United States v. Samlal

10-1153-cr United States v. Samlal UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 4 New York, on the 17th day of March, two thousand eleven. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 Chief Judge, 8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 9 PETER W. HALL, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 14 Appellee, 15 16 -v.- 10-1153-cr 17 18 GILDA SAMLAL, 19 Defendant-Appellant. 20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 21 22 FOR APPELLANT: Colleen P. Cassidy, Federal Defenders of 23 New York, Inc., Appeals Bureau, New York, 24 New York. 25 26 FOR APPELLEE: Karin Orenstein, Assistant United States 27 Attorney (Susan Corkery, Assistant United 28 States Attorney, on the brief), for 29 Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney 30 for the Eastern District of New York. 1 2 Appeal from judgment of conviction in the United States 3 District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, 4 J.). 5 6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 7 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 8 AFFIRMED. 9 10 Defendant-Appellant Gilda Samlal (“Samlal”) appeals 11 from a conviction for smuggling an alien into the United 12 States for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 13 § 1324. Samlal challenges her conviction on the ground that 14 the district court erred in admitting prior act evidence 15 pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) to establish knowledge. We 16 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, 17 the procedural history, and the issues presented for review. 18 19 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 20 United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009). 21 “To find such abuse, we must conclude that the trial judge’s 22 evidentiary rulings were arbitrary and irrational.” United 23 States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2006) 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). 25 26 “To determine whether a district court properly 27 admitted other act evidence, we consider whether ‘(1) the 28 prior acts evidence was offered for a proper purpose; (2) 29 the evidence was relevant to a disputed issue; (3) the 30 probative value of the prior act evidence substantially 31 outweighed the danger of its unfair prejudice; and (4) the 32 court administered an appropriate limiting instruction.’” 33 Mercado, 573 F.3d at 141 (quoting United States v. Brand, 34 467 F.3d 179, 196 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Huddleston v. 35 United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988) (setting forth 36 the four factors a district court should consider when 37 evaluating Rule 404(b) evidence). “In so doing, we take an 38 ‘inclusionary approach.’” Mercado, 573 F.3d at 141. 39 (quoting United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1307 (2d 40 Cir. 1992)). 41 42 The Huddleston factors were satisfied. The evidence 43 was offered for the proper purpose of establishing that 44 Samlal either knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that 45 the child she escorted was different from the person 2 1 identified in the passport that the alien used. Taken as a 2 whole, the following evidence was relevant to establishing 3 Samlal’s knowledge: (1) Samlal had escorted four different 4 people, who used recycled passports; (2) on two occasions 5 (December 2007 and August 2008) the same passport was used 6 for different people; (3) she received between $1,500 and 7 $2,000 to perform a service that airlines perform for $75- 8 $100; and (4) an agent of Customs and Border Patrol had 9 warned her in April 2008 about the consequences of escorting 10 illegal aliens. Finally, the district court gave several 11 limiting instructions, during the trial and in its final 12 charge, directing the jury to consider the evidence solely 13 for the purpose of Samlal’s state of mind. See Mercado, 573 14 F.3d at 141-42 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The evidence was also 15 accompanied by a careful and thorough instruction limiting 16 the evidence to relevant Rule 404 grounds. That instruction 17 was delivered on several occasions during testimony as well 18 as in clear jury instructions on the issue. In light of the 19 purpose and value of the evidence, and of the limiting 20 instructions, we find no abuse of discretion in deeming the 21 evidence admissible under Rule 404.”). 22 23 Accordingly, we find that the district court did not 24 abuse its discretion in admitting the prior act evidence and 25 thus affirm the judgment of conviction. 26 27 We have considered Samlal’s remaining arguments and 28 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, 29 the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. 30 31 32 FOR THE COURT: 33 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 34 3