UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4447
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAVEL MYNER BEST, a/k/a VEL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00060-NCT-2)
Submitted: February 10, 2011 Decided: March 17, 2011
Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lavel Myner Best pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2006), and possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning (1) whether Best’s
plea was knowing and voluntary; (2) whether Best’s competency
should have been evaluated before sentencing; and (3) whether
Best’s sentence was reasonable, particularly given the district
court’s failure to impose a variant sentence to obviate the
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. Best was
informed of his right to file a supplemental brief, but he has
not done so. Finding no error, we affirm.
Although counsel questions the voluntariness of Best’s
plea, he cites to no specific omission by the district court.
Because Best did not move in the district court to withdraw his
guilty plea, any error in the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing is
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). The district court fully complied
with the dictates of Rule 11 in accepting Best’s plea, and the
record shows that Best’s plea was knowing and voluntary. Thus,
no error, plain or otherwise, taints his convictions.
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Next, counsel suggests that Best’s competency should
have been evaluated before the district court sentenced Best.
This court “review[s] the district court’s competence
determination for clear error.” United States v. Robinson, 404
F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005). A district court must determine
if the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding[]
and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362
U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted); see 18
U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2006). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
Best competent for sentencing. Thus, we conclude that Best’s
claim lacks merit.
Best’s arguments regarding his sentence lack merit as
well. Best’s presentence investigation report (“PSR”) properly
placed him in criminal history category VI. The PSR correctly
calculated a total offense level of twenty-seven, resulting in
an advisory range of 130-162 months’ imprisonment. The district
court afforded counsel an opportunity to argue regarding an
appropriate sentence, afforded Best an opportunity to allocute,
considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, and
sufficiently explained its rationale for rejecting Best’s
request for a downward variance and imposing Best’s sentence of
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160 months. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th
Cir. 2009) (recognizing that the district court must “place on
the record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Finally, Best has failed to rebut our presumption
that his within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable. See United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, we conclude that Best’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case, including those issues highlighted by counsel, and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform Best, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Best
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Best. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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