retaliated against him by interfering with the
routing of a letter he mailed to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and by placing counterfeit United States Postal
Service notations on the letter. Wilson, however, did not
present the instant allegation as a federal claim in the district
court. Accordingly, he cannot raise it for the first time on
appeal. See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 338-39 (5th Cir.
1999).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Wilson’s complaint as frivolous. See Siglar v.
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Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997). Wilson’s appeal is
likewise frivolous and is therefore DISMISSED. See Howard v.
King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. The
dismissal of Wilson’s complaint as frivolous and the dismissal of
this appeal as frivolous each count as a strike for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 385-
87 (5th Cir. 1996). We caution Wilson that once he accumulates
three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil
action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in
any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious
physical injury. See § 1915(g).
MOTIONS DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED; § 1915(g) WARNING ISSUED.