UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRIO TYRELL JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(8:09-cr-00446-HFF-1)
Submitted: February 18, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, A. Lance Crick, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrio Tyrell Jones pled guilty to possession of
crack, powder cocaine, MDMA (Ecstasy) and marijuana with intent
to distribute on June 20, 2007 (Count One); possession of crack,
powder cocaine, and MDMA with intent to distribute on
December 23, 2006 (Count Two); possession of crack with intent
to distribute on July 12, 2008 (Count Three); and possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute on March 16, 2009 (Count
Four). The district court sentenced him within the advisory
guideline range to a term of 104 months imprisonment. Jones
appeals his sentence, contending that the district court
committed significant procedural error by failing to explain
adequately why it rejected his argument for a lower sentence
based on the sentencing disparity produced by the then-current
crack/powder cocaine ratio. We affirm.
Jones argued at sentencing for a lower ratio based on
legislation then pending in Congress, * which he asserted had the
attorney general’s support. The court observed that it had
witnessed the bad effects of crack and that Jones had benefitted
from the 2007 amendments which lowered the guidelines for crack
offenses. The government noted that Jones’ charges all involved
*
The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which was enacted on
August 3, 2010, changed the ratio from 100:1 to 18:1. Pub. L.
No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372.
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significant amounts of narcotics, and that he had resisted
arrest and tried to flee in three of the four charged incidents.
The government argued that a sentence within the guideline range
would reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate
deterrence and protect the public from further crimes by Jones.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). The
district court explicitly adopted the government’s view of the
§ 3553(a) factors when it imposed a sentence within the
guideline range.
A sentence is reviewed for procedural and substantive
reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
We must first ensure that the district court did not commit any
“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly
calculate the applicable guidelines range, failing to consider
the 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately
explain the sentence. Id. The district court “must place on
the record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it [which] . . . provide[s] a rationale
tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks, footnote,
and citation omitted). This is true even when the district
court sentences a defendant within the applicable guidelines
range. Id. At the same time, a sentence imposed within a
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properly calculated guidelines range enjoys a presumption of
reasonableness on appeal. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216,
218 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
346-56 (2007) (upholding appellate presumption of reasonableness
for within-guidelines sentence). Thus, an extensive explanation
is not required as long as the appellate court is satisfied
“‘that [the district court] has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own
legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States v. Engle, 592
F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 165 (2010).
Although Jones did not object to the alleged
inadequacy of the district court’s ruling at sentencing, he
preserved the issue for appeal simply by requesting a below-
guideline sentence. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
577-78 (4th Cir. 2010). He maintains on appeal that the
district court “failed to consider or explain why it rejected
application of a lower crack/powder ratio” under § 3553(a).
After review of the record, we are satisfied that the court
adequately explained its rejection of Jones’ argument when it
adopted the government’s position that a sentence within the
guideline range best served the § 3553(a) factors in light of
his repeated drug trafficking conduct, his resistance to law
enforcement authorities, and his history of flight when
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arrested. We conclude that the court rendered a sufficiently
individualized assessment to permit appellate review of the
sentence. To the extent that Jones contests the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence, we exercise our discretion to
“apply a presumption of reasonableness” to his within-guideline
sentence. United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 268 (4th Cir.)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 507 (2010).
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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