UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4388
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES RAMAGE, a/k/a James Russell Ramage,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00061-IMK-JSK-1)
Submitted: February 10, 2011 Decided: March 17, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles T. Berry, Fairmont, West Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, Zelda E.
Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Ramage pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon after officers seized a gun from his home while
investigating a reported domestic disturbance. Prior to
Ramage’s guilty plea, the district court denied his motion to
suppress evidence obtained following a warrantless search of his
home, finding that, although the officer’s warrantless entry was
illegal, the primary taint of the illegal entry was purged when
Ramage’s wife consented to a search of the home. On appeal,
Ramage argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the entry was illegal, the initial
taint of the illegal entry was not purged, and Ramage expressly
refused to consent to the search. * Finding no reversible error,
we affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a suppression motion, we
review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Hernandez-
Mendez, 626 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 2010). The evidence is
reviewed in the light most favorable to the Government as the
prevailing party below. United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360,
375 (4th Cir. 2010).
*
Ramage’s guilty plea reserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
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The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches;
a search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable
unless it falls within a valid exception to the warrant
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219
(1973). “Until a valid search warrant has issued, the Amendment
safeguards the privacy interests of owners, boarders, and
tenants, of a home, apartment, or other dwelling place.” United
States v. Gray, 491 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
citations omitted). Warrantless searches “are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 275 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)). The
government bears the burden of demonstrating exigent
circumstances. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).
Here, it is undisputed that an officer entered
Ramage’s home without a warrant or exigent circumstances. The
Government contends, however, that the district court erred in
holding that the officer’s warrantless entry was illegal. We
need not decide this issue, however, as we conclude that, even
assuming illegal entry of the Ramage home, the evidence
recovered from the home was ultimately admissible.
Evidence that is the product of an unlawful search or
seizure is nevertheless admissible so long as the connection
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between the unlawful conduct of the police and the acquisition
of the evidence is sufficiently attenuated as to purge the
evidence of the primary taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487 (1963); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939). To determine whether the taint of an illegal entry
has been purged, this court evaluates three factors: (1) the
length of time between the illegal act and the seizure of
evidence; (2) whether there were intervening circumstances; and
(3) the gravity, flagrancy, and reason for the police
misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). As
the district court concluded, Ramage’s wife’s consensual
conversation with the officer constituted a sufficient
intervening circumstance. Further, the entry was not in
flagrant disregard of Ramage’s Fourth Amendment rights, as the
officer was investigating a domestic disturbance and prudently
attempting to prevent escalation of the incident upon his
departure. Accordingly, we hold that the taint of any illegal
entry was purged.
Finally, Ramage argues that the district court erred
when it found that the officer’s search did not violate
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), because he expressly
refused to consent to the officer’s entry. See 547 U.S. at 106
(holding that when multiple occupants share authority over an
area, the express refusal to consent to police entry of one co-
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occupant prevails over the consent to entry of another co-
occupant). In fact, the district court did not reach the
Randolph issue because it declined to credit Ramage’s testimony
that he forbade the officer from entering his home. We hold
that, in the face of contradictory testimony from multiple
police officers and inconsistent testimony from Ramage, it was
not clear error for the district court to find that Ramage did
not expressly refuse to consent to the officer’s entry. Thus,
the district court did not err in denying Ramage’s motion to
suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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