FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 18 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN L. CORRIGAN, Nos. 09-35482, 09-35730
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00333-EFS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
FRED C. PFLANZ; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 8, 2011 **
Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, John L. Corrigan appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging that defendants abused
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in two prior actions. We review de novo.
Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
basis supported by the record, Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.
2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Corrigan’s claim concerning
defendants’ failure to satisfy Rule 11’s safe harbor provision in his 2003 action.
See Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The appropriate
remedy for . . . failure to satisfy safe harbor is a denial of [the] request for Rule 11
sanctions . . . .”). Further, Corrigan’s claims alleging Rule 11 abuses were barred
under the doctrine of res judicata because he could have raised them in prior
actions. See Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Res
judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised or
could have been raised in a prior action.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a pre-filing order
against Corrigan because he was provided with notice and an opportunity to
respond, and the district court created an adequate record of Corrigan’s prior
actions, found the actions to be frivolous and harassing, and narrowly tailored its
order to address Corrigan’s particular abuses. See Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty
Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1056-61 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (setting forth standard
of review).
2 09-35482
The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants Hille’s
and Scudder’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions because Corrigan’s filing of
successive complaints based on previously-rejected propositions of law constituted
harassment. See Buster v. Greisen, 104 F.3d 1186, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 1997)
(setting forth standard of review and upholding Rule 11 sanctions); United Energy
Owners Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Energy Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 837 F.2d 356, 358 (9th Cir.
1988) (district court retained jurisdiction to impose sanctions while plaintiffs’
appeal from judgment of dismissal was pending).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam).
Corrigan’s remaining contentions, including those of judicial bias, are
unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
3 09-35482