UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1670
LINDA R. TYREE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
and
JENNIFER D. MARSHALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
DEANNE M. SEEKINS; TONEY HILL; FRED WILLIAMS,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:09-cv-00663-JRS)
Submitted: March 1, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David R. Simonsen, Jr., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil
H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Jonathan H. Hambrick,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Linda R. Tyree filed an action against the
United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”),
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006), alleging malicious prosecution
on an obstruction of justice charge, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460
(2009). The Government moved for summary judgment and Tyree
moved for discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (now Rule
56(d)). The district court denied Tyree’s motion and granted
summary judgment in favor of the Government. Tyree noted a
timely appeal. We affirm.
On appeal, Tyree argues that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment for the United States, erroneously
concluding that “[b]ecause the video clearly shows the event in
question, no factual dispute exists.” Tyree maintains that
there are disputed questions as to whether, first, she committed
any act of obstruction, and second, whether she had any criminal
intent to obstruct.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Bergbauer,
602 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 297
(2010). Summary judgment may be granted only when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a).
Because Tyree brought this action under the FTCA, her
claims are governed by the law of Virginia, the state where the
alleged malicious prosecution occurred. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) (2006). In an action for malicious prosecution
under Virginia law, “the plaintiff has the burden of proving
four essential elements: that the prosecution was (1)
malicious, (2) instituted by or with the cooperation of the
defendant, (3) without probable cause, and (4) terminated in a
manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.” Reilly v. Shepherd,
643 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Va. 2007).
Virginia’s obstruction of justice statute provides:
If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs .
. . any law-enforcement officer . . . in the
performance of his duties or fails or refuses without
just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to
do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer . . . he
shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460(A) (2009). Obstruction of justice does
not require physical interference with the officer, “‘but there
must be acts clearly indicating an intention on the part of the
accused to prevent the officer from performing his duty.’”
Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (Va. App. 1998)
(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 74, 77 (Va. 1925)).
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Here, the facts known to the officer concerning
Tyree’s possible obstruction of justice are depicted in the
video recording. We conclude that these facts and circumstances
establish probable cause for obstruction of justice.
Next, Tyree argues that the officer who obtained the
warrant did not himself believe there was probable cause to
obtain a warrant. She argues that further discovery of facts
“including what [the officer] knew and understood when he
obtained the criminal warrant against Tyree,” would be relevant
to the question of whether probable cause existed. However, the
probable cause determination is an objective one, and the facts
relevant to that determination are depicted in the recording.
See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004). While
discovery into the officer’s subjective state of mind may have
relevance to the malice element of her malicious prosecution
claim, “a lack of probable cause may not be inferred from
malice.” Reilly, 643 S.E.2d at 219. The discovery Tyree
requested could not have salvaged her claim and we must
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying her motion for discovery. See Ingle ex
rel. Estate of Ingle, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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