In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 10-2094
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
W ILLIE M C B RIDE, a/k/a W ILLIAM R EO D AVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.
No. 1:09-CR-21-TLS—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 10, 2010—D ECIDED M ARCH 14, 2011
Before C UDAHY, M ANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
S YKES, Circuit Judge. Following a routine traffic stop,
a consent search of Willie McBride’s car turned up
crack cocaine, marijuana, and a loaded handgun. An
indictment followed, and McBride was charged with
possession of controlled substances with intent to dis-
tribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm
during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime,
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). McBride moved to suppress the evi-
2 No. 10-2094
dence recovered from his car on the ground that the
officer who performed the search obtained his consent
only after unreasonably prolonging the traffic stop. The
district court conducted an evidentiary hearing and
denied the motion. McBride then pleaded guilty to both
counts, reserving the right to challenge the suppres-
sion ruling on appeal, and the court sentenced him
to consecutive 60-month terms. The only question pre-
sented by this appeal is whether the police officer
violated McBride’s rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment—thus vitiating his consent to search—by detaining
him beyond the time needed to complete the traffic stop.
We conclude that he did not and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
At the hearing on McBride’s suppression motion,
Officer James Gasvoda of the Allen County Sheriff’s
Department recounted the details of the traffic stop that
led to McBride’s arrest. Gasvoda testified that on Feb-
ruary 2, 2009, he stopped McBride and a passenger
heading westbound out of Fort Wayne, Indiana. McBride
was missing the rear license plate on his Chevrolet
Monte Carlo and was speeding and changing lanes with-
out signaling. Gasvoda initiated a traffic stop, a re-
cording of which was taped by a squad-car camera
and admitted into evidence.
Some 25 minutes elapsed from the time McBride was
stopped until he consented to the vehicle search. The
stop began routinely enough; Gasvoda approached and
No. 10-2094 3
asked McBride for his license, registration, and proof
of insurance. He also asked McBride’s passenger for
identification. McBride provided an Illinois identifica-
tion card and proof of insurance but no license, while
his passenger had nothing in the way of identification.
Gasvoda noticed that both McBride and his passenger
were avoiding eye contact and appeared nervous, their
hands shaking and “carotid arteries . . . pulsing.”
Approximately four minutes into the stop, Gasvoda
asked McBride to step out of the Monte Carlo and stand
in front of the squad car. Gasvoda testified that this was
a routine safety measure. When McBride got out,
Gasvoda obtained his permission to conduct a pat-down
search, which turned up nothing, though Gasvoda
testified that McBride remained “overly nervous” through-
out. Gasvoda explained the reasons for the stop and
asked McBride basic questions about his driving status.
McBride admitted that he was driving on an expired
license. Gasvoda then asked several questions about
McBride’s and his passenger’s travel plans: Where were
they coming from and how long had they been there,
where were they going, and did they have any luggage?
McBride identified his passenger as his cousin and said
they were returning to Chicago from Fort Wayne, where
for the past three weeks they had been visiting relatives.
He also said he had a bag of laundry in the trunk. This
line of questioning lasted less than one minute. During
the exchange, a second officer arrived with a dog to
conduct a canine sniff of the vehicle, which was negative.
While McBride waited near the squad car, Gasvoda
returned to the Monte Carlo and spoke with the passenger.
4 No. 10-2094
After explaining why he had stopped the car, Gasvoda
asked the passenger similar questions about the trip. The
passenger said they had visited his sister in Fort Wayne
for two days but brought no luggage. This exchange
lasted over a minute. Before returning to the squad car
to run the vehicle information, Gasvoda briefly fol-
lowed up with McBride about the trip to Fort Wayne. This
time McBride said they had stayed for two weeks and
were visiting his cousin’s mother. Before returning to
his squad car, Gasvoda offered to retrieve McBride’s
coat from the Monte Carlo. McBride, who had been
standing in the cold since the stop began, accepted this
offer. Another minute or so passed while Gasvoda
fetched the coat, and with McBride’s consent, searched
the pockets. Gasvoda then spent the next ten minutes in
his squad car calling in the license and vehicle informa-
tion and writing a ticket. When he finished, he handed
McBride a speeding ticket and explained his payment
responsibilities.
It was then that the traffic stop took an unexpected
turn. Gasvoda asked McBride whether he had “any
dead bodies or anything” in his car. McBride, laughing,
replied, “No, would you like to search?” Gasvoda said
that he would, and again asked, this time more di-
rectly, for consent to search. McBride consented, and
the search turned up the gun and a drink can con-
taining crack cocaine and marijuana.
