UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-31201
Summary Calendar
AMY L. DILLARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALBERTSON’S, INC., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Lower Court Number 98-CV-1644
July 7, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant, Amy Dillard, filed a complaint against her
former employer, Albertson’s, Inc., and its insurer, alleging
wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and defamation under Louisiana law.1 The case was removed to
federal court. After denying Dillard’s procedural attempts to add
nondiverse defendants and to remand to state court, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of Albertson’s. Finding no
error in the disposition of Dillard’s procedural motions, we
affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except for the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
Dillard also asserted due process and equal protection claims, which
she voluntarily dismissed.
Dillard first asserts that the court erred in requiring
her to seek leave to amend her complaint to add defendant Robert
Pierce, when, pursuant to Rule 15(a), no leave is required if the
amendment precedes the defendant’s answer on the merits. That
argument would be persuasive except that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)
specifically confers on the district court the responsibility to
scrutinize attempted joinder of non-diverse parties in cases
previously removed to federal court. The magistrate judge
correctly required a motion, applied the correct legal standards
and concluded that granting the motion would be improper on the
facts before him. The district court endorsed his reasoning.
Appellant has shown no factual error or ground for abuse of
discretion in the denial of her proffered amendment.
Likewise, the trial courts’ refusal of Dillard’s second
motion to amend and add Ms. Authur as a nondiverse defendant a year
after the litigation commenced was, not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Dillard’s Motion for Extension of Time to Oppose
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 56 does not require
that discovery be closed before a motion for summary judgment can
be heard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Moreover, Dillard’s bare
contention that she needed to take more depositions, without
detailing how such deposition testimony would raise a genuine issue
of material fact, was insufficient to satisfy Rule 56(f)’s standard
for granting a continuance. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f); see also
Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.
2
1990)(finding that a party seeking additional time for discovery
must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the
summary judgment motion would enable him to rebut the movant’s
showing of an absence of material fact).
Because Dillard’s procedural motions were properly
denied, the district court did not err in considering and granting
summary judgment for Albertson’s. Accordingly, the order granting
summary judgment in favor of Albertson’s is AFFIRMED.
3