UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1952
YONG FENG ZHU; LING WENG,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: February 10, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory Marotta, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle Mead, New
Jersey, for Petitioners. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General,
Jennifer L. Lightbody, Senior Litigation Counsel, Rosanne M.
Perry, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yong Feng Zhu and Ling Weng, natives and citizens of
the People’s Republic of China, petition for review an order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing their
appeal from the immigration judge’s order denying their
applications for asylum, withholding from removal and
withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person
unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds . . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). An individual who has been forced to submit
to an abortion or sterilization procedure is “deemed to have
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such
failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
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founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2010), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in his native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2010). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on a
protected ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th
Cir. 2004). The well-founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006). “The subjective component can be met through the
presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 176
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
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evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(2006). This court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence
. . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). When both the Board and the immigration
judge issue decisions in an immigration case, this court will
review both decisions. Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234, 239-40
(4th Cir. 2009).
An applicant’s credible testimony “may be sufficient
to sustain his burden of proof without corroboration.”
Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 601 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “However, even for credible
testimony, corroboration may be required when it is reasonable
to expect such proof and there is no reasonable explanation for
its absence.” Chen Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191-92
(4th Cir. 2007).
“Regardless of [China’s] policy generally prohibiting
the birth of additional children following the birth of a son,
to be eligible for [asylum] relief the respondent must also meet
her burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that
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Chinese Government officials would enforce the family planning
policy against her through means constituting persecution.”
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 211 (BIA 2010).
The applicant must show that there is a government policy
implicated by the births at issue, that the births in question
are a violation of that policy and there is a reasonable
possibility that government officials would enforce the policy
against the petitioner through means constituting persecution.
See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142-43 (2d Cir.
2008).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Board’s decision. There was no error with the Board’s citations
to Matter of H-L-H-, Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185 (BIA
2007) or Matter of T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 163 (BIA 2007). We
further conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s
finding that the Petitioners failed to show that economic
sanctions may rise to the level of persecution. In addition, we
conclude that the Board properly reviewed the evidence and did
not fail to give consideration to any favorable evidence cited
by the Petitioners in their administrative brief. See En Hui
Huang v. Attorney Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 388 (3d Cir. 2010) (“While
we are not suggesting that the [Board] must discuss every piece
of evidence mentioned by an asylum applicant, it may not ignore
evidence favorable to the alien, particularly when, as here, the
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alien’s administrative brief expressly calls the [Board’s]
attention to it.”); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d
Cir. 2006) (The court rejected the idea that the Board “must
expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument
or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.”). We also
conclude that the cases cited by the Petitioners for the
proposition that similar petitions have been granted by other
courts are clearly distinguishable.
Because we conclude that the evidence was not so
compelling as to lead to the conclusion that no reasonable
factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution,
we deny the petition for review. * We dispense with oral because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
*
The Petitioners do not challenge the denial of relief
under the CAT. Accordingly, review is waived. See Ngarurih v.
Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that
failure to raise a challenge in an opening brief results in
abandonment of that challenge); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
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