United States v. Lua-Bermejo

FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 14 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 07-50435 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. CR-06-02515-TJW v. MEMORANDUM * SERGIO LUA-BERMEJO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted March 8, 2011 ** Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. Sergio Lua-Bermejo appeals from his conviction for attempted entry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Lua-Bermejo contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the indictment because the prior removal alleged in the indictment was the product of a fundamentally unfair deportation proceeding. First, Lua-Bermejo contends that his appeal waiver was invalid. The record reflects that his waiver was “considered and intelligent.” United States v. Estrada-Torres, 179 F.3d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Second, Lua-Bermejo contends that he was not adequately advised of possible eligibility for discretionary relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). There was no possibility that Lua-Bermejo was eligible for relief because he did not have the requisite seven years of unrelinquished domicile. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994); United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896-901 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Accordingly, the immigration judge did not have a duty to inform him of such relief. See Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d at 901. Finally, Lua-Bermejo contends that his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing and voluntary. This contention was not raised in the district court and 2 07-50435 we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 501 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010). AFFIRMED. 3 07-50435