UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4570
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
QUENTIN ROBERT BRASWELL, a/k/a Q,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (5:09-cr-00206-FL-1)
Submitted: February 25, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Steven A. Feldman, FELDMAN and FELDMAN, Uniondale, New York, for
Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Quentin Robert Braswell pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to distribution of five grams or more of
cocaine base (“crack”), and aiding and abetting, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), and
possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). The
district court sentenced Braswell to a total of 322 months of
imprisonment, and Braswell now appeals.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning the validity of Braswell’s guilty
plea and the reasonableness of his sentence. Counsel concedes,
however, that Braswell’s plea agreement included a waiver-of-
appellate rights provision with respect to his sentence.
Despite being informed of his right to do so, Braswell has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief.
The Government has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal of Braswell’s sentence based on the appellate waiver in
the plea agreement, which Braswell does not oppose. For the
reasons that follow, we grant the Government’s motion and
dismiss the appeal of Braswell’s sentence. We affirm his
conviction.
2
Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
his appellate rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United
States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court
reviews the validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue on appeal is
within the scope of the waiver. United States v. Blick, 408
F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly
and intelligently agreed to the waiver. Id. at 169. To
determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, this
court examines “the totality of the circumstances, including the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that
Braswell knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea
agreement and waived his right to appeal his sentence.
Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss the appeal of Braswell’s sentence. Although Braswell’s
plea waiver does not preclude a direct appeal of his conviction,
we have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Braswell’s conviction.
3
We deny counsel’s motion to withdraw from
representation. This court requires that counsel inform
Braswell, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Braswell requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Braswell. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
4