[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-12413 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 23, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
Agency No. A079-497-439
STELLA ARENAS,
DANIELA RIZO,
EUGENIO RIZO,
Petitioners,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(March 23, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Stella Arenas seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)
final order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT).1 Arenas’s petition challenges whether substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s conclusion that she failed to demonstrate a nexus between her political
opinion and her alleged persecution by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC). After review, we deny the petition.2
We review the IJ’s factual determinations under the substantial-evidence
test. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2005). We must
“affirm the [IJ’s] decision if it is supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (citation omitted).
“We view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft,
386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, “[t]o conclude the
1
We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of CAT relief because Arenas failed to present
the issue to the BIA. See Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1249-51 (11th
Cir. 2006).
2
We review both the IJ and BIA’s decisions concerning nexus because the BIA adopted
the IJ’s reasoning with respect to the nexus determination. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d
1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001).
2
BIA’s decision should be reversed, we must find that the record not only supports
the conclusion, but compels it.” Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762, 765 (11th Cir.
2007) (internal quotations omitted).
An applicant is eligible for asylum if she “can show that the persecution
[was], at least in part, motivated by a protected ground.” Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation and emphasis
omitted). “The fact that the guerillas’ actions are motivated by the guerillas’
political belief is ‘irrelevant’ to the question of whether the alien was persecuted
on account of the alien’s political belief.” Rodriguez Morales v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
488 F.3d 884, 890 (11th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, an asylum applicant can prove
refugee status based on an imputed political opinion, whether correctly or
incorrectly attributed to the applicant. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289
(11th Cir. 2001).
In Rodiguez Morales, the petitioner, who was a dentist, was approached by
members of the FARC who demanded that the petitioner join the FARC and
provide dental services to their members. 488 F.3d at 887. The petitioner refused
despite numerous threats on the petitioner’s life. Id. On appeal, the petitioner
argued the FARC had a “political motive” in persecuting him because they
“wanted him to help in spreading their political views.” Id. at 889, 891. We stated
3
such “evidence of the FARC’s motive does not constitute evidence that the
guerrillas persecuted him ‘because of’ his political opinion,” and concluded the
record did not compel the conclusion that the petitioner established a nexus
between his political opinion and his persecution. Id. at 891 (citing INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992)). Accordingly, mere refusal to
cooperate or to provide services is insufficient to establish a nexus between
persecution and a political opinion. Id.
In this case, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding, adopted by the
BIA, that no nexus existed between Arenas’s political opinion and her alleged
persecution. Arenas presented no evidence that the FARC was aware of her
political opinions or that the FARC instructed her to stop any political activity.
Rather, Arenas testified the FARC “wanted [her] to do [her] same job, but for their
benefit,” which she refused to do. Because the record does not compel a finding
that the FARC targeted Arenas because of an imputed political opinion, the BIA
properly denied her application for asylum.3
PETITION DENIED.
3
Because Arenas failed to meet the burden to prove eligibility for asylum, the BIA
properly denied Arenas’s claim for withholding of removal. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1292-93
(noting that a petitioner’s inability to meet the standard of proof for asylum generally precludes
the petitioner from qualifying for withholding of removal).
4