UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-7250
KELVIN DEWITT GOODE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
SARA ELIZABETH CHASE, Assistant United States
Attorney/Criminal Prosecuter; NEIL H. MACBRIDE, United
States Attorney; JOSE PREK-RUIZ, Government Civilian Police,
Ft. Lee Police Officer; UNKNOWN, Military Police NCO,
Sergeant First Class, MP Supervisor; UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, Richmond Division,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00193-REP)
Submitted: February 3, 2011 Decided: March 30, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; vacated in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Kelvin Dewitt Goode, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Dewitt Goode filed a Bivens * action while in
federal custody. In this appeal, he seeks review of the
district court’s order denying his motions to appoint counsel,
to transfer venue, and to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (2006). Because Goode has been released from custody,
his appeal of the PLRA ruling is moot, and we vacate the
judgment of the district court as it relates to Goode’s status
under the PLRA. We lack jurisdiction to consider the denial of
Goode’s motions and dismiss that portion of his appeal.
Goode challenges the district court’s finding that he
was not entitled to proceed without prepayment of fees under the
PLRA because he had three strikes within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Goode argues that each of the strikes
identified by the district court should not be counted as
strikes, that he satisfied § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger”
exception, and that the PLRA does not apply because he is no
longer a prisoner. The record reflects that Goode was in
federal custody when he filed his Bivens action, when the
district court denied his motion to proceed without prepayment
*
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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of fees, and when he noted this appeal. Goode was released
prior to the filing of his informal brief.
“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court
adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages
of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67
(1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). A case fails to meet
this requirement where “resolution of an issue could not
possibly have any practical effect on the outcome of the
matter.” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d
150, 161 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, Goode is no longer a prisoner
and therefore not subject to the requirements of the PLRA. See
DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
When a case is rendered moot on appeal, courts
typically vacate the moot aspects of the judgment “because doing
so ‘clears the path for future relitigation of the issues
between the parties,’ preserving ‘the rights of all parties,’
while prejudicing none ‘by a decision which . . . was only
preliminary.’” Alvarez v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 576, 581 (2009)
(quoting United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40
(1950)). Because Goode’s case is no longer pending before the
district court, the resolution of these issues would be without
effect, and therefore advisory. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s judgment as it relates to Goode’s status under
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the PLRA. In light of this disposition, we lack jurisdiction to
consider Goode’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his
motions to appoint counsel and transfer his case.
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal in part.
We vacate the district court’s judgment as to Goode’s status
under the PLRA. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART
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