UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4630
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SALVADOR SANTANA CABRERA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:09-cr-00122-WO-1)
Submitted: March 4, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Sandra Jane Hairston, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Salvador Santana Cabrera * pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
plea agreement, to one count of possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance
containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and one count of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The district
court imposed an eighty-seven month term of imprisonment for the
drug charge followed by a statutorily-mandated consecutive sixty
month term of imprisonment on the firearm charge.
On appeal, Santana’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states
that he finds no meritorious issues for appeal. Santana’s
counsel does call two issues to our attention: whether the
district court erred by not fully questioning Santana regarding
the five year mandatory minimum sentence for the drug charge at
the plea hearing and whether the sentence imposed was
substantively unreasonable because Santana was not granted a
below-Guidelines sentence on the basis of his work history and
*
Although indicted under the name “Salvador Santana
Cabrera,” the record indicates that the defendant is known by
the surname of “Santana” and we will therefore refer to him as
such.
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prior good character. Although advised of his right to do so,
Santana did not file a pro se supplemental brief, nor did the
Government respond to the Anders brief.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Santana is not entitled to relief. Because Santana did not move
in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, the Rule 11
hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th Cir. 2002). “To establish plain
error, [Santana] must show that an error occurred, that the
error was plain, and that the error affected his substantial
rights.” United States v. Muhammad, 478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir.
2007). Even if Santana satisfies these requirements,
“correction of the error remains within [the Court’s]
discretion, which [the Court] should not exercise . . . unless
the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
While the district court did not question Santana as
to whether he understood the significance of the five year
mandatory minimum sentence, the court did inform him of the
existence of the mandatory minimum. Furthermore, the mandatory
minimum was stated in the plea agreement and Santana testified
at the Rule 11 hearing that he fully understood the plea
agreement. Even if we were to find that the district court
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erred in failing to specifically ask Santana whether he
understood the significance of the mandatory minimum sentence,
we could not find that this error affected his substantial
rights. This alleged error therefore provides no valid grounds
for relief.
To the extent that Santana challenges the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence, we review a district court’s
imposition of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We
presume that a sentence within a properly-calculated guideline
range is reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193
(4th Cir. 2007). Santana points to several factors in his
personal history that may have lent support to a below-
Guidelines sentence in his case. But none of the considerations
Santana brings to our attention demonstrate that his bottom-of-
the-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006). The
district court provided a sound explanation for rejecting
Santana’s request for a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment at
sentencing. The record does not support a finding that the
district court’s sentence was unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Santana’s conviction and sentence. This
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court requires that counsel inform Santana, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Santana requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Santana.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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