NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3302
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SAMSON B. SLEWION,
Appellant
v.
MATTHEW P. VENEMA;
JEANNE M. PROKO;
GEORGE B. KEAHEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-10-cv-03276)
District Judge: Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 15, 2011
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed March 17, 2011 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
Samson B. Slewion filed a pro se complaint in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania alleging that he was assaulted in 2004 and seriously injured, that
he filed a personal injury action in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, and
that an arbitration panel entered an award in his favor. Slewion appealed the award, and
the Court of Common Pleas established a discovery deadline of April 6, 2009. The
lawyers representing the defendants in state court, Matthew P. Venema, Jeanne M. Proko,
and George B. Keahey, allegedly moved to compel discovery after expiration of the
deadline, and the trial court denied the motion. Slewion alleges that Venema, Proko, and
Keahey then “falsified a material fact by trick … by forging the discovery deadline of the
case management order from April 6, 2009, to May 7, 2009.” Compl. at 4. Slewion
claims that he “was precluded from testifying about liability and damages” as a result.
Id. Naming Venema, Proko, and Keahey as defendants in this federal suit, Slewion
sought compensatory damages for the injuries he allegedly suffered in the 2004 assault.
The District Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the
complaint as legally frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The court explained
that Slewion appears to seek relief because he is dissatisfied with the outcome of the state
court case, but that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to a review a state court
judgment by virtue of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Slewion timely filed this appeal.
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is plenary.
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
This Court recently affirmed the dismissal of a similar suit by Slewion in which he
named the Court of Common Pleas as the defendant, and our analysis of the jurisdictional
issue in that case applies equally here:
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To the extent that Slewion is challenging the judgment or
decisions of the Court of Common Pleas, the District Court
lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review,
directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Supreme Court
has explained that this doctrine is narrow and confined to
cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Thus, to the extent that Slewion sought to have the District
Court invalidate the orders of the Court of Common Pleas, it
lacked jurisdiction to do so.
Slewion v. Court of Common Pleas Phila. County, No. 10-3767, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS
25040, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Dec. 7, 2010) (per curiam) (not precedential).
Slewion contends on appeal that he filed this suit against Venema, Proko, and
Keahey based on “three distinct federal offenses” under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for allegedly
falsifying the state court’s case management order. Appellant’s Br. at 3-4. Slewion does
not, however, have a private cause of action against defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a
criminal statute. See Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007). Further,
as we explained in the prior suit, “[t]here is no federal right to require the government to
initiate criminal proceedings.” Slewion, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25040 at *3.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment dismissing
the complaint as legally frivolous.
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