FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 29 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STACEY D. CASE, No. 10-35307
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00083-JPH
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
James P. Hutton, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 9, 2011
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, FISHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
Stacey Case appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the
Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) determination that Case was not disabled. Case
argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because it did not contain the
requisite “specific, legitimate reasons” for rejecting her treating rheumatologist’s
opinions about her residual functional capacity (RFC). Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although the ALJ properly “set[] out a detailed and thorough
summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,” id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), we conclude that several of the ALJ’s reasons for
discounting the treating physician’s RFC were improper.
The ALJ erred by discounting the treating physician’s RFC because it was
completed “for obvious litigious purposes.” “The purpose for which medical
reports are obtained does not provide a legitimate basis for rejecting them” unless
there is additional evidence demonstrating impropriety, and the ALJ identified no
such evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 832 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 726 (9th Cir. 1998). Although this error,
standing alone, might not have required reversal, the ALJ also erred by assuming
that Case’s shoulder impairment should be disregarded because it was only
recently diagnosed. The ALJ must consider impairments even if they were
diagnosed after the alleged date of disability onset. See Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ erred by
rejecting limitations because they were based on a “recent” diagnosis of a “non-
severe” impairment).
The ALJ also noted that Case’s shoulder injury was treated conservatively.
Although we have held that conservative treatment of allegedly disabling
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conditions may undermine a finding of disability, see Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d
1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995), it is unclear whether or to what extent this factored into
the ALJ’s decision.
In any event, even if the conservative treatment of the shoulder impairment
suggests that this particular injury is not severe, “[t]he ALJ is required to consider
all of the limitations imposed by the claimant’s impairments, even those that are
not severe,” because in combination with other impairments, non-severe
limitations may contribute to rendering a claimant disabled. Carmickle, 533 F.3d
at 1164. Notably, in the first and second hypothetical RFCs that the ALJ asked the
vocational expert (VE) to consider, the ALJ included no limitations on the ability
to push and pull with the upper extremities, and the VE testified that jobs would be
available. By contrast, the VE testified that there would be no work available
under the third hypothetical, where the ALJ had introduced additional impairments,
including limitations to the upper extremities consistent with Dr. Butler’s opinions
about Case’s shoulder impairment. Although this conclusion may have been due
to limitations other than the shoulder impairment, because it is unclear on appeal
which limitations made the difference, we cannot conclude the error was harmless.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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