BLD-131 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3989
___________
ANDREW FULLMAN,
Appellant
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL;
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE;
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISIONER (EEOC) AGENCY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-04910)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 3, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 17, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Andrew Fullman filed a complaint in forma pauperis, naming, as defendants, the
Postmaster General, the United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”), and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The District Court dismissed the
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), stating that Fullman had filed his complaint as
a means to seek review of the decisions in his five earlier cases against the United States
Postal Service. The District Court explained that the doctrine of res judicata precluded
the relitigation of Fullman’s claims. Fullman filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the District Court denied.
Fullman appealed. We summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment because
no substantial issue was presented on appeal. See L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Among other
things, we held that most of Fullman’s claims were barred by res judicata. We compared
his claims to those in his earlier lawsuits and concluded that any issues Fullman discussed
in his complaint were the issues he raised, or could have raised, previously regarding the
rejection of his workers’ compensation claim and his terminations from his employment.
See, eg., Fullman v. Potter, 480 F. Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Pa. 2007), affirmed 29 F. App’x
919 (3d Cir. 2007); Fullman v. Henderson, 146 F. Supp. 2d 688 (E.D. Pa. 2001), affirmed
29 F. App’x 100 (3d Cir. 2002). We also noted that Fullman was specifically requesting
review of his earlier lawsuits.
After our ruling and our denial of his subsequent request for rehearing, Fullman
returned to the District Court. He filed a motion entitled “Motion to Submit Newly
Discovered Evidence pursuant to Rule 60(b) and Request to File Proper Forum.”
Fullman asserted that he obtained a new medical summary from a spine specialist that
2
confirmed the earlier findings of another doctor relating to injuries he suffered in 1989.
He stated that his evidence completely undermined the defendants’ defense of the case.
He asked for relief and for leave to file in the proper forum.
The District Court dismissed Fullman’s motion as frivolous. Fullman filed a
notice of appeal, in which he challenged the District Court’s order and asserted that the
District Court was biased against him. We notified Fullman that his appeal was subject to
possible summary action.
Fullman responded by arguing that he presented new medical evidence in a Rule
60(b) motion that would show that he had not filed a false workers’ compensation claim
and that he should not have been terminated from employment with the United States
Postal Service. The Appellees responded by arguing that summary action is appropriate
in this case. Detailing Fullman’s long and unsuccessful litigation history related to the
rejection of his workers’ compensation claim and his terminations from his employment,
the Appellees also moved for an order prohibiting Fullman from bringing similar or
identical claims against them without leave of court. Fullman opposes the Appellees’
motion, arguing that he has not abused his access to the courts. Instead, he argues, he is
simply seeking justice based on new evidence about the basis of his injury. He attributes
his lack of success on his claims to misrepresentations by the Appellees.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order because no substantial issue is presented on appeal. See L.A.R.
3
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Despite the District Court’s earlier rejection of his claim, our rejection
of his appeal, and our denial of his petition for rehearing, Fullman again returned to the
District Court with another medical report (evidence that could have been discovered
previously) to litigate the same claims. As the District Court concluded, the motion was
without merit. The District Court did not err in dismissing it. We also note that
Fullman’s claim of bias is without foundation in the record.
Next, we consider the Appellees’ request for an injunction. It is within the broad
scope of the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, for a court to issue an order restricting the
filing of meritless matters by a litigant who continues with great frequency to raise
meritless claims identical or similar to those that already have been adjudicated. See In re
Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982). Fullman has raised the identical or similar
claims in several unsuccessful District Court lawsuits. See Fullman v. United States of
America, No. 07-1663, 2007 WL 2262906, *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2007) (warning Fullman
“to refrain from attempting to ‘reconfigure’ his gripes with the 1989 denial of workers’
compensation claims and/or his employment and subsequent termination from the Postal
Service”). He also continues to explicitly seek review of our earlier rulings. See
Fullman v. Potter, 385 F. App’x 263, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Additionally,
Fullman repeatedly asks the District Court to reevaluate previously decided cases based
on what he terms “new evidence” relating to what happened in 1989 or claims of alleged
fraud or judicial bias. In 2010 alone, after we affirmed the District Court’s orders,
4
Fullman filed eight such motions in the District Court. He has also involved the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission by naming it as a defendant and an appellee but
not actually making claims against it. See, e.g., Fullman, 385 F. App’x at 266.
We do not disagree with the Appellees that Fullman’s claims have been numerous
and without merit. For this reason, we grant their motion in part, pursuant to the All
Writs Act, which gives us authority to issue the injunction in support of our jurisdiction,
which is “exclusively appellate.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 65 (1914); see
also In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,103 F.2d 901, 903 (3d Cir. 1939).
Specifically, absent leave of this Court, Fullman is prohibited from further appellate court
litigation raising claims identical or similar to those that have already been adjudicated
against the United States Postal Service, the Postmaster General, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, federal officials or employees, or any federal agency related to
(a) the resolution of Fullman’s 1989 workers’ compensation claim in connection with an
alleged work related injury; and/or (b) Fullman’s termination on March 20, 1989, by the
Postal Service for filing a false workers’ compensation claim; and/or (c) subsequent
attempts by Fullman to obtain re-employment with the Postal Service. To the extent that
the Appellees wish for similar relief in the District Court, they may apply there.
5