The district court concluded that the seizure did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The court found that
No. 10-2094 5
Gasvoda had spent the better part of the stop controlling
the scene and gathering information about the Monte
Carlo, McBride, and his passenger. The few additional
questions, the court observed, were negligible when
considered in relation to the entire stop and thus did not
unreasonably extend the duration of the detention.
II. Discussion
The argument McBride makes on appeal is basic
enough: He contends that Gasvoda detained him be-
yond the time necessary to issue a traffic citation. He
does not dispute that Gasvoda had probable cause to
stop his car, or that he voluntarily consented to both
the pat-down search and the vehicle search that ulti-
mately led to his arrest. Rather, he argues that by the
time he consented to the vehicle search, the stop
had already been unreasonably drawn out with inves-
tigatory questions unrelated to the purpose of the
traffic violations.
A detention following a traffic stop, like any seizure,
must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of
reasonableness. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005);
United States v. Taylor, 596 F.3d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2010).
In United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 952-53 (7th Cir.
2002) (en banc), we distinguished stops based on prob-
able cause from those based on reasonable suspicion,
holding that the former are fundamentally different
and not subject to the scope and duration limitations
of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). This important
distinction is implicated here. Because a stop based on
6 No. 10-2094
probable cause will also justify a custodial arrest, a
driver detained during such a stop has no right to ex-
peditious release. As we explained in Childs, “arrested
persons (unlike those stopped at checkpoints, or on
reasonable suspicion) need not be released as quickly
as possible.” 277 F.3d at 952; see also Ray v. City of Chicago,
629 F.3d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Moore,
375 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004). Further questioning
is permitted and will not render the stop unreasonable
so long as the officer asks “[q]uestions that hold
potential for detecting crime, yet create little or no in-
convenience.” Childs, 277 F.3d at 954.
Our decision in Childs forecloses a challenge to the
reasonableness of this traffic stop. Gasvoda had
a grace period following the completion of the stop
during which he could ask investigatory questions pro-
vided they did not cause “inconvenience.” Id. The addi-
tional questioning here did not amount to an inconve-
nience, adding only minutes to the stop. Id. Moreover,
Gasvoda had reasonable grounds, independent of the
traffic violations, to believe that his questions held the
potential for detecting crime. See Estrada v. Rhode Island,
594 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2010) (recognizing that infor-
mation gathered during traffic stop may provide rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal conduct that will justify
extending the stop); United States v. Figueroa-Espana,
511 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia,
376 F.3d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 2004).
One of the first things Gasvoda noticed when he ap-
proached the Monte Carlo was that its occupants were
No. 10-2094 7
visibly nervous. And while the appearance of anxiety
may not by itself form an objective basis for suspecting
criminal activity, see United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d
654, 655 (7th Cir. 2005), Gasvoda soon discovered that
McBride and his passenger had conflicting stories about
their trip to Fort Wayne, and that McBride, when ques-
tioned a second time, could not keep even his own story
straight. Taken in combination, these developments
gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,
and Gasvoda was justified in briefly extending the stop
to investigate the suspicion. See Figueroa-Espana, 511
F.3d at 703 (extended stop justified by driver’s nervous
demeanor and conflicting statements); United States v.
Martin, 422 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2005) (driver aroused
reasonable suspicion with inconsistent statements to
officer); United States v. Muriel, 418 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir.
2005); see also Childs, 277 F.3d at 954.
For completeness we note that McBride’s challenge
would fail under a traditional “scope and duration”
analysis. In their content and duration, Gasvoda’s ques-
tions are hard to distinguish from inquiries by officers
under similar circumstances that we have upheld as
reasonable. See Taylor, 596 F.3d at 376 (several unrelated
questions about drugs did not unreasonably prolong
traffic stop); Muriel, 418 F.3d at 725-26 (routine inquiry
about travel plans did not unreasonably prolong traffic
stop); Childs, 277 F.3d at 953 (“a minute or so” of extra
questioning was not enough to make traffic stop unrea-
sonable). Gasvoda spent most of the stop performing
routine police work—securing the scene, gathering in-
formation about the Monte Carlo and its occupants,
8 No. 10-2094
relaying information to dispatch, and writing a ticket.
The district court found that the additional questions
extended the stop by “roughly two minutes” at most.
This was not unreasonable and did not convert a
lawful stop into an unlawful one.
A FFIRMED.
3-14-11