[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 28, 2011
No. 09-11528 JOHN LEY
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00115-CR-1-TCB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JIMMY JOEL BEASLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 28, 2011)
ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jimmy Joel Beasley appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for
failing to register as a sex offender in Georgia under the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”). This Court affirmed his conviction based on
prior precedent. United States v. Beasley, 361 F. App’x 86 (11th Cir. 2010).
However, the Supreme Court granted Beasley’s petition for writ of certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded Beasley’s appeal for reconsideration in light
of Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). Beasley v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 79 (2010).
Beasley’s claim is that § 2250(a) is inapplicable to his failure to register in
Georgia when he moved there from Mississippi in January 2007 because he moved
to Georgia before an interim rule first rendered SORNA applicable to him.
Discussion
In passing SORNA, Congress sought to standardize the varied state sex-
offender registries and enhance their effectiveness. See Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2232.
Under, § 2250(a), one who “(1) is required to register under [SORNA,] (2) . . .
travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . [,] and (3) knowingly fails to register”
in the new state is eligible for up to ten years in prison for violating SORNA. Id.
In Carr, the Supreme Court clarified that these three elements must be met in
sequence. 130 S. Ct. at 2236. Thus, a defendant violates § 2250(a) only if he
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“becomes subject to SORNA’s registration requirements . . . [and] thereafter
travels and then fails to register.” Id. at 2236 (emphasis supplied). In so holding,
the Court rejected the argument that the first element is met when a defendant is
convicted of the underlying sex offense regardless of when SORNA became
applicable to him. Id. at 2235. Because the defendant in Carr traveled before
SORNA took effect, Carr could not have been “required to register” under the
plain meaning of § 2250(a).
In this case, Beasley was convicted of a state sex offense in Mississippi in
1985. Under Mississippi law, he maintained a current state registration through
2006. He then moved to Georgia in January 2007 and did not register in Georgia.
His move to Georgia took place between the July 2006 enactment of SORNA and
the February 2007 Attorney General opinion rendering SORNA applicable to him.
See United States v. Madera, 528 F.3d 852, 857-59 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
SORNA became applicable to offenders with convictions predating SORNA only
after the Attorney General’s February 2007 opinion).1 Although he had not
1
Congress enacted SORNA in July 2006 but did not specify whether it applied to
offenders whose convictions predated enactment. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Tit. I, Pub. L. 109–248, 120 Stat. 590 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901 et seq.).
However, the statute delegated to the Attorney General authority to “specify the applicability of
[SORNA] to sex offenders convicted before [July 27, 2006].” 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). On
February 28, 2007, the Attorney General issued an interim rule determining that SORNA’s
registration requirements would apply to those whose relevant convictions pre-dated SORNA.
See Applicability of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 8894,
8896 (Feb. 28 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 72.3).
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traveled since SORNA became applicable to him, Beasley was prosecuted under
§ 2250(a).
We relied on United States v. Dumont, 555 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009), to
reject Beasley’s claim. Carr overruled Dumont to the extent that Dumont suggests
that § 2250(a)’s elements do not have to be met in sequence. See Carr, 130 S. Ct.
at 2234 n.1; Dumont, 555 F.3d at 1292. Carr makes clear that the travel must
occur after the defendant becomes subject to SORNA.
In light of Carr, we reverse Beasley’s conviction because he was not subject
to SORNA’s registration requirements when he traveled to Georgia and did not
register. As the government concedes, Beasley did not meet the elements of
§ 2250(a) in sequence, as the statute requires under Carr. Accordingly, we vacate
Beasley’s conviction and remand for further proceedings.2
VACATED and REMANDED.
2
Having vacated Beasley’s conviction on statutory grounds, we need not and do not
reach his constitutional challenge to the statute.
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